Armed Forces Operation in the Scope of the Civilian Health Protection during Peacekeeping and Stabilization Missions: A Short Review

Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780198821380.003.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Ian Park

Keyword(s):

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Right To Life

The introduction sets out the broad questions to be addressed, namely: do states have right to life obligations during armed conflict; if so, what are these obligations; when do they apply, and in respect of whom; and how can states best ensure compliance with these obligations? The introduction also provides a précis of each chapter and the themes explored therein. Additionally, it makes reference to the fact that UK armed forces doctrine and procedures in respect of recent armed conflicts will be used as examples to explore the issues under consideration in the book. The aim is also to proffer a view on where the current UK procedures do not comply with the state’s right to life obligations and how this can be rectified.

New code for the protection of civilian population and property during armed conflict

International Review of the Red Cross ◽

10.1017/s0020860400067358 ◽

1980 ◽

Vol 20 (219) ◽

pp. 287-315 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ionel Gloşcă

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

International Treaties ◽

Civilian Population ◽

State Activity ◽

The Holocaust ◽

Definition Of ◽

Do So

One of the principles underlying international law applicable in armed conflicts is that no act of war is permitted against the civilian population, consisting, by definition, of persons who take no part in the hostilities.Until the holocaust of 1939–45, international law gave practically no real protection to the civilian population in the event of war, and was not even intended to do so since up to that time war was considered to be a State activity from which civilians remained aloof. There were, nonetheless, general principles and rules in various international treaties which, in one way or another, related also to the civilian population.

Get off my cloud: cyber warfare, international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilians

International Review of the Red Cross ◽

10.1017/s1816383113000246 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 94 (886) ◽

pp. 533-578 ◽

Cited By ~ 45

Author(s):

Cordula Droege

Keyword(s):

Cyber Security ◽

Traffic Control ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Forces ◽

International Humanitarian Law ◽

Cyber Warfare ◽

Humanitarian Law ◽

Civilian Population ◽

Oil Pipeline ◽

Cyber Space

AbstractCyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.

Exploring the “continuous combat function” concept in armed conflicts: Time for an extended application?

International Review of the Red Cross ◽

10.1017/s1816383119000298 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 100 (907-909) ◽

pp. 267-285

Author(s):

Sabrina Henry

Keyword(s):

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Armed Groups ◽

Function Concept ◽

Extended Application

AbstractThis paper focuses on the “continuous combat function” concept and proposes to extend its application. First, the article will demonstrate that the continuous combat function concept should be extended to certain members of organized armed groups in cases where those groups do not belong to any of the parties to an international armed conflict and whose actions do not reach the level of intensity required for a separate non-international armed conflict (NIAC) to exist. Secondly, the paper will look at the extension of this concept in order to determine individual membership in State armed forces in the context of a NIAC, while arguing that the notion of “armed forces” should be interpreted differently depending of the nature of the conflict, be it international or non-international.

The Obama Administration and Targeting “War-Sustaining” Objects in Noninternational Armed Conflict

The American Journal of International Law ◽

10.1017/s0002930000763160 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 110 (4) ◽

pp. 663-679 ◽

Cited By ~ 26

Author(s):

Ryan Goodman

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Second Order ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Islamic State ◽

President Obama ◽

Law Of Armed Conflict ◽

Economic Infrastructure ◽

Significant Attention

Since September 11, 2001, legal experts have focused significant attention on the lethal targeting of individuals by both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. An equally significant legacy of the post-9/11 administrations, however, may be the decisions to target specific kinds of objects. Those decisions greatly affect the success of U.S. efforts to win ongoing conflicts, such as the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These decisions may also become precedents for military attacks that states consider lawful, whether carried out by cyber or kinetic means, in future armed conflicts.To achieve the goal of destroying ISIL, President Obama embraced what many in the international law community long regarded as off-limits: targeting war-sustaining capabilities, such as the economic infrastructure used to generate revenue for an enemy's armed forces. Although the weight of scholarly opinion has for years maintained that such objects are not legitimate military targets, the existing literature on this topic is highly deficient. Academic discussion has yet to grapple with some of the strongest and clearest evidence in support of the U.S. view on the legality of such targeting decisions. Indeed, intellectual resources may be better spent not on the question of whether such objects are legitimate military targets under the law of armed conflict, but on second-order questions, such as how to apply proportionality analysis and how to identify limiting principles to guard against unintentional slippery slopes. In this article, I discuss the legal pedigree for war-sustaining targeting. I then turn to identify some of the most significant second-order questions and how we might begin to address them.

ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF UKRAINE: LEGAL QUALIFI-CATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

RUDN JOURNAL OF LAW ◽

10.22363/2313-2337-2019-23-3-394-412 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 23 (3) ◽

pp. 394-412

Author(s):

Petr P. Kremnev

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Humanitarian Law ◽

Legal Analysis ◽

The South ◽

Legal Doctrine ◽

Legal Norms ◽

Legal Consequences

Unconstitutional change of power in Ukraine as a result of the "Maidan revolution" in February 2014, with the subsequent power grab by Ukrainian radicals of local authorities under nationalist slogans, led to the establishment of control over parts of the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions by Donbass militias, and then to the ongoing fighting between the armed formations of the latter with units of the regular armed forces of Ukraine. The purpose of this publication is to establish the form of the armed conflict and its legal consequences from the standpoint of current international law, which has not yet found proper legal analysis and coverage in either domestic or foreign (including Ukrainian) legal doctrinе. In official statements and legislative acts of Ukraine, this conflict is declared as a "state of war with Russia", "aggression of Russia", and the Ukrainian doctrine of international law almost unanimously declares the need to apply to the conflict the norms of international humanitarian law and qualifies it as an international armed conflict. In this publication, on the basis of the analysis of existing international legal norms and legal doctrine, the qualification of existing forms of armed conflicts is carried out: war, international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, internationalized armed conflict. This examines the legal consequences (or otherwise the obligations of the parties to the conflict) that are caused by each form of such armed conflict, that is concealed and ignored by the Ukrainian side. On the basis of the theoretical and legal analysis of the UN Charter, the relevant provisions of the Geneva conventions on the protection of victims of war of 1949 and Additional protocols I and II of 1977, the author qualifies the situation in the South-East of Ukraine as a non-international armed conflict and the obligation to comply with applicable legal norms by all parties to the conflict. At the same time, the author comes to the conclusion about the insolvency of the claims about the applicability of the rules governing other mentioned forms of armed conflicts.

Civilian Self-Protection and Civilian Targeting in Armed Conflicts: Who Protects Civilians?

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.216 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Betcy Jose ◽

Peace A. Medie

Keyword(s):

Civil War ◽

Civil Wars ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Physical Violence ◽

International Community ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Effective Protection ◽

Civilian Protection ◽

Vast Literature ◽

Self Protection

Studies have shown that civilians are often intentionally targeted in civil wars and that civilian protection efforts launched by the international community have not always been successful, if they occur at all. Civilians, therefore, have had to rely on themselves for protection in most conflicts. However, despite the pervasiveness of civilian self-protection (CSP) and its success at protecting civilians from violence in some cases, it is rarely discussed in the civilian protection literature, and its impact on civilian targeting is inadequately explored. Addressing this gap in the study and practice of civilian protection by carefully conceptualizing CSP and appreciating its role in civil war dynamics can further scholarly and practitioner discussions on civilian protection. CSP is defined as (a) actions taken to protect against immediate, direct threats to physical integrity imposed by belligerents or traditional protection actors; (b) primarily selected and employed by civilians; and (c) employed during an armed conflict. CSP strategies can be organized into three categories. The first, non-engagement, describes strategies in which civilians do not interact with belligerents or traditional protection actors who pose a threat to them. The second, nonviolent engagement, entails some interaction with one or more actors who may harm civilians. The third, violent engagement, includes CSP strategies that incorporate physical violence. These CSP strategies may actually render civilians more vulnerable to threats. First, some CSP strategies might lock civilians into unpredictable relationships with belligerents, which can become dangerous. Second, allying with one set of belligerents might lead to targeting by opposition forces, who view these CSP strategies as crucial support for their enemies. Third, civilians may overestimate how successful their CSP strategies can be, exposing them to harm. Fourth, civilian use of violence may cause belligerents to view them as threats, leading to intentional targeting. Appreciation of the reasons why civilians engage in CSP and understanding when and how this may endanger them can inspire more effective protection policies, as well as advance our understanding of civil war dynamics. For instance, further study on these issues can provide some insights into the conditions under which CSP is effective in protecting civilians and how the international community can support CSP. This information could be particularly useful in the design and execution of peacekeeping strategies that are sensitive to the efforts and needs of conflict-affected communities. Additionally, studying CSP can advance the vast literature on civilian targeting by shedding additional light on why belligerents kill civilians.

