scholarly journals Communication Vulnerabilities in Electric Mobility HCP Systems: A Semi-Quantitative Analysis

Smart Cities ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 405-428
Author(s):  
Robert Basmadjian
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Electric Mobility ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Security Risks ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Charging Station ◽  
Mobility Service ◽  
Supply Equipment ◽  
The Common ◽  
Available Information

An electric mobility ecosystem, which resembles a human-centred cyber physical (HCP) system, consists of several interacting sub-systems that constantly communicate with each other. Cyber-security of such systems is an important aspect as vulnerability of one sub-system propagates to the entire system, thus putting it into risk. Risk assessment requires modelling of threats and their impacts on the system. Due to lack of available information on all possible threats of a given system, it is generally more convenient to assess the level of vulnerabilities either qualitatively or semi-quantitatively. In this paper, we adopt the common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) methodology in order to assess semi-quantitatively the vulnerabilities of the communication in electric mobility human-centred cyber physical systems. To this end, we present the most relevant sub-systems, their roles as well as exchanged information. Furthermore, we give the considered threats and corresponding security requirements. Using the CVSS methodology, we then conduct an analysis of vulnerabilities for every pair of communicating sub-systems. Among them, we show that the sub-systems between charging station operator (CSO) and electric vehicle supply equipment (charging box) as well as CSO and electric mobility service provider are the most vulnerable in the end-to-end chain of electric mobility. These results pave the way to system designers to assess the operational security risks, and hence to take the most adequate decisions, when implementing such electric mobility HCP systems.

scholarly journals Managing Cyber Security Risks of the Cyber-Enabled Ship

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 768
Author(s):  
Georgios Kavallieratos ◽  
Sokratis Katsikas
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Cyber Physical Systems ◽  
Transformation Process ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Shipping Industry ◽  
Security Risks ◽  
Industrial Control Systems ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Cyber Risk

One aspect of the digital transformation process in the shipping industry, a process often referred to as Shipping 4.0, is the increased digitization of on board systems that goes along with increased automation in and autonomy of the vessel. This is happening by integrating Information Technology with Operation Technology systems that results in Cyber Physical Systems on which the safe operations and sailing of contemporary and future vessels depend. Unavoidably, such highly interconnected and interdependent systems increase the exposure of the vessel’s digital infrastructure to cyber attacks and cyber security risks. In this paper, we leverage the STRIDE and DREAD methodologies to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the cyber risk of Cyber Physical Systems on board digitalized contemporary and future ships. Further, we propose appropriate cyber security baseline controls to mitigate such risks, by applying a systematic approach using a set of criteria that take into account the security requirements; the cyber risks; the possible attacks; and the possibly already existing controls, to select from the list of controls provided in the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) overlay of the NIST Guide to ICS Security. The results are expected to support the decision-making and the design of a security architecture for the cyber-enabled ship.

scholarly journals The Study on the Cyber Security Requirements of Cyber-Physical Systems for Cyber Security Frameworks

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 255-265
Author(s):  
Soo-Youl Park ◽  
Wook-Jin Choi ◽  
Bo-Heung Chung ◽  
Jeong-Nyeo Kim ◽  
Joo-Man Kim
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Cyber Physical Systems ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Physical Systems

scholarly journals Risk Management and Standard Compliance for Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 32-39
Author(s):  
George Matta ◽  
Sebastian Chlup ◽  
Abdelkader Magdy Shaaban ◽  
Christoph Schmittner ◽  
Andreas Pinzenöhler ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Security Analysis ◽  
Cyber Physical Systems ◽  
Risk Identification ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Systems Of Systems ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Railway Systems ◽  
Industry Standards

The Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud technologies are increasingly implemented in the form of Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems (CPSoS) for the railway sector. In order to satisfy the security requirements of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), domainspecific risk identification assessment procedures have been developed. Threat modelling is one of the most commonly used methods for threat identification for the security analysis of CPSoS and is capable of targeting various domains. This paper reports our experience of using a risk management framework identify the most critical security vulnerabilities in CPSoS in the domain and shows the broader impact this work can have on the domain of safety and security management. Moreover, we emphasize the application of common analytical methods for cyber-security based on international industry standards to identify the most vulnerable assets. These will be applied to a meta-model for automated railway systems in the concept phase to support the development and deployment of these systems. Furthermore, it is the first step to create a secure and standard complaint system by design.

scholarly journals A Preliminary Design-Phase Security Methodology for Cyber–Physical Systems

Systems ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Carter ◽  
Stephen Adams ◽  
Georgios Bakirtzis ◽  
Tim Sherburne ◽  
Peter Beling ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Systems Engineering ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Cyber Physical Systems ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Complex Nature ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Model Based ◽  
The Face ◽  
Comparison Of The Results

