SELF-REFERENCE, THEORY OF TYPES, AND CATEGORIZATION IN WITTGENSTEIN’S PICTURE THEORY OF STATEMENTS

Рассматривается источник логических парадоксов, выявленных Б. Расселом в системе обоснования математики, предложенной Г. Фреге. Самореферентность выражений, предложенная Б. Расселом как объяснение возникновения парадоксов, рассматривается с точки зрения разработанной им простой и разветвленной теории типов. Обосновывается, что теория типов, предложенная Б. Расселом, основана на онтологических предпосылках. Онтологические предпосылки зависят от предпочтения семантическому перед синтаксическим подходом, который принимается Б. Расселом. Рассмотрены синтаксические подходы к логическому символизму, которые позволяют устранить парадоксы с точки зрения языка современной символической логики. Анализируется подход к решению парадоксов Л. Витгенштейна, который основан на синтаксическом подходе. Показано, что этот подход отличается от способов построения языка, принятых в современной логике. The article analyzes the source of logical paradoxes Bertrand Russell identified in the foundations of mathematics proposed by Gottlob Frege. Russell proposed self-reference of expressions as the source of paradoxes. To solve paradoxes, he developed the simple and ramified theory of types. Ontological presuppositions are well substantiated for his theory; they depend on semantic, but not syntactic, preference. Contemporary approaches in symbolical logic prefer syntactic methods. But Wittgenstein’s approach in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is more interesting, especially from the perspective of his picture theory of statements.

Wittgenstein’s Bridge A Linguistic Account of Visual Representation

This paper uses structure-mapping to bridge the divide between the analytical and visual culture traditions of image interpretation. Wittgenstein’s analytic ‘picture theory of meaning’ from his early period, and his cultural theory of ‘meaning as use’ from his later period are used to show that the terms similarity, analogy and metaphor can be applied to both image and linguistic interpretation. As a result, by the mapping of similarity and analogy onto the analytic approach, and by the mapping of metaphor onto the visual culture approach, a common linguistic ground for the comparison of these two approaches to image interpretation can be established.

Exceeding Continental and Analytic Philosophy: The Post-Continental Thought of W.J.T. Mitchell

The division between Continental and Analytic Philosophy in contemporary philosophy is more difficult to maintain than in modern philosophy. Some philosophers use both Continental and Analytic Philosophy together. They defy the presupposition that Continental thought is subjectivist, collectivist, and historicist, while Analytic thought is objectivist, individualist, and scientific. John Mullarkey calls this circumstance “The Post-Continental Philosophy”. This research aims to examine 'what is the post-continental thought of W.J.T. Mitchell?' and 'how does Mitchell exceed the boundaries of Continental and Analytic Philosophy?'. The method of this research is hermeneutic which involves some elements such as interpretative analyses, historical continuity, heuristics, and descriptive. In conclusion, Mitchell’s post-continental thought bridges the Continental and Analytic philosophy, especially through the concepts of Picture Theory and Image Science. In Picture Theory, he uses the Continental philosophy approach that emphasizes the interpretation of the image. Meanwhile, in Image Science, he employs the Analytic philosophy approach that gives attention to the abstract, rational, and mathematical analysis.

Wittgenstein: Physics and Philosophy

The purpose of this article is to fill an interpretive gap in L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in what has been overlooked by most scholars of the Austrian philosopher. It is the consideration of the possible influences that he would have suffered from the time of Mechanical Engineering studies and that reflected directly in his philosophy, especially those arising from the field of Physics. Due to the extensive restrictions that involve a scientific article, it will not be possible to present here what we believe to be the influences of L. Boltzmann’s thought on the Wittgenstein Tractatus – which will remain for future work. However, we present the influences of H. Hertz’s The Principles of Mechanics on at least three fundamental themes of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: on the ontological formalism of Tractarian objects, on the picture theory of language and on the conception of science of that work. It is expected that such clarifications will serve a new and important understanding of this seminal work of the 20th century, this time from the perspective of the relationship between Philosophy and Physics in Wittgenstein.

Treatise and the Tractatus

Cornelius Cardew named his monumental graphic score Treatise after Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophical masterpiece Tractatus logico-philosophicus, and this well-known fact has engendered speculation about whether there might be other connections between Cardew’s composition and Wittgenstein’s book. Previous commentaries have focused on possible allusions to the Tractatus in the visual imagery employed by Cardew, and this article includes further suggestions of this type. However, it concentrates on more general affinities between Treatise, as Cardew conceived of it prior to his involvement with the free improvisation group AMM, and the philosophy adumbrated in the Tractatus. Foremost among these is a striking concordance between Cardew’s initial enthusiasm for an isomorphic mode of interpreting Treatise and Wittgenstein’s picture theory of the proposition. The article also excavates traces of the picture theory in the numerological basis of Volo solo, a more conventionally notated by-product of the Treatise project.

Quotation (May 20, 1970)

Davidson’s third lecture concerns quotation. He considers and rejects a number of semantic treatments of quotation, including the “proper-name theory,” the “picture theory,” and the “spelling theory.” He then presents his own preferred theory, which assimilates the semantics of quotation to the semantics of demonstratives. According to Davidson’s “demonstrative theory,” quotation marks refer to the material they flank, which is not always a semantic part of the sentence containing it. The flexibility of demonstrative reference, Davidson claims, allows his theory to account for mixed use/mention cases: in these cases, the demonstrative introduced by the quotation marks refers to a part of the sentence which does make a semantic contribution. Moreover, since the demonstrative theory reduces quotation to demonstration, it is susceptible to a truth-theoretic treatment if demonstratives are.