Right to be forgotten and fundamental rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 35-66
Author(s):  
Se Eun Jeong
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 31-39
Author(s):  
Ana Bobić

AbstractThe relationship between the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht is perhaps one of the most explored relationships in all of EU’s legal history. In attempting to understand and operationalize the uncertainty surrounding the positioning between EU and national constitutional orders, they have in some respects followed the footsteps of a typical life-long love story: in the early years of European integration, both courts appeared to be in denial of any romance, and entered into a conflict over the question of the final arbiter; they subsequently turned to flirting by moving away from an institutionally based conflict towards finding a common substantive ground; which resulted in finally abandoning the competition for domination, but rather embracing mutual respect and a heterarchical relationship. This brief piece follows these developments in fundamental rights review that for now end with the second German decision concerning the right to be forgotten.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 27-30
Author(s):  
Matej Avbelj

AbstractThe ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Right to be forgotten II case is an example of constitutional pluralism in action. It demonstrates how a pluralist-minded court can elevate itself from and above the constitutional confines of its own legal order. By integrating the material standards of another legal order in its own review of constitutionality a national constitutional court contributes directly to the strengthening of the fundamental rights of individuals against the national authorities within the overall system of European legal order.


Author(s):  
Evgeniya V. GERASIMOVA

The development of digital technologies affects the legal status of an individual. The task of constitutional justice is the constitutional interpretation of new legal phenomena such as the right to be forgotten. This article aims to analyze the right to be forgotten in the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and German Constitutional Court in a comparative aspect. The research methodology is primarily a dialectical method. This method helps the author to identify the content of the right to be forgotten, as well as to determine its role in relation to other constitutionally significant values. The comparative legal method is of particular importance for achieving the objectives of the research and helps to highlight the general and specific in the approaches of the courts to the concept of this right. This approach distinguishes the novelty of this research in comparison with other papers. The use of the dialectical and comparative legal research methods allows drawing the following conclusions. The distinctive feature of the right to be forgotten is its dualistic nature. On the one hand, this is a civil right associated with the right to privacy; on the other, it acts as a way to protect other constitutional rights (for example, the dignity of the individual). This right is not absolute. Some information may be of public interest. To resolve the issue of the prevailing constitutionally significant value in a particular case, the Russian Constitutional Court suggests using the method of finding a balance. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany emphasized that the right to free personal development and dignity sometimes prevails over freedom of information, especially considering the time factor in the case, as well as the degree of harm caused to a person by links to information posted on the Internet. The German Federal Constitutional Court, characterizing the legal relationship regarding the exercise of the right to be forgotten, highlights that this is a relationship between private subjects with fundamental rights, and refers to the concept of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (“mittelbare Drittwirkung”) developed in German constitutional law. This article concludes that the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the right to be forgotten are the guidelines for other courts, as well as the legislator for further improving legal regulation. Taking into account the development of information technologies, the author believes that the constitutional courts will more than once turn to the digital aspects of the legal status of an individual and, in particular, the concept of the right to be forgotten.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-48
Author(s):  
Daria A. Petrova ◽  
Ekaterina A. Galchun

The internet information and telecommunications network, due to its accessibility and easy storage and distribution of huge amounts of data, and its ability to search and find information, plays a key role in the implementation of such fundamental rights as freedom of speech and the press. At the same time, there is an increasing risk that materials on the World Wide Web may harm the rights and legitimate interests of individuals, especially the right to privacy. In these conditions of eternal competition between the public and the private, the right to be forgotten arises as a mechanism that allows one to remove or slow the spread of unwanted information. The authors investigate the problem of implementing this relatively new opportunity in the context of finding a balance between the public interest in obtaining information and the private interest in destroying it. It is argued that this category of cases is difficult due to the lack of a unified standard of proof and criteria for evaluating arguments. Based on an analysis of the most important precedents, the most common legal positions on the issue are identified and critically assessed. An increasing priority afforded to public interest and the decreasing requirements for the deletion of information is revealed. The authors consider the emergence of the right to be forgotten as a new mechanism for settling disputes in a pre-trial manner, by allowing one to not completely destroy, but to suspend the dissemination of undesirable information, thereby protecting private interests without violating the legitimate rights of the public. The conclusion is made about the right to be forgotten as a compromise in the conflict of fundamental rights. An approximate list of arguments for applicants and respondents is provided, suitable for practical application in disputes about the right to be forgotten.


2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.


2021 ◽  
pp. 60-78
Author(s):  
Andrei Smochina ◽  
◽  
Alexandru Tarna ◽  

Information technology changed the way we relate to information as any data posted on the Internet can remain accessible indefinitely. This ease of access undoubtedly favored the freedom of information, but the fundamental right to privacy of natural persons seems to be under threat in the absence of adequate legal mechanisms. Since recently the Court of Justice of the European Union (,,CJEU”) ruled in two cases (C136/17 and C-507/17) on a series of questions concerning the implementation of the right to de-referencing (digital right to be forgotten) and its territorial scope, this paper analyses the impact of those two judgments on the effectiveness of the right to be forgotten. On the one hand, we are witnessing its strengthening, especially as a result of the clarification that, in principle, the operator of a search engine is required to admit a request for de-referencing where the information relates to an earlier stage of a legal proceeding and no longer corresponds to the current situation. On the other hand, we find a limitation of its effectiveness, since, by default, the links removal by the operator of the search engine will only be done on the versions of that search engine corresponding to all member states. However, we must not forget that CJEU emphasized that, in the light of national standards of protection of fundamental rights, a supervisory or judicial authority of a member state remains competent to order, where appropriate, the operator of that search engine to carry out a de-referencing concerning all its versions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-32
Author(s):  
Kayo Lucas Coutinho De Menezes ◽  
Luana Dos Santos Alves ◽  
Pedro Teófilo De Sá

This work aimed to study personality rights in the legal system, focused on the internet with a focus on image advertising rights, to discuss the reflexes of continuity (forgetfulness). For this, the deductive method was used. In this way, the consequences of the right to use the image and the right to be forgotten were studied. It was observed that the theme is related to personality rights and that it has constitutionalprotection, focused on fundamental rights as a way for the State to intervene and enforce the rights of the holder of the right to image and oblivion. However, when used in disagreement with the constitutional and infraconstitutional mandate causing damage to its holder, the right to indemnity action is guaranteed.


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