Despite “cyber” being in the name, cyber–physical systems possess unique characteristics that limit the applicability and suitability of traditional cybersecurity techniques and strategies. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to cyber–physical systems can have significant safety implications. The physical and cyber interactions inherent in these systems require that cyber vulnerabilities not only be defended against or prevented, but that the system also be resilient in the face of successful attacks. Given the complex nature of cyber–physical systems, the identification and evaluation of appropriate defense and resiliency strategies must be handled in a targeted and systematic manner. Specifically, what resiliency strategies are appropriate for a given system, where, and which should be implemented given time and/or budget constraints? This paper presents two methodologies: (1) the cyber security requirements methodology and (2) a systems-theoretic, model-based methodology for identifying and prioritizing appropriate resiliency strategies for implementation in a given system and mission. This methodology is demonstrated using a case study based on a hypothetical weapon system. An assessment and comparison of the results from the two methodologies suggest that the techniques presented in this paper can augment and enhance existing systems engineering approaches with model-based evidence.

scholarly journals Cyber Security for Multi-Station Integrated Smart Energy Stations: Architecture and Solutions

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (14) ◽  
pp. 4287
Author(s):  
Yangrong Chen ◽  
June Li ◽  
Qiuyu Lu ◽  
Hai Lin ◽  
Yu Xia ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Local Area ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Integrated Systems ◽  
Secondary System ◽  
Communication Services ◽  
Layered Architecture ◽  
Charging Station ◽  
Electric Vehicle Charging ◽  
Iec 62351

Multi-station integration is motivated by the requirements of distributed energies interconnection and improvements in the efficiency of energy systems. Due to the diversity of communication services and the complexity of data exchanges between in-of-station and out-of-station, multi-station integrated systems have high security requirements. However, issues related to cyber security for multi-station integrated systems are seldom explored. Hence, this paper designs the secondary system architecture and proposes cyber security protection solutions for smart energy stations (SESt) that integrate the substation, photovoltaic station, energy storage station, electric vehicle charging station, and data center station. Firstly, the composition of SESt and functions of each substation are presented, a layered architecture of SESt is designed, and data exchanges of SESt are analyzed. Then, the cyber security threats and requirements of SESt are illustrated. Moreover, the cyber security protection principle and a cyber security protection system for SESt are proposed. On this basis, a security zoning and isolation scheme for SESt is designed. Finally, a traffic isolation scheme based on virtual local area networks (VLANs), a real-time guarantee scheme for communications based on service priority, and an enhancing cyber security scheme based on improved IEC 62351 are proposed for SESt.

Security of Cyber-Physical Systems: A Generalized Algorithm for Intrusion Detection and Determining Security Robustness of Cyber Physical Systems using Logical Truth Tables

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis G. Northcutt
Keyword(s):  
Intrusion Detection ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Logical Truth ◽  
Cyber Physical Systems ◽  
Security Model ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Multiple Signal ◽  
Security Attack ◽  
Truth Tables

The recent proliferation of embedded cyber components in modern physical systems [1] has generated a variety of new security risks which threaten not only cyberspace, but our physical environment as well. Whereas earlier security threats resided primarily in cyberspace, the increasing marriage of digital technology with mechanical systems in cyber-physical systems (CPS), suggests the need for more advanced generalized CPS security measures. To address this problem, in this paper we consider the first step toward an improved security model: detecting the security attack. Using logical truth tables, we have developed a generalized algorithm for intrusion detection in CPS for systems which can be defined over discrete set of valued states. Additionally, a robustness algorithm is given which determines the level of security of a discrete-valued CPS against varying combinations of multiple signal alterations. These algorithms, when coupled with encryption keys which disallow multiple signal alteration, provide for a generalized security methodology for both cyber-security and cyber-physical systems.

scholarly journals CS Measures for Nuclear Power Plant Protection: A Systematic Literature Review

Signals ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 803-819
Author(s):  
Nabin Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Systematic Literature Review ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Plant Protection ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
Defense In Depth

As digital instrumentation in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is becoming increasingly complex, both attack vectors and defensive strategies are evolving based on new technologies and vulnerabilities. Continued efforts have been made to develop a variety of measures for the cyber defense of these infrastructures, which often consist in adapting security measures previously developed for other critical infrastructure sectors according to the requirements of NPPs. That being said, due to the very recent development of these solutions, there is a lack of agreement or standardization when it comes to their adoption at an industrial level. To better understand the state of the art in NPP Cyber-Security (CS) measures, in this work, we conduct a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) to identify scientific papers discussing CS frameworks, standards, guidelines, best practices, and any additional CS protection measures for NPPs. From our literature analysis, it was evidenced that protecting the digital space in NPPs involves three main steps: (i) identification of critical digital assets; (ii) risk assessment and threat analysis; (iii) establishment of measures for NPP protection based on the defense-in-depth model. To ensure the CS protection of these infrastructures, a holistic defense-in-depth approach is suggested in order to avoid excessive granularity and lack of compatibility between different layers of protection. Additional research is needed to ensure that such a model is developed effectively and that it is based on the interdependencies of all security requirements of NPPs.

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