scholarly journals Comparatively Analyzing the Impact of Government Subsidy and Carbon Tax Policy on Authorized Remanufacturing

Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao ◽  
Hao Wang

Authorized remanufacturing is an important means to achieve green manufacturing and carbon neutrality. In this study, a game theory model between a manufacturer and a remanufacturer was constructed to analyze the impact of government subsidies and carbon tax policies on authorized remanufacturing. Based on the game theory model, the effects of two government policies on the optimal solution, namely, the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the waste product recovery rate, were compared and analyzed. This analysis could provide a reference for the government to improve and formulate relevant remanufacturing policies. The main results are as follows: government subsidy policies may increase the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the rates of waste product recovery; government carbon tax policies may not affect the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization, and increase the rates of waste product recovery; the government subsidy policy may not affect the unit retail price of new products, and reduces the unit retail price of remanufactured products; the government subsidy and carbon tax policies may reduce sales of new products and increase sales of remanufactured products; the government subsidies may increase the revenue of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the remanufacturer; and the government carbon tax policies may increase the revenue of the remanufacturer. However, government carbon tax policies increase the revenue of the OEM only when the new product carbon tax amount is higher than a certain threshold. The impact of the two policies on the environment is related to the ratio of the two products’ impact on the environment, i.e., the quota ratio between the unit government carbon tax of the new product and the unit government subsidy of the remanufactured product. Finally, the consumer surplus is maximized when the government adopts the subsidy policy and lowest when the government adopts the carbon tax policy.

Author(s):  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Chien-Chiang Lee ◽  
Yongqi Wu

Conducting product recovery and remanufacturing not only help manufacturers decrease the unit cost of production, but also benefit the environment. However, most manufacturers are hampered by the huge initial investment of related operations. In order to alleviate the manufacturers’ financial pressure of product recovery and remanufacturing, some governments implement the production subsidy (subsidy [Formula: see text]) and recycling subsidy (subsidy [Formula: see text]). Meanwhile, retailers can provide the revenue-sharing contract (contract [Formula: see text]) and cost-sharing contract (contract [Formula: see text]). Hence, this paper mainly studies the incentive designs of the government and retailer, and the effects of these incentives on the closed-loop supply chain. We first establish a Stackelberg game model consisting of a government, a manufacturer and a retailer, then investigate and compare the optimal decisions and payoffs of each member under each incentive combination of the government and retailer. Our results first show that, on the other hand, the government’s subsidy type cannot affect the retailer’s design of contract [Formula: see text], but subsidy [Formula: see text] can induce the retailer to share a higher rate of sale revenue, comparing to subsidy [Formula: see text]. On the other hand, the retailer’s contract [Formula: see text] could induce the government to increase subsidy rate in most cases, comparing to contract [Formula: see text]. Second, the subsidy [Formula: see text] can always lead to a higher collection rate, lower wholesale and retail prices, and higher payoffs for the government, manufacturer and retailer, comparing to subsidy [Formula: see text]. Besides, under subsidy [Formula: see text], contract [Formula: see text] always leads to a higher collection rate, lower wholesale and retail prices, and higher payoffs for the government, manufacturer and retailer, comparing to contract [Formula: see text]. However, under subsidy [Formula: see text], contract [Formula: see text] can lead to a higher collection rate, a lower wholesale price, and higher payoffs for the manufacturer and retailer, comparing to contract [Formula: see text] only when the manufacturer’s recovery efficiency is high. Moreover, the retail price is always higher and the government payoffs is always lower under contract [Formula: see text]. Third, the government prefers to implement the subsidy [Formula: see text] and then which contract is chosen by the retailer depends on the collection efficiency of the manufacturer. Therefore, subsidy [Formula: see text] combining with contract [Formula: see text] or [Formula: see text] is the equilibrium incentive combination.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 2216
Author(s):  
Aswin Padyanoor

