scholarly journals A Minimal Theory of Creative Ability

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Claire Stevenson ◽  
Matthijs Baas ◽  
Han van der Maas
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Real World ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Creative Ability ◽  
Minimal Theory ◽  
Technical Issues

Despite decades of extensive research on creativity, the field still combats psychometric problems when measuring individual differences in creative ability and people’s potential to achieve real-world outcomes that are both original and useful. We think these seemingly technical issues have a conceptual origin. We therefore propose a minimal theory of creative ability (MTCA) to create a consistent conceptual theory to guide investigations of individual differences in creative ability. Building on robust theories and findings in creativity and individual differences research, our theory argues that creative ability, at a minimum, must include two facets: intelligence and expertise. So, the MTCA simply claims that whenever we do something creative, we use most of our cognitive abilities combined with relevant expertise to be creative. MTCA has important implications for creativity theory, measurement, and practice. However, the MTCA isn’t necessarily true; it is a minimal theory. We discuss and reject several objections to the MTCA.

A Minimal Theory of Creative Ability

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Stevenson ◽  
Matthijs Baas ◽  
Han van der Maas
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Creative Ability ◽  
Minimal Theory ◽  
Technical Issues

Despite decades of extensive research on creativity, the field still combats psychometric problems when measuring individual differences in creative ability. We think these seemingly technical issues have a conceptual origin. We therefore propose a minimal theory of creative ability (MTCA) to create a consistent conceptual theory to guide investigations of individual differences in creative ability. Our theory argues that creative ability, at a minimum, must include two facets: intelligence and expertise. So, the MTCA simply claims that whenever we do something creative, we use most of our cognitive abilities combined with relevant expertise to be creative. MTCA has important implications for creativity theory, measurement, and practice. But, the MTCA isn’t necessarily true, it is a minimal theory. We discuss and reject several objections to the MTCA and conclude with a falsification challenge.

scholarly journals When Fair Is Not Equal

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 847-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Zhao ◽  
Eamonn Ferguson ◽  
Luke D. Smillie
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Big Five ◽  
Real World ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Prosocial Behaviors ◽  
Contextual Cues ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
The Real

Growing evidence has highlighted the importance of social norms in promoting prosocial behaviors in economic games. Specifically, individual differences in norm adherence—captured by the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness—have been found to predict fair allocations of wealth to one’s partner in the dictator game. Yet, most studies have used neutrally framed paradigms, where players may default to norms of equality in the absence of contextual cues. In this study ( N = 707), we examined prosocial personality traits and dictator allocations under salient real-world norms of equity and need. Extending on the previous research, we found that—in addition to politeness—the compassion aspect of agreeableness predicted greater allocations of wealth when they were embedded in real-world norms. These results represent an important step in understanding the real-world implications of laboratory-based research, demonstrating the importance of both normative context and prosocial traits.

Types of deception revealed by individual differences in cognitive abilities

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 554-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charity J. Morgan ◽  
Julia B. LeSage ◽  
Stephen M. Kosslyn
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Abilities

scholarly journals Changing our thinking about changing their thinking in older adulthood

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (9) ◽  
pp. 1405-1407
Author(s):  
Viviana M. Wuthrich
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Flexibility ◽  
Cognitive Deficits ◽  
Processing Speed ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Anxiety And Depression ◽  
Cognitive Changes ◽  
Older Adulthood ◽  
New Learning

It is well-established that as people age, deterioration in cognitive abilities including processing speed, memory, and cognitive flexibility occurs, although vast individual differences occur in the rate and consequences of this decline (Christensen, 2001). Anxiety and depression in late life are also associated with specific cognitive deficits in memory and executive functioning that may impact on new learning (Yochim et al., 2013). Therefore, it is possible that cognitive changes make it more difficult for older adults to learn how to change their thinking particularly in the context of psychological therapy.

scholarly journals Experimentally-induced and real-world acute anxiety have no effect on goal-directed behaviour

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
CM Gillan ◽  
MM Vaghi ◽  
FH Hezemans ◽  
Grothe S van Ghesel ◽  
J Dafflon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Anxiety Disorders ◽  
Healthy Volunteers ◽  
Real World ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Stressful Events ◽  
Panic Attacks ◽  
Healthy Individuals ◽  
Correlational Design ◽  
Acute Anxiety

AbstractCompulsivity is associated with failures in goal-directed control, an important cognitive faculty that protects against developing habits. But might this effect be explained by co-occurring anxiety? Previous studies have found goal-directed deficits in other anxiety disorders, and to some extent when healthy individuals are stressed, suggesting this is plausible. We carried out a causal test of this hypothesis in two experiments (between-subject N=88; within-subject N=50) that used the inhalation of hypercapnic gas (7.5% CO2) to induce an acute state of anxiety in healthy volunteers. In both experiments, we successfully induced anxiety, assessed physiologically and psychologically, but this did not affect goal-directed performance. In a third experiment (N=1413), we used a correlational design to test if real-life anxiety-provoking events (panic attacks, stressful events) impair goal-directed control. While small effects were observed, none survived controlling for individual differences in compulsivity. These data suggest that anxiety has no meaningful impact on goal-directed control.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document