Uzasadnienia orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w kwestii dopuszczalności wniosków i skarg konstytucyjnych a konstytucyjne standardy sprawiedliwości proceduralnej

2014 ◽  
pp. 117-136
Author(s):  
Łukasz M. Bębenista

The author focuses on how the Constitutional Court formulates reasons for its decisions on the admissibility of the constitutional complaints and applications. The Court’s practice is confronted with constitutional standards of procedural fairness. The author draws attention to the need to ensure the predictable nature of the decisions of the Constitutional Court by the consistency of its case-law, in particular with regard to the concept of the matters referred to in Art. 191 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. The author analyzes the requirement to indicate in what way the freedom or the applicant’s constitutional rights have been violated, having regard to the obligation to disclose the motives of the Court’s ruling in a clear manner. In the author’s opinion, the obligation to justify the decision in such a way that the applicant verify the judge reasoning also applies to the decision on account of appeal against a decision to refuse to grant constitutional complaint further. The author looks at the ground for refusal of the application or the constitutional complaint further action from the perspective of, on the one hand, the obligation of a comprehensive examination of the facts, on the other hand, the obligation to smooth hearing within a reasonable time.

2019 ◽  
pp. 35-47
Author(s):  
IONUȚ DUMITRU APACHIȚEI

The current study aims at presenting the conditions under which the restriction of the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms can operate in order to satisfy the measures regarding the protection of national security. One the one hand, the valences of constitutional law of this topic lie on the fact that the adopted measures must be in close correspondence with the exigencies of the Constitution, and on the other hand, the checking of the conditions of adopting specific measures to restrict constitutional rights and freedoms is the prerogative of the Constitutional Court asked to verify the compliance with the provisions of the Fundamental Law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 237
Author(s):  
Friday Okafor Onamson

This paper analyzes the provisions of the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 which, against the grain of general law rules on decrystallisation of floating charge, provides that a crystallised floating charge can decrystallise or refloat where the creditor withdraws from possession after the debtor has commenced payment or if the receiver, with consent of the creditor, is withdrawn. The analysis is relevant because the provision has dire implications for business sustainability since parties engage in debt transaction to sustain the going concern basis of their businesses. Bearing in mind that uncertainty pervades the boundaries between fixed and floating charge, the paper asks what is the priority status of a decrystallised floating charge as against a floating charge created prior to refloatation; and what is the relationship between the decrystallised floating charge and a fixed charge that predated the decrystallisation on the one hand and a fixed charge created post refloatation on the other hand. Using the case law and existing literature the paper showed that the statutory provision for decrystallisation of floating charge not only failed to clarify the general law rules on decrystallisation of floating charge, but it has cast a veil of uncertainty over the rights of parties to a debt transaction secured by floating charge. Since the provision can impact on the health of businesses, it behoves on the parties to be proactive in crafting debts contracts creating an interest secured by floating charge.


Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel CABELLOS ESPIÉRREZ

LABURPENA: Konstituzioak, 149.1.6 artikuluan, ez zion atea itxi nahi izan autonomia- erkidegoen parte-hartzeari araudi prozesalaren erregulazioan, eta, berez, Estatuari legegintza prozesalaren gainean eman zion eskumen esklusiboa mugatua da; izan ere, beren zuzenbide substantiboaren berezitasunetatik eratorritako espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena aitortu baitzien, aldi berean, autonomia-erkidegoei. Eskumen hori batez ere zuzenbide zibil propioa duten erkidegoetan erabiltzekoa zen, baina ez haietan bakarrik, ez eta soilik gai honi dagokionean ere. Konstituzio Auzitegiak, baina, hain modu murriztailean jokatu du konstituzio-arau hori interpretatu eta aplikatu behar izan duenean (47/2004 epaia da salbuespen bakarra), non autonomia-erkidegoen espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena ezerezean geratu baita. Artikulu honen asmoa honako hau da: alde batetik, egoera honetara nola heldu garen aztertzea; bestetik, 21/2012 epaia analizatzea, zeinak Konstituzio Auzitegiaren ildo murriztailea berresten duen; eta, azkenik, gaurko egoeran beste hautabide batzuk eskaintzea, autonomia-erkidegoek espezialitate prozesalen gainean daukaten eskumena (haietako batzuk erabiltzen ari direna) desagertzeko zorian dago-eta Konstituzio Auzitegiaren jurisprudentzian. RESUMEN: La Constitución, en su art. 149.1.6, no quiso cerrar la puerta a la intervención de las CCAA en la regulación de la normativa procesal y otorgó al Estado una competencia exclusiva sobre legislación procesal cuya exclusividad es, en realidad, limitada, dada la simultánea atribución a las CCAA de la competencia para dictar las necesarias especialidades procesales derivadas de las particularidades de su derecho sustantivo. Ello debía ser especialmente útil en aquellas comunidades con Derecho civil propio, aunque no solo en estas ni únicamente respecto de este ámbito material. Ocurre sin embargo que el Tribunal Constitucional, en las ocasiones en que ha debido interpretar y aplicar el mencionado precepto constitucional, lo ha hecho de modo tan restrictivo que, con la única y aislada excepción de la STC 47/2004, la competencia autonómica relativa a las especialidades procesales ha quedado reducida a la nada. El propósito de este artículo es, por un lado, el de examinar cómo se ha llegado a este punto; por otro, estudiar el último de los casos relevantes, la STC 21/2012, que confirma la citada línea restrictiva seguida por el Tribunal; y finalmente apuntar algunas alternativas a la situación a la que se ha llegado, en que la competencia de las CCAA en materia de especialidades procesales (que por otra parte algunas están ejerciendo) se halla condenada a la práctica desaparición en la jurisprudencia constitucional. ABSTRACT: The Constitution in section 149.1.16 has not closed the door to the Autonomous Communities intervention in the regulation of the procedural provisions and conferred the State the exclusive power over the procedural legislation albeit its exclusivity is limited by the simultaneous allocation to the Au tonomous Communities of the power to enact the necessary procedural specifities that come from the special features of its substantive law. That should be extremely useful in those Communities with their own Civil law, even though not only in those and not solely regarding this material field. But what happens is that when the Constitutional Court had to interpret and apply the aforementioned constitutional provision, it has done it so narrowly that with the only and sole exception of the Constitutional judgment 47/2004 the power is almost reduced to nothing. The purpose of this article is on the one hand to examine how this is been reached; and on the other hand, to study the last relevant ruling, judgment 21/2012, which confirms the aforementioned narrow line of interpretation followed by the Court; and finally to point at some alternatives to the situation that has been created in which the power of the Autonomous Communities regarding the procedural specificities (and which they are exercising anyway) is doomed to the practical disappearance according to the constitutional caselaw.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-173
Author(s):  
Niels Petersen

AbstractRobert Alexy is one of the most prominent proponents of proportionality in international legal scholarship. His theory has two dimensions. On the one hand, it is a normative defense of balancing. On the other hand, it seeks to provide a reconstruction of the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. This Article focuses on the reconstructive part of his theory. It argues that his reconstruction of the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court is only partly accurate. In particular, it does not provide a suitable reconstruction of the decisions in which the Court finds a statute to be inconsistent with the constitution. For this reason, the normative critique of Alexy’s theory does not necessarily translate into a critique of the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court’s application of proportionality or even the proportionality doctrine itself. Instead, it targets only one specific interpretation of proportionality.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Wala

<p>The current case law regarding the recognition of racially motivated offences as being undertaken without a reason or for an obviously trivial reason can raise serious doubts. It does not seem reasonable to assume the existence of a racial reason of the act of the perpetrator on the one hand, which is necessary for assigning an offence under Article 119 § 1 and Article 257 of the Criminal Code, and on the other hand, to recognise that the reason for the act of the perpetrator did not exist at all. Treating such reasons as trivial may also raise doubts on the juridical level.</p>


