scholarly journals Pricing and assembly rate decisions for a prefabricated construction supply chain under subsidy policies

PLoS ONE ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e0261896
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Xian Qi
Keyword(s):  
High Efficiency ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Environmental Friendliness ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
The Government ◽  
Assembly Rate

Prefabricated construction has attracted worldwide concern and promotion due to its environmental friendliness, high quality, and high efficiency. In China, the application of prefabricated construction still lags due to its high cost. To improve prefabricated construction development, the Chinese government and provinces have launched subsidy policies for different objects that offer subsidies to the assembler, the manufacturer, or consumers. Subsidy policies for different subsidy objects have different impacts on the manufacturer wholesale price and assembler retail price and assembly rate and make their decisions more complicated. Therefore, this study uses game theory and builds three models to analyze the effects of government subsidies on manufacturer pricing, assembler pricing, assembly rate decisions, and profit. We find that government subsidy policies can bring more profit to prefabricated construction enterprises, reduce their costs, and benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we also find that when the government subsidizes enterprises more, it is better to subsidize the assembler, because it is good for all three parties. First, consumers can obtain a lower retail price. Second, enterprises can obtain more profits. Finally, for the government, this approach can increase the demand for prefabricated construction and increase the assembly rate, which is conducive to the promotion of prefabricated construction. When the government subsidizes customers more, it is better for the assembler and the manufacturer to subsidize customers, because they can obtain more profits. It is better for the government and customers to subsidize the assembler or the manufacture, because consumers can get the lower retail price. Although the assembly rate and enterprises’ profits are not optimal, they have also been improved. In addition, when the government directly subsidizes enterprises, the enterprises will actively cooperate with the subsidy policy and are more willing to adopt prefabricated construction. This approach will benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction.

scholarly journals Knowing and Doing: The Perception of Subsidy Policy and Farmland Transfer

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yali Zhang ◽  
Yihan Wang ◽  
Yunli Bai
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Household Survey ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Agricultural Labor ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Agricultural Income ◽  
The Government ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Moderate Scale

Farmland transfer is conducive to the rational allocation of farmland resources and scaling of agricultural production in China. The Chinese government launched a pilot program to subsidize moderate-scale farmland management in 2016, yet the perception of the program and its effects are rarely empirically tested using micro-level data. Using data on 523 households extracted from a rural household survey, the Probit and Tobit model results determined a significant positive impact of the perception of moderate-scale subsidies on both farmland transfer behavior and farmland transfer area. If the household knows about the moderate-scale subsidy policy, then it is 19.2% more likely to have moderate-scale land endowment, and the household has 17.626 ha more inflow land than that who do not know the policy. The results show that only 5% of the households know the moderate-scale subsidy policy, thus hindering the process of farmland transfer. Additionally, high levels of educational attainment and non-agricultural income promote farmers’ decisions to transfer farmland and to expand farmland areas for moderate-scale households. However, age, household size, the family dependency ratio, and non-agricultural labor are obstacles to farmland transfer. The findings imply that the government should adopt a more effective policy transmission mechanism to increase the proportion of knowing the subsidy policy for both small-scale and moderate-scale households.

scholarly journals Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selling Effort

Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Subsidies on the Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Carbon Emission Reduction Level

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (14) ◽  
pp. 7603
Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government’s choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

scholarly journals Selection of Recycling Channels and Product Eco-Design with Take-Back Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 8961
Author(s):  
Shiqi Xu ◽  
Hui Liu ◽  
Guangye Xu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Take Back ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Selection Of

The influence of government policies on the selection of recycling channels has been widely discussed, but there are few studies from the perspective of product Eco-design. This paper examines the recycling channel options for a manufacturer applying Eco-design under government environmental regulation. We consider a system that includes a retailer, a manufacturer, and a government, and develop a three-stage Stackelberg game model. The government firstly decides whether to impose environmental regulations. Next, the manufacturer decides whether to recycle by himself or delegate the recycling task to the retailer, deciding both the wholesale price of the product and the collected price (recycled by the manufacturer) or the recycling compensation to the retailer (recycled by the retailer), and the retailer decides the retail price of new products and the collection price (recycled by the retailer). Our study finds that for the regulator, the optimal policy is not to implement environmental regulation because the manufacturer has implemented the product Eco-design. For the manufacturer, the choice of recycling channel depends on the recycling cost of the manufacturer and the retailer. When the manufacturer’s recycling cost is below a certain threshold, he will prefer to recycle the waste products by himself, and when the cost increases beyond this threshold, the manufacturer will transfer the recycling task to the retailer.

scholarly journals Socioeconomic and Climatic Impacts of Photovoltaic Systems Operating High-Efficiency Irrigation Systems: A Case Study of the Government Subsidy Scheme for Climate-Smart Agriculture in Punjab, Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Faakhar Raza ◽  
Muhammad Tamoor ◽  
Sajjad Miran
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Dioxide Emissions ◽  
High Efficiency ◽  
Sprinkler Irrigation ◽  
Photovoltaic Systems ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Irrigation Systems ◽  
Pv Systems ◽  
Subsidy Scheme ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