Part IV The Right to Reparation/Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, B Guarantees of Non-Recurrence of Violations, Principle 37 Disbandment of Parastatal Armed Forces/Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Children

10.1093/law/9780198743606.003.0041 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Duthie Roger ◽

Mayer-Rieckh Alexander

Keyword(s):

Transitional Justice ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Theoretical Framework ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Historical Background ◽

Armed Groups ◽

Social Reintegration ◽

Criminal Violence ◽

The Right

Principle 37 focuses on the disbandment of parastatal armed forces and the demobilization and social reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts. It articulates measures designed to prevent the transformation of conflict violence to criminal violence through the dismantling and reintegration of all armed groups engaged in abuses, and outlines comprehensive responses to the injustices experienced by children during armed conflict. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 37 before discussing its theoretical framework and practice. It then examines the importance of reintegration processes and how they can be affected by transitional justice measures, along with their implications for former child combatants. It also highlights the relevance of measures for dealing with unofficial armed groups from an impunity standpoint, as well as the efforts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs to address them.

Killing Citizens: Core Legal Dilemmas in the Targeted Killing Abroad of Canadian Foreign Fighters

Canadian Yearbook of international Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international ◽

10.1017/cyl.2017.13 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 54 ◽

pp. 134-187

Author(s):

CRAIG FORCESE ◽

LEAH WEST SHERRIFF

Keyword(s):

United Kingdom ◽

International Law ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Terrorist Attack ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Military Force ◽

Targeted Killing ◽

Canadian Government ◽

The United Kingdom

AbstractFor the first time since the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada is in an armed conflict with an insurgency that has actively recruited Canadians and directed them to use or promote violence against Canada. In the result, the Canadian government may ask its soldiers to target and kill fellow Canadians abroad or to assist allies in doing so. This situation raises a host of novel legal issues, including the question of “targeted killing.” This matter arose for the United Kingdom in 2015 when it directed the use of military force against several Britons believed to be plotting a terrorist attack against the United Kingdom from abroad. This incident sparked a report from the British Parliament highlighting legal dilemmas. This article does the same for Canada by focusing on the main legal implications surrounding a targeted killing by the Canadian government of a Canadian citizen abroad. This exercise shows that a Canadian policy of targeted killing would oblige Canada to make choices on several weighty legal matters. First, the article discusses the Canadian public law rules that apply when the Canadian Armed Forces deploy in armed conflicts overseas. It then analyzes international law governing state uses of military force, including the regulation of the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the law of armed conflict (jus in bello). It also examines an alternative body of international law: that governing peacetime uses of lethal force by states. The article concludes by weaving together these areas of law into a single set of legal questions that would necessarily need to be addressed prior to the targeted killing of a Canadian abroad.

Protecting the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict

Our Earth Matters ◽

10.3233/stal210015 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Peter Maurer

Keyword(s):

Natural Environment ◽

Rural Areas ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

Environmental Consequences ◽

Climate Risks ◽

Direct And Indirect Impacts ◽

Urban And Rural Areas ◽

Indirect Impacts

Armed conflicts have direct and indirect impacts on the natural environment, and climate risks now magnify this harm for dependent communities. Too often, the natural environment is directly attacked or suffers incidental damage as a result of the use of certain methods or means of warfare. It is also at risk from damage and destruction to the built environment, across urban and rural areas. To reduce this harm, parties to armed conflict can integrate legal protections for the environment into their armed forces’ doctrine to reduce damage as they fight. Humanitarians in turn must commit sufficient resources and expertise to respond to the needs of those coping with the environmental consequences of conflict, and limit their own climate and environmental footprint. In order to address this challenge, in November 2020 the ICRC released the Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict which aim to contribute in a practical way to promoting respect for and protection of this precious asset during armed conflicts.