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erfaniah Zuhriah ◽  
Lutfiana Dwi Mayasari

<p>Constitutional Court’s decision on the rights of children who were born out of wedlock causes various controversies. On the one hand, it is considered as a positive decision for children’s benefit and their future. On the other hand, it is considered also as a negative decision by legalizing unregistered marriage. Using a field research and qualitative approach, this research produces a conclusion that four of respondents from  different  background  of  organizations  agree  with  this  constitutional  court decision if the intended object is the children from Sirri (unregistered) marriage. Furthermore, one respondent agrees if this decision becomes a guideline and no longer a phenomenon. The most important message from informants is a recommendation that Constitutional Court not to issue another ambiguous fatwa and this institution is capable to make a humanist decision and remains in the corridors of the religious demands that have been rooted in the community.</p> <p>Keputusan  mahkamah  konstitusi  tentang  hak  anak  diluar  nikah  menimbulkan  berbagai macam kontroversi. disatu pihak keputusan tersebut dianggap positif untuk kemaslahatan anak  dan  masa  depan  mereka,  dan  di  lain  pihak  keputusan  tersebut  dianggap  negative karena melegalkan pernikahan dibawah tangan. Dalam penelitian yang menggunakan jenis penelitian field research dengan pendekatan kualitatif ini menghasilkan suatu kesimpulan bahwa empat responden dengan latar belakang organisasi yang berbeda menyatakan setuju dengan keputusan MK tersebut jika yang dimaksud adalah anak hasil pernikahan sirri. Dan satu responden menyatakan setuju jika keputusan tersebut menjadi sebuah pedoman bukan lagi fenomenal. Pesan terpenting dari para informan adalah himbauan agar MK tak  lagi  mengeluarkan  suatu  fatwa  yang  ambigu  dan  mampu  menciptakan  keputusan yang  humanis  dan  tetap  dalam  koridor  tuntutan  keagamaan  yang  telah  mengakar  di masyarakat.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-97
Author(s):  
Dieu-Merci Ngusu Masuta

This article provides a study of the modalities and legal effects of the termination of the functions of members of the Congolese Constitutional Court. It offers a detailed analysis based mainly on the relevant provisions of Ordinance No. 16/070 of August 22, 2016 on the special status of members of the Constitutional Court. This Ordinance was adopted in application of the Congolese Constitution of February 18, 2006 in conjunction with organic-law No. 13/026 of October 15, 2013 on the organization and functioning of the Constitutional Court. Distinguishing on the one hand the normal cause of cessation of functions - the expiry of the mandate - and on the other hand the so-called exceptional causes - the resignation, dismissal and death of a member -, the study shows that the enumeration thus retained from the ordinance is incomplete with regard to the above-mentioned organic law. Thus, the list must be supplemented with the "nullity of the appointment" of a member in accordance with articles 2 and 3 of that organic law. The law is silent, however, on the issue of the voluntary retirement of members, although the implementation of this right inevitably has an impact on the end of their functions. The study therefore continues by an examination of both the general and the specific legal effects of these different modalities of ending the functions of a member of the Constitutional Court. Finally, in order to support and complete this essentially theoretical analysis, the article also looks at the question that remains most topical in Congolese constitutional law, namely the legal nature of the 'power' of the President of the Republic to appoint members of the Constitutional Court to other Courts or functions during their term of office. It concludes that such a power is not justified in the current framework of Congolese constitutional law. Indeed, it is inconceivable that such appointments should be imposed on the Constitutional Court members, their acceptance being the only exception to the principle of irremovability that governs them. Such a case should be considered one of voluntary resignation and a subsitute member should therefore only be appointed after this situation has been ascertained and established by the Constitutional Court.


Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

The parties to agreements sometimes express themselves in terms that are vague, incomplete, or uncertain. The courts have experienced considerable difficulty in deciding whether or not an agreement has been expressed in a form that is sufficiently certain for them to enforce. On the one hand, judges generally do not wish to be seen to be making the contract for the parties, and on the other hand, are reluctant to deny legal effect to an agreement that the parties have apparently accepted as valid and binding. The result has been a degree of tension in the case-law. This chapter examines two groups of cases. The first group consists of cases in which it was held that the agreement was too uncertain or too vague to be enforced, while the second comprises a number of cases in which the courts have concluded that the agreement was valid and binding.


Author(s):  
David Kosař ◽  
Ladislav Vyhnánek

This chapter focuses on the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC). It shows, on the one hand, how the CCC has so far skilfully navigated through political ups and downs and has risen to prominence in Czech politics. On the other hand, this chapter also suggests that the CCC, despite its current wide powers, is a rather fragile institution. It argues that the creation of the CCC must be understood in the broader historical and political context. To that end, the chapter sketches the institutional design of the CCC and discusses the CCC’s powers. Subsequently, the chapter analyses the internal judicial practices of the CCC and the key procedural rules, then provides the taxonomy of the CCC’s rulings as well as their style, effects, and publication. Finally, it identifies and discusses political determinants of the CCC’s functioning and focuses on the interaction of the CCC with other domestic as well as supranational actors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Iswan Toro

AbstractThe journey of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in the constitution is considered to still not compensate for the dynamics of proliferation of legislation. The reason is that the function of the DPD with the DPR in the field of legislation has been tugging and there has been intense competition in the formation of legislation, on the one hand the existence of the DPR as an institution holding a legislative function born earlier is considered to dominate the formation of legislation. On the other hand, the existence of the DPD as a new institution that is also given a legislative function, its authority is considered to be too small when compared to the authority of the DPR in the process of establishing legislation. Even the DPD is considered to add to the problem of over regulation in Indonesian legislation. Borrowing the term Richard Susskind mentions that hyper regulations or obesity are legal and over regulation. This situation led to the implementation of the DPD's legislative function not being optimal because it tends to be half-hearted. In other words, the existence of the DPD as the holder of legislative power is still under the shadow of the DPR, so it has not been taken into account in the process of establishing legislation in Indonesia, even though it has been corrected by the Constitutional Court through Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 92/PUU-X/2012 and Decision Constitutional Court Number 15/ PUU-XIII/2015, but the decision was ignored.AbstrakPerjalanan Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) dalam ketatanegaraan dianggap masih belum mengimbangi dinamika proliferasi legislasi. Penyebabnya adalah fungsi DPD dengan DPR di bidang legislasi mengalami tarik ulur dan terjadi persaingan ketat dalam pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan, di satu sisi keberadaan DPR sebagai lembaga pemegang fungsi legislasi yang lahir lebih dahulu dianggap mendominasi pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan. Sisi lain, keberadaan DPD sebagai lembaga baru yang juga diberi fungsi legislasi, kewenangannya dianggap masih terlalu kecil jika dibandingkan dengan kewenangan DPR dalam proses pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan. Bahkan DPD dianggap akan menambah permasalahan over regulasi dalam peraturan perundang-undangan Indonesia. Meminjam istilah Richard Susskind menyebutkan bahwa hyper regulations atau obesitas hukum dan over rugulation. Keadaan tersebut menyebabkan pelaksanaan fungsi legislasi DPD tidak optimal karena cendrung setengah hati. Dengan kata lain, keberadaan DPD sebagai pemegang kekuasaan legislasi masih di bawah bayang-bayang DPR, sehingga belum diperhitungkan dalam proses pembentukan perundang-undangan di Indonesia, walaupun sudah diluruskan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi melalui Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 92/PUU-X/2012 dan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 15/PUUXIII/2015, namun putusan tersebut tidak dihiraukan.


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