The economy has changed dramatically since the COVID-19 outbreak began. The impact that occurred in Indonesia was almost on all fronts, and the Government continued to issue policies due to this impact. Tax policies that are designed to provide incentives for affected taxpayers are expected to increase economic growth. This research was conducted to map 14 Tax Policies in three Regulations issued by the Government based on the objective of reducing the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The study used a qualitative method with a descriptive approach obtained. Then perform data analysis using three stages of analysis techniques in the form of data collection, data reduction, and concluding. The results of the study state that Indonesia has issued a policy to help taxpayers who are affected by COVID-19. Benefits for taxpayers, namely a reduction in rates to an exemption from income tax, the goal is that the economy which has stopped moving up becomes stable. Keywords: Tax Incentives; Tax Policy; Taxpayers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 636
Author(s):  
Ruey-Chyn Tsaur

The information technology industry plays an important role in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, and its total notebook production ranks top in the world. The rapid development of IT products has caused many of these products to be discarded, although most of them can be recycled, remanufactured, and reused. In order to reduce the manufacture of new products and the associated carbon emissions, this study aims to discover the optimal subsidy policy for remanufactured notebooks in the green market, focusing on the pricing of remanufactured notebooks and maximizing manufacturers’ profits while retaining optimal social welfare for consumers. We use a two-stage game theory model to identify the optimal government subsidy policies for a duopoly environment. The results are based on the subsidy ratio between consumer and manufacturers, as this factor is important to the entire green supply chain; manufacturers can still reap optimal profits by only producing new or remanufactured products, and the government should be aware of the likelihood of manufacturers colluding and of the need to intervene when necessary to avoid sacrificing social welfare.


2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 195
Author(s):  
Doug Young

The Clean Energy Act (CEA) and its related legislation received royal assent on 18 November 2011, ushering in a new era for the Australian industry, and for those who deal with it. Building on the 2007 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme (NGERS), which mandates the measurement and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions and electricity production and consumption, the CEA imposes direct obligations on: individual industrial operations (facilities) that emit more than 25,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide, or its other equivalent greenhouse gases, from particular sources, in a year; suppliers of natural gas (at the point of last supply before the gas is burnt or otherwise used), for the emissions that will be generated when the gas is burnt; and, operators of land-fill facilities, such as local councils. While the primary emissions targeted by the scheme are produced by burning fossil fuels, they also include emissions such as the methane released when coal is mined. The obligations include the option of surrendering carbon units for each tonne of emissions, however, if this optional step is not performed, the mandatory payment of a tax, which far exceeds the cost of a unit, is enforced. The Australian Government will sell carbon units at a fixed price for the first three years, starting at $23, after which units will be auctioned for between $15 and the expected international unit price, plus $20. The supply of domestic units will be unlimited for the three fixed price years, but will be subject to a reducing cap in following years, consistent with the Government policy of reducing Australia’s emissions. The Government has created a monopoly for the supply of units for the first three years by prohibiting the use of overseas-sourced carbon units, and by only allowing 5% of the unit surrender requirements to be comprised of Australian generated carbon credits. Thereafter, for the first five of the flexible-charge years, only half the units can be sourced from overseas, with any apparent saving likely to be offset by the various taxes and charges applicable to the use of those units. Certain fuels will also be separately taxed. Entities, however, which acquire, manufacture or import fuels and would otherwise be entitled to a fuel tax credit, may be able to assume direct liability thus enabling them to acquire or manufacture fuel, free of the carbon tax component. Where the imposts will cause competitive disadvantage to industries that compete with entities from other countries that do not have similar imposts, some assistance is provided in the form of allocated units provided at no charge. Assistance is also available to coal-fired electricity generators, producers of liquefied natural gas, operators of gassy coal mines, and the steel industry (not discussed in this paper). This paper also explains, in detail, how liability is created, how to determine which entities are liable, the means of assigning liability to other entities, and the assistance available to various industries to help deal with the financial impact of the scheme on their operations. It also outlines the key concepts that underpin the scheme.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Feng ◽  
Weidong Meng ◽  
Bo Huang

AbstractDue to the financing constraint that faced by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), SMEs are more cautious in innovation investments, and thus more eager to gain external financial support. This paper discusses the impact of SMEs’ R&D investment on government subsidy under the constraint of hidden information. It adopts a modified endogenous switching regression model to solve the endogenous problems. The results show that SME’s initiative to signal its underlying innovative capacity has an important impact on Chinese government’s subsidy feedback. SMEs that send high-type signals have gained more subsidies. And when SMEs are with different types of innovation signals, they would have different influence mechanisms on subsidy feedback. This study concludes that the policymakers should make more use of its belief and give effective feedbacks to the entrepreneurs.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Junda Yang ◽  
Yun Xia ◽  
Liu Yang ◽  
Zhongtao Zhang

