scholarly journals Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 5429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Liu ◽  
Bisheng Du ◽  
Wenwen Yuan ◽  
Guiping Li
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Basic Model ◽  
Innovation Barriers ◽  
The Impact

Increasing attention to sustainable development issues and recycling are forcing the recyclers to use different incentives to capture more market share. Recycling innovation input is one of the effective topics in reverse competitive chains. Because of the importance of this issue, firstly, a basic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system is discussed that includes an integrated manufacturer and a third-party collector. Then the impact of the integration with the innovation input into third-party product collectors is considered. Eventually, two models are constructed. The first model is a basic model that includes an integrated manufacturer and one third-party collector with innovation investment. The other model is the hybrid model that includes an integrated manufacturer and two third-party collectors with and without innovation input. Stackelberg game models are used to study the optimal pricing strategies for all three models and players’ attitudes toward different scenarios. Finally, numerical analysis is presented. Our findings are generated on the following three aspects. The collector’s recycling choice, recycling innovation input, and influence on recyclers and manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturer will always choose to recycle and prefers the hybrid recycling market, which depends on the rate of collection and the compensation from production-collecting. Moreover, the results reveal that the highest return rate of recyclers occurred under the hybrid model. However, the recyclers may not be able to invest the sustainable recycle innovation input under the exorbitant innovation barriers.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

Data-driven online service supply chain: a demand-side and supply-side perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Li ◽  
Shaojun Ma ◽  
Xu Han ◽  
Chundong Zheng ◽  
Di Wang
Keyword(s):  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Selection Algorithm ◽  
Feature Selection Algorithm ◽  
Online Service ◽  
Content Type

PurposeBig data analytics (BDA) and machine learning (ML) can be used to identify the influencing factors of online service supply chains (OSSCs) and can help in the formulation of optimal pricing strategies. This paper analyzes the influencing factors of customer online shopping from the demand-side perspective and formulates optimal pricing strategies from the supply-side perspective.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses ML and the Stackelberg game approach to discuss OSSC management. ML's feature selection algorithm is used to identify the important influencing factors of 12,330 customers' online shopping intention data using four different classifiers. The Stackelberg game approach is used to analyze the pricing strategies of integrators and suppliers in OSSCs.FindingsFirst, the feature selection algorithm can improve the efficiency of optimization in big data samples of OSSCs. Second, the level of visualization and the quality of information (page value) will affect the purchase behavior of customers. Finally, the relationship between the optimal pricing and the level of visualization is obtained through the Stackelberg game approach.Practical implicationsThis paper reveals the phenomenon of “mystery customers,” and the results of this paper can provide insights and suggestions regarding the decision-making behavior of integrators and suppliers in OSSC management.Originality/valueConsidering customer behavior intention, this paper uses a data-driven method to explore the influencing factors and pricing strategies of OSSCs. The empirical results enrich the existing OSSC management research, proposing that the level of product visualization and information quality plays an important role in OSSCs.

A Study on the Price Decisions of the Dual-Channel Composite Decision in B2C Mode

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 46-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haoxiong Yang ◽  
Wen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Marketing Channels ◽  
Online Marketing ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Online Retail ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies the subject of pricing decisions of online dual-channel based on hybrid decisions wherein a manufacturer introduces direct online marketing channels beyond the traditional online retail channels. The purpose is to study how to balance the interests of different online channels and maximize the overall efficiency of the channel. Having considered both online channels' satisfaction and the hidden costs of channel selection, by means of the demand function of both channels derived from a consumer utility and selection model, the author investigates the impacts of these two factors on the online dual-channel pricing decisions. This article also further analyzes the impact of changes in these two factors for manufacturers, retailers and channel' total revenue, with the purpose to provide decision-making reference for the enterprises' managers in the supply chain to develop optimal pricing strategies.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

Prenegotiation Development of Optimism in Intractable Conflict

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean G. Pruitt
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Case Material ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Intractable Conflict ◽  
The Third ◽  
A Chain ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Psychological Experiments

