scholarly journals Principle of Interpretation in Favor of the Insuree in Turkish Social Security Law

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurgül Emine Barın
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Labor Law ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Business Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
True Meaning ◽  
The Common

One of the major problems encountered in the implementation of the rule of law is in the absence of the meaning of law or what it wants to tell is not clearly defined, the true meaning is revealed through interpretation. In labor law and social security law; Although the review will benefit from the rules for the common law, workers-interpretation in favor of the insuree is effective. This policy is considered as one of the fundamental policies of the Labour and Social Security Law. Located between the basic policies of business law, the protection of the workers, which is a consequence of the interpretation in favor of the insuree policy, shows itself in the form of interpretation in favor of the insuree in the social security law. One factor for necessity of supporting interpretation in favor of the insuree is, social security right is among the basic human rights. In particular, the interpretation of legislation related to the social security right by constitutional guarantee, it is important to keep in mind this basic policy. The overall purpose of the social security law is to benefit from this right by more people, namely the expansion of the scope. In this study, the place of interpretation in favor of the insuree and limitations related to this interpretation will be examined in the light of samples of Supreme Court Decisions and regarding substance of the Constitution and laws.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: CONCEPTUAL CONUNDRUM OR INTERPRETATIVE INQUIRY?

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.R.S. Allan
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
True Meaning ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One

THE essay questions the sense and purpose of current debate over the coherence of the ultra vires doctrine. It argues that the dispute is mainly semantic, serving to conceal rather than illuminate genuine questions about the nature and legitimacy of judicial review. If the doctrine’s opponents are right to emphasise the common law basis of the relevant standards of legality, abstractly conceived, the ultra vires school is equally right to insist that, in a statutory context, legislative intention is critical to the application of such standards. To connect the present debate with significant issues of substance, it would have to be recast as one between those favouring a “normativist” grounding of judicial review in the rule of law, on the one hand, and their “functionalist” or “pluralist” opponents, generally hostile to judicial review, on the other. The futility of the present debate is revealed by the simultaneous adherence of both sides to an integrated “rule of law” perspective. A useful analysis of the foundations of judicial review, capable of illuminating issues of substance, must explore the true meaning of the interrelated concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. No attack on the “empty formalism” of the ultra vires doctrine can carry conviction while at the same time affirming the doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty, a doctrine equally malleable in the hands of judicial interpreters of statute, guided by common law precepts.

scholarly journals A Populist Monster and the future of Constitutional Democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.

The Rule of Law and Good Governance

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Henk Addink
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
Continental Tradition

The concept of the rule of law has different—common law and continental—historical roots and traditional perspectives. The common law tradition is more focused on limiting the powers of the state, whereas the continental tradition focuses on not just to limit but also to empower the government. But both systems have a focus on the rule of law. The rule of law in the classical liberal tradition is based on four elements: legality, division and balance of powers, independent judicial control, and protection of fundamental rights. The differences between rule of law and rechtsstaat are: different concepts of the state, mixed legal systems and different approaches of a constitution, and different perspectives on human rights. There are two levels of development: a model in which law is a way of structuring and restricting the power of the state, the second level is more subjective and has important individual positions. The concept of good governance related to these developments makes clear the need to broaden the concept of the rule of law.

The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency by David Dyzenhaus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 250pp. Page numbers in text are to this book.

2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-483
Author(s):  
Jamie Cameron
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Action ◽  
The Common ◽  
Constitutive Properties ◽  
Principle Of Legality

What the rule of law means and how it constrains the exercise of state power raise issues which have been debated-without resolution-over the ages. Times of emergency bring fresh energy to the discussion, and David Dyzenhaus is one of many who have entered the fray to debate the balance between liberty and national security in the post 9/11 period. It has not been easy for those who place their trust in written constitutions to account for the way textual guarantees are diluted when the state is under threat. Rather than address that dilemma, Dyzenhaus sets his ideas apart by proposing a theory which maximizes the protection of rights in emergency circumstances, without straining the institutional capacities or legitimacy of the judiciary. This theory invokes the pedigree of the common law-and “common law constitutionalism”-and is grounded in the constitutive properties of the rule of law, or principle of legality. Dyzenhaus may not have answered the questions readers will want to ask, but he has opened up the middle ground between the competing supremacies yet more, by drawing common law constitutionalism and its rule-of-law pedigree into constitutional theories of review. More to the point, he has challenged the judiciary to draw on the moral resources of the law to make executive and legislative action as accountable as possible at all times, in emergencies as well as in normal times. Readers can and should engage, at many levels, with the complexity of his thought in this important book.