Enterprise technological innovation is the backbone of the transformation of economic development mode in China, the optimization of economic structure, and the realization of national innovative development strategy. In order to promote the transformation and upgrading of the economic structure and encourage the the development of technological innovation of enterprises, a series of fiscal and tax policies which encourage technological innovation are introduced in China. Although the fiscal and tax incentives are generally adopted by the governments of the world, the research conclusions of the academia on the implementation effect of fiscal and tax policies are not unified. For this reason, in this paper, based on the data of listed companies on the Growth Enterprise Market from 2011 to 2017, the STATA 14.0-version software is used to analyze the sample data, and the relationship between the current fiscal policies and technological innovation is explored. The study results show that the fiscal and tax incentives positively affect the technological innovation of enterprises, which provides an important theoretical basis for the government to further improve fiscal and tax policies. Finally, based on the previous research contents, the corresponding conclusions are summarized, and relevant suggestions for improving the fiscal and tax incentive policies are proposed.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e0261896
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Xian Qi

Prefabricated construction has attracted worldwide concern and promotion due to its environmental friendliness, high quality, and high efficiency. In China, the application of prefabricated construction still lags due to its high cost. To improve prefabricated construction development, the Chinese government and provinces have launched subsidy policies for different objects that offer subsidies to the assembler, the manufacturer, or consumers. Subsidy policies for different subsidy objects have different impacts on the manufacturer wholesale price and assembler retail price and assembly rate and make their decisions more complicated. Therefore, this study uses game theory and builds three models to analyze the effects of government subsidies on manufacturer pricing, assembler pricing, assembly rate decisions, and profit. We find that government subsidy policies can bring more profit to prefabricated construction enterprises, reduce their costs, and benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we also find that when the government subsidizes enterprises more, it is better to subsidize the assembler, because it is good for all three parties. First, consumers can obtain a lower retail price. Second, enterprises can obtain more profits. Finally, for the government, this approach can increase the demand for prefabricated construction and increase the assembly rate, which is conducive to the promotion of prefabricated construction. When the government subsidizes customers more, it is better for the assembler and the manufacturer to subsidize customers, because they can obtain more profits. It is better for the government and customers to subsidize the assembler or the manufacture, because consumers can get the lower retail price. Although the assembly rate and enterprises’ profits are not optimal, they have also been improved. In addition, when the government directly subsidizes enterprises, the enterprises will actively cooperate with the subsidy policy and are more willing to adopt prefabricated construction. This approach will benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Haoran Li ◽  
Wei Peng

Carbon emission has negative externalities, which will cause severe natural and social problems. In recent years, more and more attention has been paid to carbon emission reduction issue both in academic and application fields. This paper aims to explore the impact of punitive carbon tax and incentive carbon emission reduction subsidy on economy and environment through the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. The results show that both carbon tax and carbon emission reduction subsidy policies can help to reduce carbon emissions and to improve environment quality. In addition, carbon emission reduction subsidy has a positive impact on economy, while carbon tax has the opposite impact. It follows that the incentive carbon emission reduction policy is more conducive to the coordinated development of economy and environment. This research can be a guideline for the government to formulate carbon emission abatement policies from the perspective of coordinated development.


2013 ◽  
Vol 724-725 ◽  
pp. 283-287
Author(s):  
Li Cao ◽  
Sui Jiang Lei

As a renewable energy, the development of bio-fuel ethanol has caught the attention of the whole world. Consensus has been reached that subsidy policy should be formulated to promote the industrial development. Subsidy policy, however, is faced with such problems as lack of scientificity and low efficiency, making it important to design the mechanism of scientific subsidy policy. To provide scientific basis for the government in this respect, this paper will deal with the establishment of random optimization theory model of multi-objective bio-fuel subsidy in connection with energy gap, food safety as well as survival and development of non-food bio-fuel ethanol enterprises.


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