Except when there is substantial third-party pressure for settlement, participants in intractable conflict will only enter negotiation if they are motivated to end the conflict and optimistic about negotiation’s chances of success. The sources of such optimism are explored using case material from three intractable interethnic conflicts that were ultimately resolved by negotiation. In all three cases, optimism developed during prenegotiation communication between the parties. Also there were two main channels of communication, each channel providing credibility to the other and serving as a back-up if the other failed. In two of the cases the communication was face-to-face and friendly, but in the third it was distant and mediated by a chain of two intermediaries. A possible reason for this difference is that the parties were positively interdependent in the first two cases but not in the third. The paper concludes with a summary of three psychological experiments that demonstrate the impact of positive vs. negative interdependence.

scholarly journals The Impact of Price Comparison Service on Pricing Strategy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Xu ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Price Comparison ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Recently, price comparison service (PCS) websites are more and more popular due to its features in facilitating transparent price and promoting rational purchase decision. Motivated by the industrial practices, in this study, we examine the pricing strategies of retailers and supplier in a dual-channel supply chain influenced by the signals of PCS. We categorize and discuss three situations according to the signal availability of PCS, under which the optimal pricing strategies are derived. Finally, we conduct a numerical study and find that in fact the retailers and supplier are all more willing to avoid the existence of PCS with the objective of profit maximization. When both of retailers are affected by the PCS, the supplier is more willing to reduce the availability of price information. Important managerial insights are discussed.

scholarly journals Optimal pricing strategies based on time delay in multi-service networks with priority

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Fude ◽  
Jing Yuanwei ◽  
Zhou Jianhua ◽  
Khosrow Sohraby ◽  
Georgi Dimirovski
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Time Delay ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Service Networks ◽  
Incentive Strategy ◽  
Service Priority

The problem of pricing equilibrium of multi-service priority-based net- work is studied by using incentive strategy in Stackelberg game theory. First some concepts in game theory were introduced. Then, the existing results on two-user two-level Nash problem was introduced briefly. A new one-leader two-user two-level incentive Stackblberg strategy is presented by employing the time delay in the strategy.

scholarly journals Research on Pricing and Service Level Strategies of Dual Channel Reverse Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference in Multi-Regional Situations

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (23) ◽  
pp. 9143
Author(s):  
Yao Kang ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Di Wu
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Transfer Prices ◽  
High Level

Facing the increasingly serious waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling problem, recycling enterprises actively introduce online recycling channels, build dual channel reverse supply chains (DRSC), and use high-level recycling price and service levels to enhance consumers’ recycling enthusiasm and recycling amount. Nevertheless, in China, where the imbalance of regional development is widespread, the recycling center, third-party recycler (TPR), and third-party platform (TPP) are faced with the choices of pricing and service level when facing multi-regional consumers. This paper mainly answers the following questions: (1) When the recycling center and TPP introduce online recycling channels in multi-regional situations, how should they set online recycling price, transfer price, and service level? (2) When consumer preference for online channels changes in a certain region, how should recycling enterprises adjust their optimal pricing and service level decisions for different regions to maximize their own profits? How do the profits of recycling enterprises change? In order to solve the above problems, in this paper, we propose three pricing and service level decision models for the recycling center with online channels, namely, keeping prices unchanged, unifying all prices, and maximizing its own profits. By using the Stackelberg game to solve the model, we get the optimal pricing, service level decisions, as well as the maximum profits of the recycling center, TPP, and TPR when consumer preference changes. By analyzing the results of the model, we find that the change of consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will affect the decision and profits of multi-regional recycling enterprises. Specifically, consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will not only lead to an increase in the profits of the recycling center and TPP and a decrease in the profit of local TPRs, but also an increase in the profit of TPRs in other regions. In addition, at the beginning of introducing online channels, the recycling center can adopt two strategies to avoid conflicts among channels: keeping offline transfer prices unchanged and unifying all transfer prices, but the former promotes its economic profits more significantly.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

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