scholarly journals Implementation of Pipeline Integrity Management in a Large Pipelines Network in India

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 3019-3027
Keyword(s):  
Distribution System ◽  
Management System ◽  
Public Awareness ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Large Network ◽  
Large Country ◽  
Pipeline Network ◽  
Short Period ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Failure

Hydrocarbon pipelines are one of the key elements of the energy security system of a country, especially in a large country like India hydrocarbon pipelines are the backbone of the energy distribution system. While the operational reliability of such a system is important to ensure a sustained supply of hydrocarbon energy across the country, the continued structural integrity of the network is vital for public safety. Generally, pipelines are the safest mode of transportation of bulk hydrocarbon energy, but pipeline failure is not uncommon. Recent global databases on pipeline failure indicate that third party damage and corrosion are two major causes of pipeline failure though there are other reasons like poor construction quality; an incorrect operation etc., may also lead to pipeline failure. The extent of damage that a pipeline failure can cause depends on the extent of the release, for example, a small leak may not cause much damage if detected with a short period, while a rupture of the pipeline can release a significant amount of pipeline content and may cause significant damage to property and life. With a higher degree of public awareness and stricter regulatory regime, pipeline operators are having a relook into their integrity management system to prevent any untoward incident. Majority of the pipeline operator now realize that holistic approach taking together as much factor as possible could be a better approach to manage the integrity of the pipeline network especially a large network of pipeline spread across a vast country like India. This realization has led many pipeline operators to implement computer-based pipeline integrity management system. While this is a welcome change but implementation of PIMS across a vast network of pipeline built over a long period, with various technologies and having diverse engineering requirements have come of the challenges that the pipeline operator must overcome. This paper discusses one such case of implementation of the Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) in a large and diverse network pipeline in India and the challenges faced in the course of implementation. Authors feel that the case could be a good learning ground for those operators who are contemplating implementation of PIMS in their respective pipeline network.

HSE and City Gas Distribution

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ajay Kumar Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Quality Assurance ◽  
Distribution System ◽  
Management System ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Gas Distribution ◽  
Notification System ◽  
First Choice ◽  
Call System ◽  
City Gas ◽  
Integrity Management

City Gas Distribution is one of the most assured businesses in current times as Natural Gas being a clean fuel becomes the first choice of consumers. Though CGD Network has enormous potential and has evident advantages however, it brings alongwith it’s own challenges but the biggest challenge is the vicinity of CGD Network with common public. A major factor for success of CGD Network depends on the discipline and involvement of common public in keeping CGD Network safe and effective. This paper intends to discuss on HSE issues with focus on like Single Call system for India, Indian regulations Vs other countries and Quality Assurance. Single Call system for India is the most important issue of CGD Network that really needs to be deliberated. In India, more than 20 clearances need to be obtained from various statutory and civil authorities before execution of any CGD Network project which really affects the project cost, time, consumer benefits, emergency response and third party damages. Now let’s consider few international regulations like National Energy Board in Canada which is the nodal agency to ensure CGD pipelines are safe for public and environment. NEB regulations harmonize with provinces to ensure that any third party excavation work within pipeline corridor is carried out only after due communication to the pipeline company. The 49 US Code 60114 - One Call notification system also mandates that any third party before carrying out any excavation needs to establish if there are underground facilities present in the area of the intended activity and contact appropriate system. Indian regulations like T4S and ERDMP for CGD Network are indeed bringing all CGD companies at par in terms of design, safety, O&M and Integrity Management System. However, they need to sincerely look into Single Call System alongwith specific issues like interdistances, space constraints in big cities, compressor installation at height. Quality Assurance involves periodic inspection and maintenance of CGD asset through a systematic plan including identification of critical equipments, Preventive Maintenance Schedules, carrying out maintenance as per the PM, maintaining a database of observations and defects. A key component is the generation of baseline data for implementing and monitoring Integrity Management System for CGD Network. Hence, as CGD Network is a complex and dynamic distribution system involving public, private industries/commercials, civil authorities and wide geography, it is imperative to have a multi-pronged approach involving strict regulation enforcement, well informed public and latest technologies to ensure safe and efficient CGD Networks.

