scholarly journals The pivotal role of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in protecting citizens’ rights

Author(s):  
Sofia Smirnova

The article examines the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and aims to exemplify the ways in which it clearly illustrates the principle of indirect effect. The article would argue that indirect effect has played a pivotal role in protecting citizens' rights, particularly in the absence of the horizontal direct effect of directives. The main cases explored in the article examine the ways in which the law of the European Union has been developing as it is constantly subject to interpretation. It is important to examine the case law of the European Union on a case-by-case basis, as with contextual change, changes the interpretation of the principles. The development of EU Law is incremental requiring a careful case-by-case analysis, as demonstrated in the article above by the cases of indirect effect.

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 139-167
Author(s):  
Ester Herlin-Karnell ◽  
Theodore Konstadinides

Abstract The principle of consistency has a prominent place in EU law. In the Treaty of Lisbon, it constitutes an umbrella under which a number of legal principles of EU law follow as corollaries. Consistency manifests itself within both horizontal and vertical levels of governance. This chapter will unpack this principle and will focus on the broader implications of consistency for the division of powers in EU law. In doing so, the authors aim to discuss the rise of consistency in EU law and decrypt its various constitutional expressions in order to determine its scope of application. Two notions of consistency are presented: a formal one that appears in the Treaty of Lisbon and a strategic one, prominent in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is argued that consistency is relevant to both traditional (integrationist) and alternative (differentiated) routes to European integration. The chapter concludes by discussing whether the undefined nature of ‘consistency’ puts it at risk of becoming an empty vessel.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2020 ◽  
pp. 205-239
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter addresses the Treaty's provisions on the enforcement of EU law, particularly looking at Articles 258–260 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The European Commission's enforcement action, known as ‘infringement proceedings’, is set out in Article 258 TFEU. If the Commission proves an infringement has occurred, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will issue a binding verdict that requires the Member State to rectify the breach: in other words, to amend its domestic laws until they are compliant with EU law. Article 260 TFEU makes clear, however, that the CJEU can only order ‘compliance’. Article 259 sets out a very similar process, rarely used, for Member State v Member State infringement proceedings. The chapter then considers the CJEU's development of the principles of direct and indirect effect and state liability, and explores the remedies for breaches of EU law. It also assesses the impact of Brexit on the enforcement of EU law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-27
Author(s):  
Ondrej Hamuľák ◽  
David Kopal ◽  
Tanel Kerikmäe

The aim of this paper is to determine the position of the CJEU towards the national identity with regard to its case law and whether the Court gives preference to the national identity or to the primacy of EU law during the balancing between the constitutional principles and the interests of member states with EU law. The introductory part of the paper addresses the insertion and the development of the national identity clause in the primary law. Its main part consists of analysis of the case law of the CJEU, as well as of the opinions of Advocates General, in the period before and after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-56
Author(s):  
Anna Kosińska

The present study seeks to answer the question whether the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in cases concerning the exercise of broadly understood cultural policies may in reality affect the extent of implementation of cultural rights—that is, access to products of culture, participation in cultural life and freedom of artistic creativity—at the level of Member States. Cultural rights are traditionally regulated by the constitutions of EU Member States and are classified by legal scholars and commentators as second generation rights. Culture, in turn, according to primary legislation of the European Union, is only a supporting competence (Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). However, a review of the Court’s case law demonstrates that CJEU’s judgments form standards that contribute to a more effective implementation of cultural rights guaranteed in the national law of the Member States and international agreements to which they are parties. This results from the nature of the Union’s law, which penetrates a national system and thanks to the principle of direct effect and supremacy truly affects the situation of EU citizens.


Author(s):  
Daniel HALBERSTAM

Abstract This article provides a constitutionally grounded understanding of the vexing principle of ‘national procedural autonomy’ that haunts the vindication of EU law in national court. After identifying tensions and confusion in the debate surrounding this purported principle of ‘autonomy’, the Article turns to the foundational text and structure of Union law to reconstruct the proper constitutional basis for deploying or supplanting national procedures and remedies. It further argues that much of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may be considered through the lens of ‘prudential avoidance’, ie the decision to avoid difficult constitutional questions surrounding the principle of conferral. As the last Part shows, a constitutional understanding of ‘national procedural authority’—not ‘autonomy’—helps clear up some persistent puzzles, and provides critical guidance for when deference to national procedures and remedies is appropriate, and when such deference is misplaced. Comparative references inform the argument along the way.


Climate Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Suzanne Kingston

In EU law the polluter pays principle (ppp) enjoys constitutional status: Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) enshrines it among the fundamental principles of the EU’s environmental policy. This article considers the legal status and development of the ppp in EU law, in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) and in EU policy, most recently in the EU’s Green New Deal. It goes on to identify three bodies of climate-related litigation where the ppp has been most influential to date: first, cases concerning the EU ets and emissions; second, cases concerning EU energy law; and third, cases concerning EU state-aid law. The conclusion reflects on the potential role of the ppp in other areas, including climate cases based on human and environmental rights, and climate cases brought against private parties.


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