This paper presents the results of a field study conducted in the Punjab, Pakistan, to evaluate the socio-economic and climatic impact of Photovoltaic (PV) systems installed under government subsidy scheme for operating high efficiency irrigation systems (HEIS) i.e., drip and sprinkler irrigation systems. Agriculture provides livelihood to almost half of the rural population and recent energy crisis in the country has adversely affected the rural communities. Farmer’s dependence on fossil fuels has significantly increased for operating irrigation systems which has resulted in high costs of agriculture production. Government of Punjab has launched a subsidy scheme to install PV systems for operating efficient drip and sprinkler irrigation systems on cost sharing basis. Photovoltaic systems having a capacity of 17.30 megawatt, were installed to operate high efficiency irrigation systems at around twenty thousand acres under this subsidy project, that has resulted in an annual saving of 0.0066 billion liters of diesel. The average capacity of installed PV systems was 9.0 kilowatt, which matched the 7.50 horse power of installed water pumps. On average, the cost of a PV system per acre was calculated to be 0.000142 billion PKR, while the cost per kWp was calculated to be 0.000149 billion PKR. The research results show that the installation of photovoltaic systems has increased the adoption rate of high-efficiency irrigation systems, reduced carbon dioxide emissions, and reduced the high operating costs associated with diesel powered pump systems. The primary data about on-farm agriculture and irrigation practices used in this study were collected through in-depth farmer surveys, while the secondary data information came from reports, official documents and statistics issued by the government.

The Chinese system of government relief supplies: from the perspective of knowledge management

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangyuan Xing ◽  
Yi Li ◽  
Haixu Bao ◽  
Guoxing Zhang ◽  
Zhenguo Li
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Knowledge Acquisition ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Crisis ◽  
Capital Constraints ◽  
Level Of Knowledge ◽  
The Government

Purpose Public crisis often generates new knowledge that should be incorporated into a government’s macro-control to ensure the relief supply. From the perspective of public crisis knowledge management, the Chinese system of Government relief supplies can be considered as a special case of the knowledge system. This paper aims to investigate the supply and production mechanism of relief goods and explore the advantages of the Chinese system when a sudden public crisis occurs. Design/methodology/approach Under the Chinese system, the authors construct a relief supply chain model consisting of the Chinese Government, one manufacturer and one supplier, where the supplier has no capital constraints. Given the demand for relief goods, the government purchases from the manufacturer with a guide price. Then, the manufacturer decides on its order quantity and offers a wholesale price to the supplier. The supplier has a random capacity and decides on the level of knowledge acquisition to improve its capacity. Findings The authors first obtain the analytical solution for the manufacturer to motivate a high level of knowledge acquisition from the supplier. Specifically, the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity is equal to the demand and the optimal wholesale price has a cost-plus form that reimburses the supplier for its production cost and knowledge-acquisition cost. Next, the authors derive the optimal guide price for the government, which should be set to subsidize the manufacturer with a proportion of the sourcing cost. Finally, the authors compare the Chinese system with the market mechanism where the supplier has capital constraints and confirm that the Chinese system is more beneficial to both the manufacturer and the government. Originality/value Quantitative research on the Chinese system of Government relief supplies is difficult to be conducted. This paper provides feasible and practical methods to quantify the benefits of the Chinese system. The results reveal that the Chinese system is an effective mechanism of public crisis knowledge management, which can be helpful to the government’s policy-making in practice.

Pricing decisions and subsidy preference of government with traditional and green products

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-482
Author(s):  
Xueping Zhen ◽  
Shuangshuang Xu ◽  
Dan Shi ◽  
Fangjun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Future Research ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
Heterogeneous Consumers ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This study aims to explore the government’s subsidy preference and pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously under different government subsidy policies. Design/methodology/approach The authors establish a model consisting of a government, a set of heterogeneous consumers and a manufacturer. Three government subsidy policies are investigated without government subsidy (NS), government subsidy to consumer (CS) and government subsidy to the manufacturer (MS). Findings The results show that the government subsidy can increase both the green product’s demand and the manufacturer’s profit. The subsidy level and government’s utility under the CS policy are equal to those under the MS policy. Furthermore, if the government’s subsidy level is exogenous, there exists a Pareto improvement region when social welfare for unit greenness level is high. That is, if the government’s subsidy level under the CS policy is higher than that under the MS policy, both government and manufacturer prefer the CS policy; otherwise, they prefer the MS policy. Research limitations/implications This paper considers the market where there is a monopoly green manufacturer and a government that only provides subsidy policy. In fact, competition from traditional manufacturers and carbon taxes are also worth exploring in future research. Practical implications This study provides some suggestions for government subsidy and provides guidance for the manufacturer’s pricing decisions under different government subsidy policies. Originality/value This paper is the first to compare government subsidy to consumer with a government subsidy to the manufacturer and investigate the pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously by considering an endogenous subsidy level of government.

scholarly journals The Government Subsidy Strategy Choice for Firm’s R&D: Input Subsidy or Product Subsidy?

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Zhiying Liu ◽  
Qinqin Li
Keyword(s):  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Output Quality ◽  
The Government ◽  
Production Output

To encourage enterprises to conduct technology innovation, the government needs to formulate appropriate subsidies policy. This paper compares two R&D subsidy policies in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain, in which the manufacturer conducts R&D activity for quality improvement. By means of game theory, we investigate the optimal decisions of the players under the two R&D subsidy policies, that is, input subsidy policy and product subsidy policy. Finally, we compare the profits and welfare to explore the better R&D subsidy policy and provide decision support for government to formulate subsidy policy. The results show that under input subsidy policy the optimal production output, quality improvement, profits, government subsidies, and social welfare are all lower than those of product subsidy policy. Therefore, the government should use product subsidy strategy to encourage enterprise R&D activities.

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