The Evolution of Facilities Integrity Management at Enbridge Pipelines Inc.

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monique Berg ◽  
Shadie S. Radmard
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Public Awareness ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
The Public ◽  
Employee Safety ◽  
Industry Practice ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pump Stations ◽  
Small Team

Public and employee safety, environmental stewardship, increased focus by the regulators, public awareness are some of the reasons why operators need to focus on the integrity of their operations and create solutions to reduce common types of releases. In the past, the focus has been on mainline piping integrity due to the greater consequence of mainline releases but increasing importance is being placed on facilities, such as tank terminals and pump stations. Facilities Integrity Management of a pipeline system is a relatively new concept for many companies; however, it is gaining momentum, particularly with regulators and the public. Prior to 2004, various Enbridge departments were responsible for ensuring integrity was maintained within facilities. There was a renewed emphasis and on Enbridge’s Facilities Integrity Programs in 2004 with a mandate of reducing facility releases across the Enbridge Pipeline system. In 2005, a small team of engineers drafted a six-page Facilities Integrity Management System document and program documentation to address facilities integrity issues. Today, Facilities Integrity is responsible for more facilities and programs than originally envisioned. The Integrity Management System documentation has since been amended several times and reviewed through internal and external audits. The Facilities Integrity Management System is vital to the success of the various facilities integrity programs as it identifies responsibilities and associated overlaps and gaps as well as the need for documentation and tracking. As there are no set regulations specific to Facilities Integrity, Enbridge has taken the initiative to be at the forefront of industry practice. This paper will describe Enbridge’s Facilities Integrity Management System: past and present Facilities Integrity programs, current scope of work, the role of Facilities Integrity, the importance of historical release information and program trending, and future initiatives.

Establishment and Discovery of Pipeline Integrity Management System

ICPTT 2011 ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Wang ◽  
Qing-shan Feng ◽  
Hong-long Zheng ◽  
Ling Sun ◽  
Qing Chang
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Integrity Management

Implementation of a Pipeline Integrity Management System at TIGF (France): The Added Value of the Pipeline Threats and Mitigations Module

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karine Kutrowski ◽  
Rob Bos ◽  
Jean-Re´gis Piccardino ◽  
Marie Pajot
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Oil And Gas Industry ◽  
Management Plan ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Transmission Grid ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Corrective Actions

On January 4th 2007 TIGF published the following invitation for tenders: “Development and Provision of a Pipeline Integrity Management System”. The project was awarded to Bureau Veritas (BV), who proposed to meet the requirements of TIGF with the Threats and Mitigations module of the PiMSlider® suite extended with some customized components. The key features of the PiMSlider® suite are: • More than only IT: a real integrity philosophy, • A simple intuitive tool to store, display and update pipeline data, • Intelligent search utilities to locate specific information about the pipeline and its surrounding, • A scalable application, with a potentially unlimited number of users, • Supervision (during and after implementation) by experienced people from the oil and gas industry. This paper first introduces TIGF and the consortium BV – ATP. It explains in a few words the PIMS philosophy captured in the PiMSlider® suite and focuses on the added value of the pipeline Threats and Mitigations module. Using this module allows the integrity analyst to: • Prioritize pipeline segments for integrity surveillance purposes, • Determine most effective corrective actions, • Assess the benefits of corrective actions by means of what-if scenarios, • Produce a qualitative threats assessment for further use in the integrity management plan, • Optimize integrity aspects from a design, maintenance and operational point of view, • Investigate the influence of different design criteria for pipeline segments. To conclude, TIGF presents the benefits of the tool for their Integrity Management department and for planning inspection and for better knowledge of their gas transmission grid.