Interpreting the Contours of Self-Defence within the Boundaries of the Rule of Law, the Common Law and Human Rights

2015 ◽  
Vol 79 (5) ◽  
pp. 330-343
Author(s):  
Catherine Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Criminal Legal System ◽  
Objective Concept ◽  
Self Defence

The Crime and Courts Act 2013 has amended s. 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 on the amount of force a person can use in self-defence. The amended provision poses a dilemma for the courts: it states that only reasonable force can be used by a householder against a trespasser, but adds that force is unreasonable if it is grossly disproportionate. Until now, the courts have treated reasonable force and proportionate force as synonyms. This article suggests that the amended s. 76 should be interpreted to comply with the rule of law, incorporating the idea of equality before the law and legality. The courts should respect the traditional common law concept of reasonableness which is an impartial, objective concept that plays an important role across the whole of the criminal legal system. In addition, the article points out that the Act must be interpreted, where possible, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights to avoid the problems that arose with the defence of lawful chastisement.

scholarly journals How has China formed its conception of the rule of law? A contextual analysis of legal instrumentalism in ROC and PRC law-making

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qianlan Wu
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Contextual Analysis ◽  
European Origin ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Making

The rule of law as a globally recognised concept is multi-faceted (Chesterman, 2008). In the common-law tradition, it is conceived through a formal and substantive framework. In essence, it centres on the supremacy of the law over the arbitrary exercise of power and the formal legality of the law (Tamanaha, 2004, p. 115; Cotterrell, 1992, p. 157). The rule-of-law concept has been criticised as being of unique European origin, where plural social organisation and universal natural law constitute its two preconditions (Unger, 1977, pp. 80–110). It has, however, been advocated around the world as one essential principle leading to modernity, where the legitimacy of the law based on the formal and substantive rule of law serves as a strong symbol for a modern society (Deflem, 1996, p. 5).

The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hulsebosch
Keyword(s):  
American Revolution ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Early America ◽  
Constitutional History ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Time Out ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ancient Constitution ◽  
Anglo American

One of the great, unrecognized ironies in Anglo-American constitutional history is that Sir Edward Coke, the seventeenth-century mythologist of the “ancient constitution” and the English jurist most celebrated in early America, did not believe that subjects enjoyed the common law and many related rights of Englishmen while overseas. “The common law,” Coke declared in Parliament in 1628, “meddles with nothing that is done beyond the seas.” The ancient constitution was an English constitution and, though non-English subjects of the English king could enjoy its liberties and privileges while in England, it did not apply to anyone outside that realm. The jurisprudence that gave intellectual shape to colonial resistance before, and to notions of the rule of law after, the American Revolution was not intended by its primary author to benefit Americans. Whether or not the ancient constitution existed time out of mind, it did not extend to land out of sight.

3. The features and sources of the UK constitution

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-70
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Uk

This chapter examines the characteristics of the UK constitution. The main features of the UK constitution are that it is uncodified; flexible; traditionally unitary but now debatably a union state; monarchical; parliamentary; and based on a bedrock of important constitutional doctrines and principles: parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law, separation of powers; the courts are also basing some decisions on bedrock principles of the common law. Meanwhile, the laws, rules, and practices of the UK constitution can be found in constitutional statutes; judicial decisions; constitutional conventions; international treaties; the royal prerogative; the law and custom of Parliament; and works of authoritative writers. The chapter then looks at the arguments for and against codifying the UK constitution.

6. The royal prerogative and constitutional conventions

Public Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk

This chapter explores the historical, legal, and political nature of the Crown and the royal prerogative. The rule of law requires that the government act according to the law, which means that the powers of the government must be derived from the law. However, within the UK Constitution, some powers of the government are part of the royal prerogative, as recognised by the common law. The concepts of the Crown and the royal prerogative mean that although the Queen is Head of State, it is generally the ministers who form the government that exercise the prerogative powers of the Crown. For this reason, many prerogative powers are often referred to as the ‘ministerial prerogatives’, and the few prerogative powers still exercised personally by the monarch, are referred to as the ‘personal prerogatives’.

6. The royal prerogative and constitutional conventions

Public Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 203-258
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk

This chapter explores the historical, legal, and political nature of the Crown and the royal prerogative. The rule of law requires that the government act according to the law, which means that the powers of the government must be derived from the law. However, within the UK Constitution, some powers of the government stem from the royal prerogative, as recognized by the common law. The concepts of the Crown and the royal prerogative mean that although the Queen is Head of State, it is generally the ministers who form the government that exercise the prerogative powers of the Crown. For this reason, many prerogative powers are often referred to as the ‘ministerial prerogatives’, and the few prerogative powers still exercised personally by the monarch, are referred to as the ‘personal prerogatives’.

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