scholarly journals O NOVO EQUILÍBRIO REAGAN-GORBACHEV

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (34) ◽  
pp. 394-400
Author(s):  
Érica Salatini ◽  
Rafael Salatini
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Intermediate Range

O texto analisa o encontro entre o presidente estadunidense Ronald Reagan e o primeiro-ministro soviético Mikhail Gorbachev, em Washington, em 08 de dezembro de 1987, para assinar um tratado de diminuição das armas nucleares, que fora firmado em Genebra, em 24 de novembro de 1987, o Tratado de Forças Nucleares de Alcance Intermediário, conhecido como Tratado INF (de Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), promovendo uma distensão entre as duas grandes potências da Guerra Fria. Tal evento é analisado em comparação com os objetivos pacifistas da ONU e a política de equilíbrio de poder entre os Estados, a partir do que Norberto Bobbio questiona os rumos do sistema internacional no final dos anos 1980.

United States Alleges Russia Continues to Violate INF Treaty

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 787-791
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Short Range ◽  
State Department ◽  
Flight Test ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Cruise Missile ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, obligates the parties “not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” In 2014, the State Department reported that Russia was in violation of its obligation not to possess intermediate- or short-range missiles. Russia denied the violation and expressed its own doubts about the United States' compliance with the INF Treaty; the meetings and discussions that followed did not resolve either state's concerns. Subsequent State Department reports in 2015 and 2016 continued to express concern about Russia's violation.

scholarly journals Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Wheeler ◽  
Joshua Baker ◽  
Laura Considine
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The United States ◽  
Personal Relationship ◽  
International Level ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Intermediate Range ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter uses the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a case study to explore the relationship between trust and verification. It argues that the acceptance of verification measures has to be considered an act of trust, since it implies the acceptance of one's vulnerability as a result of an altered perception of the trustworthiness of one's opponent. More specifically, the chapter illustrates how Gorbachev's notion of trustworthiness toward the United States changed through the influence of his inner circle, his understanding of the dynamics of a security dilemma fed by mutual fear and mistrust, his trusting actions toward the development of a common security on an international level, and his personal relationship with Ronald Reagan.

The Helsinki Accord: A Growth Industry

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 53-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Korey
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The United States ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Negotiation Strategies ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Growth Industry

Despite conservative opposition, in the late 1970s, Jimmy Carter turned the tide in favor of the Helsinki Accord by taking a strong stand in fostering U.S. participation in it. Korey focuses on the U.S. delegation to the Commission on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe and credits the success of the Helsinki Accord to U.S. adroit negotiation strategies, beginning with the Carter administration. By 1980, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came to embrace the “humanitarianism” of the treaty. The Vienna review conference's (1986–89) effort peaked when a milestone was reached in the human rights process, linking it directly to security issues equally pertinent to the East and the West. The author contends that the United States' ardent participation in the monitoring of compliance was particularly effective in putting pressure on the Soviet Union to uphold the agreement within its territory, yielding enormous progress in human rights

Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985–88

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
National Security ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Military Doctrine ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Window Of Vulnerability ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
And Behavior

This chapter examines the indicators used by the Reagan administration to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1988. Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981 after an election campaign that expressed alarm over a “window of vulnerability” that endangered U.S. national security. Reagan's national security strategy featured schemes such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The chapter considers U.S. perceptions of Soviet military capabilities, military doctrine, and behavior during the period based on predictions derived from the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. It also explores how, when, and to what extent U.S. perceptions of Soviet intentions changed in order to elucidate the broader changes that eventually led to the end of the Cold War.

Helmut Schmidt, Euromissiles, and the Peace Movement

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-171
Author(s):  
Noel D. Cary
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The United States ◽  
Peace Movement ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Nuclear Missiles ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Vladimir Putin

On February 1, 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from a landmark Cold War treaty: the agreement between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to ban intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe. One day after Trump's announcement, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would also withdraw from the treaty. Allegations of Russian violations in recent years have thus led to actions that threaten to return Europe to some of the most frightening days of the Cold War.

scholarly journals United States Initiates Withdrawal from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 631-634
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Intermediate Range ◽  
Trump Administration

On February 2, 2019, the United States formally notified Russia that it would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in six months and that, effective immediately, it was suspending its performance under the treaty in light of Russia's material breach. This decision came more than three months after the Trump administration indicated that the United States was planning to withdraw from the treaty.

The Myth of Triumphalism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Moral Leadership ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Us Military ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Insight Into

Virtually no one anticipated the ending of the Cold War. Understanding how this long-standing conflict was peacefully resolved can give us insight into how to conclude other seemingly intractable conflicts. Triumphalists believe that President Ronald Reagan “won” the Cold War by building up US military power and threatening the USSR. His hard-line policies forced Moscow to reduce its arsenal, adopt democratic reforms, withdraw from its war in Afghanistan, and ultimately collapse. Triumphalists assert that contemporary leaders should follow Reagan’s example bycompelling adversaries into submission. However, triumphalism is a myth, a series of falsehoods about Reagan’s intentions, his policies, and the impact his administration had on the USSR.Drawing upon American and Soviet sources,this book demonstrates that Reagan’s initial hard-line policies brought the superpowers to the brink of war and made it more difficult for Moscow to disarm and reform. Compellence failed miserably. The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust. The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced radical new ideas about nuclear disarmament. Consequently, both encountered domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.

Jazz as Democracy?? Dave Brubeck and Cold War Politics

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Crist
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Sequence Of Events ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Governmental Secrecy ◽  
The Impact

Abstract The Dave Brubeck Quartet's 1958 tour on behalf of the U.S. State Department, part of the grand Cold War project of propagating American-style democracy in opposition to communism, did not advance in an orderly and self-evident manner. Rather it was an extremely contingent enterprise enacted through countless individual actions and statements by a motley assortment of bureaucrats and businessmen, and frequently teetered on the brink of chaos. The story of Brubeck's tour, including its evolution and impact, is complex and multifaceted, involving overlapping and conflicting agendas, governmental secrecy, high-minded idealism, and hard-nosed business. The narrative also raises issues of race and race relations in the context of the Cold War struggle against communism and brings into focus the increasing cultural prestige of jazz and other popular genres worldwide during the period when the ideological premises of the Cold War were being formulated. Thirty years later——in 1988, as the Cold War was waning——the Quartet performed in Moscow at the reciprocal state dinner hosted by President Ronald Reagan for General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during their fourth summit meeting. The sequence of events leading up to this occasion, including the Quartet's long-anticipated tour of the Soviet Union during the previous year, reveals Brubeck to have been not only a talented musician but a canny entrepreneur as well. By the late 1980s the cultural and political landscape had shifted so dramatically as to be virtually unrecognizable to the Cold Warriors of the 1950s. By all accounts, Brubeck's tours in the 1950s and 1980s were among the most successful of their kind. Though Brubeck attributes their efficacy primarily to the power of an influential idea that came into its own toward the beginning of the Cold War——namely, jazz as democracy——the documentary record makes clear that the impact of his travels involved a multifarious nexus of other factors as well, including reputation, personality, and marketability.

scholarly journals History of and Aftermath from the Withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Berliner ◽  
Jake Hecla ◽  
Michael Bondin ◽  
Austin Mullen ◽  
Kelsey Amundson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Historical Review ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Intermediate Range ◽  
Force Structure ◽  
Nuclear Stability ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of

On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.

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