An Expert Software System has Accomplished Full Implementation of Well Integrity Management System WIMS Resulting to Excellent Safety and Production Sustainability for Critical Sour HPHT Field in Offshore Madura Strait, Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fianti Ramadhani ◽  
Syaiful Nurdin ◽  
Michael Olu Etuhoko ◽  
Yang Zhi ◽  
Sugeng Mulyono ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Material Selection ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Software System ◽  
Well Performance ◽  
Integrity Test ◽  
Well Integrity ◽  
High Pressure High Temperature ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Productive Assets

Abstract Four high-pressure-high temperature (HPHT) and sour gas wells are currently operating at Madura offshore as the only productive assets for Husky-CNOOC Madura Limited (HCML). Each well performance is very crucial to fulfill the demand of the gas customers in East Java, Indonesia. Since starting production in 2017, the wells experienced two main well integrity challenges, high annulus pressure and wellhead growth. Both challenges are very dependent to the well flow rate and the flow duration. A continuous operation monitoring is highly required in order to keep the wells operating safely. To overcome the challenges, HCML established a Well Integrity Management System (WIMS) document that approached several international standards as its basis. As company grows, development plan challenged the WIMS to perform faster and more efficient as compared to the existing manual system. From there, the journey of WIMS digitalization began. The journey started with the alignment of the existing WIMS document to the ISO-16530-1 at Operational Phase with more stringent boundary to operate the wells safely. The alignment covers, but not limited to the organizational structure, well barriers and criteria, monitoring and surveillance, annulus pressure management, and maintenance. The document also covered risk assessment and management of well integrity failure, which was the backbone of the WIMS digitalization. The current digital solutions allow production data to be accessed and retrieved directly from the system for analysis purposes. It compares the recorded data with pre-determined rules and parameters set in the system. It triggers a notification to the responsible personnel to perform the required action should any anomaly occurs. It also can send a reminder to users to schedule and complete a well Integrity test to ensure that a well is always in compliance with the WIMS. All test reports and documentation are stored in the system as preparation for any future audit. A key requirement of the expert software system was access to future developments that can offer enhanced functionality of the well integrity platform through additional near time capabilities such as predictive erosion and corrosion for downhole flow wetted components. This is being developed to enhance workover scheduling for existing wells and material selection for new wells and is planned to update automatically critical well integrity criteria such as tubing burst, collapse and MAASP.

Implementing a Geohazard Integrity Management Program: Statistics and Lessons Learned Over 15 Years

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Baumgard ◽  
Tara L. Coultish ◽  
Gerry W. Ferris
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Proactive Approach ◽  
Oil Pipelines ◽  
Pipeline Networks ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Failures ◽  
Program Challenges

Over the last 15 years, BGC Engineering Inc. has developed and implemented a geohazards Integrity Management Program (IMP) with 12 major pipeline operators (consisting of gas and oil pipelines and of both gathering and transmission systems). Over this time, the program has been applied to the assessment of approximately 13,500 individual hydrotechnical and geotechnical geohazard sites spanning approximately 63,000 km of operating pipelines in Canada and the USA. Hydrotechnical (watercourse) and geotechnical (slope) hazards are the primary types of geohazards that have directly contributed to pipeline failures in Canada. As with all IMPs, the core objectives of a geohazard management system are to ensure a proactive approach that is repeatable and defensible. In order to meet these objectives, the program allows for varying levels of intensity of inspection and a recommended timescale for completion of actions to manage the identified geohazards in accordance with the degree of hazard that the site poses to the pipeline. In this way, the sites are managed in a proactive manner while remaining flexible to accommodate the most current conditions at each site. This paper will provide a background to the key components of the program related specifically to existing operating pipeline systems, present pertinent statistics on the occurrence of various types of geohazards based on the large dataset of inspections, and discuss some of the lessons learned in the form of program results and program challenges from implementing a geohazard integrity management system for a dozen operators with different ages of systems, complexity of pipeline networks, and in varied geographic settings.

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