scholarly journals Packet Forwarding Strategies in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yuanjie Li ◽  
Xiaojun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Packet Forwarding ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Average Probability ◽  
Save Energy ◽  
Stable Points

In multiagent systems (MASs), agents need to forward packets to each other to accomplish a target task. In this paper, we study packet forwarding among agents using evolutionary game theory under the mechanisms of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). Packet forwarding among agents plays a key role to stabilize the whole MAS. We study the transfer probability of packet forwarding of agents at the idle state or the busy state and computer the probability of the packet forwarding for a MAS. When agents make their decisions to select Forward or No-Forward strategy, a packet forwarding evolutionary game model is built to reflect the utilities of different packet forwarding strategies. Two incentive mechanisms are introduced into the game model. One is to motivate agents to strengthen cooperation; the other is to encourage agents to select the No-Forward strategy to save energy while they are in the busy state. The parameter value that encourages an agent to select the No-Forward strategy is inversely proportional to the average probability of the packet forwarding. The replicator dynamics of agent packet forwarding strategy evolution are given. We propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) can be attained. The results of simulation experiments verify the correctness of the proposed theorems and the effects of the two incentive mechanisms and the probability of packet forwarding, which assures the robustness of evolutionary stable points among agents in MASs.

scholarly journals Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 805
Author(s):  
Leyi Shi ◽  
Xiran Wang ◽  
Huiwen Hou
Keyword(s):  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Active Defense ◽  
Defense Technology ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950005
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Filipe Martins ◽  
Jorge Oviedo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
Two Populations ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this paper, we study the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) for symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. The main properties of these games and strategies are analyzed and several examples are provided. We relate the concept of ESS with previous literature and provide a proof of finiteness of ESS in the context of symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. We show that unlike the case of [Formula: see text], when there are more than two populations an ESS does not have a uniform invasion barrier, or equivalently, it is not equivalent to the strategy performing better against all strategies in a neighborhood. We also construct the extended replicator dynamics for these games and we study an application to a model of strategic planning of investment.

scholarly journals Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunpeng Yang ◽  
Weixin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials

During China’s air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents’ behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Model of Stock Price Synchronicity from Investor Behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yue Dong ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Jinnan Pan ◽  
Tingqiang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
The Cost

Institutional and individual investors are the two important players in the stock market. Together, they determine the price of the stock market. In this paper, an evolutionary game model that contains the two groups of players is proposed to analyze the stock price synchronicity considering the impacts of investors’ decisions on stock investment. Factors affecting investors’ decisions include the potential revenue or loss, the probability of gain or loss, and the cost of corresponding behavior. The proposed game model is analyzed by replicator dynamics equations and simulation of the evolutionary equilibrium strategy under different circumstances. The analysis shows that the operating cost of institutional investors, the cost of information collection before trading, and the expected loss that may be punished by regulators are the key factors that affect the evolutionary game system between institutional investors and individual investors. In addition, reducing the speculation in the market and increasing the information access of investors through the serious operation mode of institutional investors and the strengthening of the market information disclosure mechanism are beneficial to alleviate price synchronicity in stock market.

scholarly journals Trust Dynamics in WSNs: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigen Shen ◽  
Longjun Huang ◽  
En Fan ◽  
Keli Hu ◽  
Jianhua Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Trust Management ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Trust Mechanism ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism

A sensor node (SN) in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) can decide whether to collaborate with others based on a trust management system (TMS) by making a trust decision. In this paper, we study the trust decision and its dynamics that play a key role to stabilize the whole network using evolutionary game theory. When SNs are making their decisions to select actionTrustorMistrust, a WSNs trust game is created to reflect their utilities. An incentive mechanism bound with one SN’s trust degree is incorporated into this trust game and effectively promotes SNs to select actionTrust. The replicator dynamics of SNs’ trust evolution, illustrating the evolutionary process of SNs selecting their actions, are given. We then propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies can be attained under different parameter values, which supply theoretical foundations to devise a TMS for WSNs. Moreover, we can find out the conditions that will lead SNs to choose actionTrustas their final behavior. In this manner, we can assure WSNs’ security and stability by introducing a trust mechanism to satisfy these conditions. Experimental results have confirmed the proposed theorems and the effects of the incentive mechanism.

scholarly journals Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rongwu Lu ◽  
Xinhua Wang ◽  
Hao Yu ◽  
Dan Li
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mine ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Mine Safety ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Optimization Analysis ◽  
Coal Mine Safety ◽  
Complex Relationships

Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management.

scholarly journals Habit or Utility: A Key Choice Point in Promoting the Adoption of Telehealth in China

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Yun Fan ◽  
Sifeng Liu ◽  
Jun Liu ◽  
Saad Ahmed Javed ◽  
Zhigeng Fang
Keyword(s):  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Choice Point ◽  
Model Solution ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Adoption Rate ◽  
Patient Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Telehealth, as an indispensable means of technical support in the Healthy China Strategy, currently has less than 20 percent adoption rate in China despite a great deal of government policies and investments. In the current study, to analyse the influencing factors behind doctors’ and patients’ adoption of telehealth, an asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model of doctor-patient behaviour selection was established. Based on the model solution, the evolutionarily stable strategies that emerge in different situations were analysed. The results show that it is difficult for the adoption of telehealth in China to keep pace with coverage due to the “dual low” nature of telehealth: both doctors’ utility from telehealth and patients’ telehealth cost threshold are too low to incentivize adoption. The strategy to promote the adoption of telehealth in China should include providing adequate training for doctors and patients on the use of telehealth technology, rewarding doctors who provide telehealth services and raising the threshold cost of patient’s telehealth adoption.

scholarly journals Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Pan ◽  
Ying Guo ◽  
Shujie Liao
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Response ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Nonprofit Organization ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
The One

We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.

scholarly journals Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Yang ◽  
Yunpeng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Stable Points ◽  
The Ideal

By constructing a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving the central government, local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public, this paper attempts to comprehensively analyze the development and implementation of China’s air pollution control policies. Through the quadrilateral evolutionary game model, this paper systematically studies the evolutionary stable strategies of the four parties involved and obtains 27 equilibrium points, strategy sets, and their corresponding policy performance with the help of the four-dimensional dynamic system. The research results show that there are five equilibrium points that represent the least ideal scenarios, 14 equilibrium points that represent the less than ideal scenarios, four equilibrium points that represent the ideal scenarios, three equilibrium points that represent the more than ideal scenarios, and one equilibrium point that represents the most ideal scenarios. By analyzing the eight equilibrium points that represent the ideal, more than ideal and most ideal scenarios, especially the four stable points, this paper has obtained the conditions as well as policy implications of the four stable points in China’s air pollution control campaign.

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