scholarly journals Explorations in Authority in the Daodejing: A Daoist Engagement with Hannah Arendt

Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 378
Author(s):  
Thomas Michael

The present study is an attempt to liberate the thought of the Daodejing from the constraints imposed on it by both traditional Confucian exegesis and modern Western sinological methodologies in the effort to engage the thought of the work more directly. Because the language and thought of the Daodejing are somehow oddly foreign to the Western traditions of analytic philosophy and sinology, this study attempts to make the Daodejing more familiar by recourse to the tradition of continental philosophy, in this case by taking recourse to Hannah Arendt and in particular to her seminal essay on authority. Engaging Arendt’s understanding of authority, this study offers a new look at the thought of the Daodejing by discussing issues that lie at the heart of its political vision, including natural versus political authority, power and coercion, and the relation between authority, tradition, and religion. This study also attempts to situate the fate of the Daodejing’s conception of authority in Chinese political history, and it concludes with a brief look at the contemporary comparative philosophical project that brings the Daodejing into conversation with continental philosophy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
pp. 14-19
Author(s):  
Anastasia Jessica Adinda Susanti

The division between Continental and Analytic Philosophy in contemporary philosophy is more difficult to maintain than in modern philosophy. Some philosophers use both Continental and Analytic Philosophy together. They defy the presupposition that Continental thought is subjectivist, collectivist, and historicist, while Analytic thought is objectivist, individualist, and scientific. John Mullarkey calls this circumstance “The Post-Continental Philosophy”. This research aims to examine 'what is the post-continental thought of W.J.T. Mitchell?' and 'how does Mitchell exceed the boundaries of Continental and Analytic Philosophy?'. The method of this research is hermeneutic which involves some elements such as interpretative analyses, historical continuity, heuristics, and descriptive. In conclusion, Mitchell’s post-continental thought bridges the Continental and Analytic philosophy, especially through the concepts of Picture Theory and Image Science. In Picture Theory, he uses the Continental philosophy approach that emphasizes the interpretation of the image. Meanwhile, in Image Science, he employs the Analytic philosophy approach that gives attention to the abstract, rational, and mathematical analysis.


Author(s):  
Jon Cogburn

The first chapter focuses on Garcia’s arguments against reductionism, with (i) an explanation of Garcia’s affirmation of ontological liberality, and (ii) a discussion of Garcia’s important supplementary arguments against the view that some putative entities are not things. The first few sections of the chapter contain an analysis of Garcia’s argument against what Graham Harman calls overmining and undermining. Both philosophers’ efforts are tied to contemporary work concerning reductionism in analytic philosophy. This discussion motivates (i) a brief presentation of Harman’s account of Heidegger’s “readiness-to-hand”, (ii) a discussion of capacity metaphysics, and (iii) Garcia’s differential ontology of objects. In this manner, Garcia’s central motivation and broad picture are situated with respect to recent trends in continental philosophy, particularly speculative realism and object-oriented ontology.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 392-413
Author(s):  
Michele Cardani ◽  
Marco Tamborini

Abstract This paper takes into account Bertrand Russell’s, Francis H. Bradley’s, and Immanuel Kant’s arguments about “what is the real Julius Caesar” to examine (i) Russell’s characterization of analytic philosophy as a “new philosophy”, born as a revolt against idealism, and (ii) the actual relationship between Bradley and Kant. In order to understand who Russell was actually revolting against, we analyse the features of Bradley’s idealism and investigate how he understood and interpreted Kant’s transcendental revolution. By using the notion of Julius Caesar as a cogent comparative case study, we show that Bradley’s reading of Kant was not well-grounded. Therefore, we argue that Bradley’s interpretation of Hegel’s idealism was also unconventional. This misunderstanding in turn shaped and characterised Russell’s revolt against idealism. As a result, we show that analytic and continental philosophy began to part ways with the birth of what Russell calls new philosophy much earlier than their encounter at Davos. The reasons for this parting can be found in British idealists’ erroneous interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy.


Think ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (37) ◽  
pp. 57-72
Author(s):  
Chris Norris

This essay takes a hard look at the current state of much academic (mainly analytic) philosophy and sets out to diagnose where things have gone wrong. It offers a sharply critical assessment of the prevailing narrowness, cliquishness, linguistic inertness, like-mindedness, intellectual caution, misplaced scientism, over-specialisation, guild mentality, lack of creative or inventive flair, and above all the self-perpetuating structures of privilege and patronage that have worked to produce this depressing situation. On the constructive side I suggest how a belated encounter with developments beyond its cultural-professional horizons – including certain aspects of ‘continental’ philosophy – might bring large (and reciprocal) benefits. I also offer some tentative ideas as to what ‘creativity’ could or should mean as applied to philosophical thinking and writing.


Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Davies

Analytic philosophy, with its emphasis on clear, topic-based argument, is usually dated to the early 20th century and is contrasted with Continental philosophy, which is more often concerned with overarching systems and theories. Analytic philosophers did not turn their attention to music until the last decades of the 20th century. Of course, they were influenced by and commented on earlier, philosophically motivated discussions of music, starting with the Greeks and much later including relevant work by musicologists, composers, critics, and psychologists as well as philosophers. Three topics became prominent: the expression of emotion in music, the nature of musical works, and what is involved in understanding and appreciating music. Philosophers asked if music expresses emotion, and if they answered yes, as most did, they asked how this is possible and whether the attribution could be literal. Is music expressive by virtue of some connection with the world of human feeling or in its own, perhaps indescribable fashion? Why is the listener moved by the music’s expressiveness if no one undergoes the emotions it expresses? In the case of works, the interest was in their connection to notational specifications and performances. If they are abstract, does this mean they are discovered rather than created? Philosophers considered what makes a performance a performance of a given work, whether faithfulness to the work is important and what it entails, and in what respects the performer is free to interpret the work. In addition, they debated the prerequisites for musical understanding: for example, is knowledge of musical technicalities helpful or even necessary, and should the listener track the music’s large-scale structure? And why do we value music so highly given that it does not provide useful information? As these topics imply, the primary focus at first fell on notated classical Western music composed for multiple, live performances by instrumentalists, and the main perspective was that of the listener. When the scope of interest was broadened, different issues emerged. Jazz, for example, raised questions about the nature of improvisation and about how the appreciation of music not intended for replay might differ from that appropriate for notated works. Rock, with its reliance on electronic mediation and recordings, provoked new debate about the nature of recorded works and about the relevant differences between recordings of works intended for live performance and recordings of works that essentially involve electronic manipulations and the kind of editing that cannot be achieved in real time. The range of philosophical topics invited by consideration of music and its role in human life continues to expand, though this article concentrates on those matters that have received most attention.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Thut

The contentious ‘ethical turn’ in continental philosophy motivates this project. Emmanuel Levinas is among the leaders of this movement to draw renewed attention to ethics in the continental tradition. Levinas describes the transcendence that transpires in the self-Other encounter as the source of ethical obligation. However, given Friedrich Nietzsche’s ethical critique, his followers view the category of transcendence with suspicion. They think it presupposes an ontology of unchanging being. Since Nietzsche and his disciples reject ontologies of unchanging being, preferring immanence instead, they think that transcendence inevitably appeals to some imaginary world beyond the one we inhabit. Consequently, they view all philosophers of transcendence as escapist. To assess whether Levinas’ philosophical project is viable, I draw from Nietzsche’s work to mount a Nietzschean critique of Levinas. I subsequently consider a Levinasian reply to the Nietzschean critique, arguing that Levinas’ transcendence provides a compelling alternative to a Nietzschean ethics of immanence.


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