scholarly journals A Proportional-Egalitarian Allocation Policy for Public Goods Problems with Complex Network

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (17) ◽  
pp. 2034
Author(s):  
Guang Zhang ◽  
Nan He ◽  
Yanxia Dong
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Complex Network ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Total Income ◽  
Allocation Policy ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Set Up

How free-riding behavior can be avoided is a constant topic in public goods problems, especially in persistent and complex resource allocation situations. In this paper, a novel allocation policy for public goods games with a complex network, called the proportional-egalitarian allocation method (PEA), is proposed. This allocation rule differs from the well-studied redistribution policies by following a two-step process without paying back into the common pool. A parameter is set up for dividing the total income into two parts, and then they are distributed by following the egalitarianism and proportional rule, respectively. The first part of total income is distributed equally, while the second part is allocated proportionally according to players’ initial payoffs. In addition, a new strategy-updating mechanism is proposed by comparing the average group payoffs instead of the total payoffs. Compared with regular lattice networks, this mechanism admits the difference of cooperative abilities among players induced by the asymmetric network. Furthermore, numerical calculations show that a relatively small income for the first distribution step will promote the cooperative level, while relatively less income for the second step may harm cooperation evolution. This work thus enriches the knowledge of allocation policies for public goods games and also provides a fresh perspective for the strategy-updating mechanism.

Donating money is not the only way to sustain cooperation in public goods game

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (12) ◽  
pp. 1750149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tong Chen ◽  
Zheng-Hong Wu ◽  
Le Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Time Model ◽  
Research Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Better Than

Most of the previous studies research cooperation mainly based on donating money in social public goods games. Owing to the lack of income, some people prefer to donate time instead of money to promote the activity, in our daily life. Motivated by this fact, we here investigate the influence of the encouragement of donating time on the evolution of cooperation based on village opera. In our study, we set up two models: one is money-only model (MOM). Donating money is the only choice in MOM. The other is money–time model (MTM). Besides donating money, donating time is an alternative in MTM. Through numerical simulations, we find that compared to MOM, MTM has a faster speed to reach cooperation equilibrium and cost advantage to sustain the same cooperation level, without the effects of income, reputation, satisfaction, emotion and maximum nonmonetary input. However, it should be noted that MTM is better than MOM in a moderate interval of general budget [Formula: see text]. Our results provide stark evidence that the encouragement of donating time can promote and sustain cooperation better than only donating money.

Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners’ incentives affect us?

2021 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 513-537
Author(s):  
Adriana Alventosa ◽  
Alberto Antonioni ◽  
Penélope Hernández
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Games

Experimental Investigation into Driver Behavior along Curved and Parallel Diverging Terminals of Exit Interchange Ramps

2021 ◽  
pp. 036119812199742
Author(s):  
Alberto Portera ◽  
Marco Bassani
Keyword(s):  
Design Stage ◽  
Lane Change ◽  
Age And Gender ◽  
Traffic Conditions ◽  
Current Design ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Safety Countermeasures ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Curve Radius

Current design manuals provide guidance on how to design exit ramps to facilitate driving operations and minimize the incidence of crashes. They also suggest that interchanges should be built along straight roadway sections. These criteria may prove ineffective in situations where there is no alternative to terminals being located along curved motorway segments. The paper investigates driving behavior along parallel deceleration curved terminals, with attention paid to the difference in impact between terminals having a curvature which is the same sign as the motorway segment (i.e., continue design), and those having an opposite curvature (i.e., reverse design). A driving simulation study was set up to collect longitudinal and transversal driver behavioral data in response to experimental factor variations. Forty-eight drivers were stratified on the basis of age and gender, and asked to drive along three randomly assigned circuits with off-ramps obtained by combining experimental factors such as motorway mainline curve radius (2 values), terminal length (3), curve direction (2), and traffic conditions (2). The motorway radius was found to be significant for drivers’ preferred speed when approaching the terminal. Terminal length and traffic volume do not have a significant impact on either longitudinal or transversal driver outputs. However, the effect of curve direction was found to be significant, notably for reverse terminals which do not compel drivers to select appropriate speeds and lane change positions. This terminal type can give rise to critical driving situations that should be considered at the design stage to facilitate the adoption of appropriate safety countermeasures.

Public goods games on random hyperbolic graphs with mixing

2021 ◽  
Vol 144 ◽  
pp. 110720
Author(s):  
Maja Duh ◽  
Marko Gosak ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Hyperbolic Graphs

scholarly journals A ΔSOC-based equalization strategy applied to industry

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maonan Wang ◽  
Chun Chang ◽  
Feng Ji
Keyword(s):  
Open Circuit ◽  
Battery Pack ◽  
Battery Management System ◽  
Battery Management ◽  
Battery Cell ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Relative Errors ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Battery Cells

Abstract The voltage-based equalization strategy is widely used in the industry because the voltage (U) of the battery cell is very easy to obtain, but it is difficult to provide an accurate parameter for the battery management system (BMS). This study proposes a new equalization strategy, which is based on the difference between the state of charge (SOC) of any two battery cells in the battery pack, that is, a ΔSOC-based equalization strategy. The new strategy is not only as simple as the voltage-based equalization strategy, but it can also provide an accurate parameter for the BMS. Simply put, using the relationship between the open circuit voltage and the SOC of the battery pack, the proposed strategy can convert the difference between the voltage of the battery cells into ΔSOC, which renders a good performance. Additionally, the required parameters are all from the BMS, and no additional calculation is required, which makes the strategy as simple as the voltage-based balancing strategy. The four experiments show that the relative errors of ΔSOC estimated by the ΔSOC-based equalization strategy are 0.37%, 0.39%, 0.1% and 0.17%, and thereby demonstrate that the ΔSOC-based equalization strategy proposed in this study shows promise in replacing the voltage-based equalization strategy within the industry to obtain better performance.

Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

scholarly journals Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (103) ◽  
pp. 20141203 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Tom Lenaerts
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Full Agreement ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Common ◽  
Strategic Solution

When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.

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