scholarly journals The Optimal Carbon Emission Reduction and Prices with Cap and Trade Mechanism and Competition

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 2570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linghong Zhang ◽  
Hao Zhou ◽  
Yanyan Liu ◽  
Rui Lu
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Carbon Price ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Closed Form Solutions ◽  
Retail Prices

More and more countries employ the Carbon Cap and Trade mechanism (CCT-mechanism) to stimulate the manufacturer to produce much more eco-friendly products. In this paper, we study how the CCT-mechanism affects competitive manufacturers’ product design and pricing strategies. Assume that there are two competitive manufacturers; we give the optimal closed form solutions of the carbon emission reduction rates and retail prices in the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game model with CCT-mechanism, respectively. Additionally, we also discuss the impacts of CCT-mechanism, consumer environmental awareness (CEA), and the sensitivity of switchovers toward price on the optimal carbon emission reduction rates, retail prices, and manufacturers’ profits. We find that (i) when the carbon quota is not enough, there is a trade off between investing in producing much greener product and purchasing carbon quota; when the carbon price is not high, the manufacturer tends to purchase the carbon quota; and when the carbon price is much higher, the manufacturer is more willing to increase the environmental quality of the product; (ii) manufacturer’s size affects product’s emission reduction rate and manufacturer’s optimal profit; larger manufacturer tends to produce much greener product, but it does not mean that he could obtain much more money than the small manufacturer; and (iii) the decision sequence changes manufacturer’s strategies; the optimal emission reduction rate in Nash and Stackelberg game models are almost the same, but the differences of prices and profits between Nash and Stackelberg model’s are much bigger.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions for Two Risk-Averse Competitive Manufacturers under the Cap-and-Trade Policy and Uncertain Demand

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 1010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Jie Yang ◽  
Yang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government

With the increasingly serious problem of environmental pollution, reducing carbon emissions has become an urgent task for all countries. The cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has gained international recognition and has been adopted by several countries. In this paper, considering the uncertainty of market demand, we discuss the carbon emission reduction and price policies of two risk-averse competitive manufacturers under the C&T policy. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: simultaneous decision making and sequential decision making. Two models were constructed for these behaviors. The optimal decisions, carbon emission reduction rate, and price were obtained from these two models. Furthermore, in this paper the effects of some key parameters on the optimal decision are discussed, and some managerial insights are obtained. The results show that the lower the manufacturers’ risk aversion level is, the higher their carbon emission reduction rate and utilities. As the carbon quota increases, the manufacturers’ optimal carbon reduction rate and utilities increase. Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, it is more beneficial for the government to reduce the carbon quota and motivate manufacturers’ internal enthusiasm for emission reduction. The government can, through macro control of the market, make carbon trading prices increase appropriately and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions.

Stackelberg game based co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation

2021 ◽  
pp. 0958305X2110415
Author(s):  
Zongtang Xie ◽  
Hongxia Liu
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Trade Regulation ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Emission Quota ◽  
Interactive Algorithm

Coal-fired power industry is under enormous pressure to accomplish carbon emission reduction targets. This paper proposes a bi-level multi-objective model for co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation which considers a leader-follower Stackelberg game between the authority and the coal-fired power plants. The upper level regards social welfare maximization and allocation satisfaction maximization as its multiple objectives, while the lower level attempts to maximize the profits of each coal-fired power plant. The inherent uncertainty prompts the motivation for employing fuzzy set theory to characterize the uncertain parameters and determine their exact values. A case study from Shandong Province, China is provided to demonstrate the practicality and efficiency of the optimization model. [Formula: see text]-constraint method and interactive algorithm are used to solve the model, and furthermore the solutions associated with different free carbon emission quota levels and minimal allocation satisfactions have been generated to examine the influences. Based on the analysis and discussion, the methodology can meet the carbon emission reduction goals and transit to a lower-carbon power generation. It also assists the decision makers to develop desired quota allocation strategy in accordance with their attitudes and actual conditions.

scholarly journals The Impact of Power Structures on Supply Chain Enterprises with Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 246
Author(s):  
Fan Dandan ◽  
Xu Qi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
The Impact

This paper focuses on analyzing the impact of power structures of supply chain enterprises on their carbon emission reduction decisions. First, three game models (Nash, Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are constructed according to members’ different bargaining power, respectively. Then, the optimal carbon emission reduction decisions and profits of supply chain enterprises in different game models are solved and compared. The research results show that supply chain enterprises have the lowest carbon emission reduction rate in Nash game, and their corresponding profits are the least. As for Stackelberg game, the carbon emission reduction rate as a leader is greater than that as a follower, but the profit as a leader is less than that as a follower. The total profit of the entire supply chain system in Manufacturer Stackelberg model is always greater than that in Retailer Stackelberg model.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing Decisions for a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern under Carbon Quota Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 556
Author(s):  
Hao Zou ◽  
Jin Qin ◽  
Bo Dai
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Fairness Concern

This research investigates the effect of fairness concerns on a sustainable low-carbon supply chain (LCSC) with a carbon quota policy, in which a manufacturer is in charge of manufacturing low-carbon products and sells them to a retailer. The demand is affected by price and the carbon emission reduction rate. The optimal decisions of pricing and carbon emission reduction rate are analyzed under four decision models: (i) centralized decision, (ii) decentralized decision without fairness concern, (iii) decentralized decision with manufacturer’s fairness concern, (iv) decentralized decision with retailer’s fairness concern. The results indicate that the profits in the centralized LCSC are higher than those in the decentralized LCSC with fairness concern. If a manufacturer pays close attention to fairness, the fairness concern coefficient will reduce the carbon emission reduction rate and the profit of the LCSC and increase the wholesale price and the retail price of the product. If a retailer pays close attention to fairness, and the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is low, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer increases the total profit of the LCSC and decreases the carbon emission reduction rate and retail price of the product. Otherwise, if the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is great, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer would lead to a lower retail price compared with the retail price in the centralized decision and decrease the total profit of the LCSC.

scholarly journals Operational Lifecycle Carbon Value of Bus Electrification in Macau

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3784
Author(s):  
Xinkuo Xu ◽  
Liyan Han
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Fossil Fuel ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Carbon Price ◽  
Emission Coefficient ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Academic Fields ◽  
Fossil Fuel Consumption ◽  
New Perspective

The economic value of carbon emission reduction in the electrification of buses is of concern in practical and academic fields. The aim of this paper, which focuses on direct and indirect carbon emissions, is to study the economic value of the carbon emission reduction of bus electrification in an operational lifecycle carbon footprint, with the empirical data sourced from the bus electrification in Macau. First, it proposes the methodology to evaluate the operational lifecycle carbon value of bus electrification (OLCVBE). Second, it analyses the distinct impacts of internal determinants on OLCVBE. Third, it discusses the determinants’ characteristics for OLCVBE. The results indicate that (1) OLCVBE may be a carbon debt, but it is not a carbon asset in some situations; (2) OLCVBE is determined by the carbon emission coefficients of both electric power and fossil fuel, buses’ electric or fossil fuel consumption levels, buses’ terminations, carbon price and discounted rate; and (3) as a comparison, electric power’s embedded carbon emission coefficient has the biggest impact on OLCVBE, then carbon price and the electric consumption have the second or third biggest impacts, and the annual driving distance of buses has relative less impact. This paper provides a new perspective to study the economic and environmental effects of bus electrification.

scholarly journals Stability analysis of carbon emission reduction based on evolutionary game model

2020 ◽  
Vol 514 ◽  
pp. 032065
Author(s):  
Jialin Lin ◽  
Mengxin Lan ◽  
Xiaoxuan Wang ◽  
Ming Zeng ◽  
Chenjun Sun
Keyword(s):  
Stability Analysis ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction

scholarly journals Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Wenfei Lu ◽  
Qianwen Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
General Contractor ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Pure Competition

Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

Carbon emission reduction and pricing policies of a supply chain considering reciprocal preferences in cap-and-trade system

2017 ◽  
Vol 268 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 149-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangjie Xia ◽  
Tingting Guo ◽  
Juanjuan Qin ◽  
Xiaohang Yue ◽  
Ning Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Pricing Policies ◽  
Reciprocal Preferences

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing, Ordering, and Coordination for Prefabricated Building Supply Chain with Power Structure and Flexible Cap-and-Trade

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (19) ◽  
pp. 2426
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Menglin Liu ◽  
Lu Gan ◽  
Chong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Under the increasing pressure of global emission reduction, prefabricated buildings are becoming more and more popular. As prefabricated building manufacturers and assemblers are emerging in the market, how do they make decisions of pricing, ordering, and emission reduction? In this paper, game theory is used to make the decisions for the prefabricated building supply chain with flexible cap-and-trade and different power structures, i.e., using prefabricated building manufacturers as the leader, using the vertical Nash equilibrium, and using prefabricated building assemblers as the leader. The two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and to improve the supply chain performance. Moreover, we discuss the influence of different power structures and the two-part tariff contract on the optimal decisions and profits. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusions. This indicates that the supply chain leaders will gain a higher profit and that the power structure has a significant influence on the two-part tariff contract, which will result in an unfair distribution of profit. High carbon trading prices benefit carbon emission reduction. Consumer low-carbon awareness has a positive effect on carbon emission reduction and supply chain performance.

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