Chapitre 4. EU Interest Groups and their Members : When is Membership a “Collective Action Problem” ?

2002 ◽  
pp. 227-253
Author(s):  
Justin Greenwood
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Collective Action Problem

Distributional and Encompassing Coalitions in the Olsonian Theory of Interest Groups: A Strategy–Shift Effect Analysis

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-142
Author(s):  
Alberto Batinti
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Reform ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Effect Analysis ◽  
Strategy Shift ◽  
Shift Effect ◽  
Total Wealth

Abstract This paper shows that, in an Olsonian framework, the activity of encompassing groups respect to distributional coalitions has been understated in the literature. We derive this conclusion analyzing first of all the evolution of the Olsonian thought, then some of the theoretical findings that weaken die extreme dilemmatic vision of a collective action problem. Then we present a simple model of strategy choice, where distributional coalitions temporarily become encompassing groups or are ‘locked’ in a distributional strategy, unless a change in both the share of total wealth and members’ number occurs. Some implications and explanations in terms of political reform success and stickiness follow.

A Unified Spatial Model of Congress

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Buchler
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Legislative Session ◽  
Disciplinary System ◽  
Sincere Voting

This chapter presents a unified model of legislative elections, parties, and roll call voting, built around a party leadership election. First, a legislative caucus selects a party leader who campaigns based on a platform of a disciplinary system. Once elected, that leader runs the legislative session, in which roll call votes occur. Then elections occur, and incumbents face re-election with the positions they incrementally adopted. When the caucus is ideologically homogeneous, electorally diverse, and policy motivated, members will elect a leader who solves the collective action problem of sincere voting with “preference-preserving influence.” That leader will threaten to punish legislators who bow to electoral pressure to vote as centrists. Consequently, legislators vote sincerely as extremists and get slightly lower vote shares, but they offset that lost utility with policy gains that they couldn’t have gotten without party influence. Party leaders will rarely pressure legislators to vote insincerely.

scholarly journals Climate Change Inaction and Optimism

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Philip J. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Economic Growth ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Policy Context ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Ideological Fantasy

The problem of climate change inaction is sometimes said to be ‘wicked’, or essentially insoluble, and it has also been seen as a collective action problem, which is correct but inconsequential. In the absence of progress, much is made of various frailties of the public, hence the need for an optimistic tone in public discourse to overcome fatalism and encourage positive action. This argument is immaterial without meaningful action in the first place, and to favour what amounts to the suppression of truth over intellectual openness is in any case disreputable. ‘Optimism’ is also vexed in this context, often having been opposed to the sombre mood of environmentalists by advocates of economic growth. The greater mental impediments are ideological fantasy, which is blind to the contradictions in public discourse, and the misapprehension that if optimism is appropriate in one social or policy context it must be appropriate in others. Optimism, far from spurring climate change action, fosters inaction.

scholarly journals The collective action problem in primate territory economics

2013 ◽  
Vol 280 (1759) ◽  
pp. 20130081 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik P. Willems ◽  
Barbara Hellriegel ◽  
Carel P. van Schaik
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Collective Action Problem

Politikberatung der Öffentlichkeit?

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Pitlik
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
General Public ◽  
Policy Advice ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Academic System ◽  
Countervailing Power

Abstract Due to the incentives of both suppliers and users of policy advice the influence of economists on government decisions is almost negligible. This paper aims to explore the prospects of policy advice addressed to the general public as a countervailing power. It is argued that in order to have some impact on public opinion economists must rely primarily on propaganda and have to overcome a serious collective action problem. Yet, the organization of the academic system provides no incentives for economists to fulfil the role of general-public-oriented advisers.

scholarly journals Antimicrobial Footprints, Fairness, and Collective Harm

2020 ◽  
pp. 377-387
Author(s):  
Anne Schwenkenbecher
Keyword(s):  
Antimicrobial Resistance ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Carbon Footprint ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Real Difference ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Individual Behaviour ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
Collective Harm ◽  
Discernible Difference

Abstract This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global effects of individual behaviour and for highlighting that our choices can collectively make a real difference. But can we be morally obligated to make a contribution to resolving a collective action problem when our individual contributions by themselves make no discernible difference? I will focus on two lines of argument in favour of such obligations: whether a failure to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint is unfair and whether it constitutes wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by suggesting that the argument from collective harm is ultimately more successful.

The Innovation Problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 27-56
Author(s):  
Jason Potts
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Economic Problem ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Allocation Problems ◽  
Knowledge Problem ◽  
Definition Of

Explains the nature of the innovation problem as an economic problem in the context of economic trade and long-run growth. Distinguishes between a market failure definition of the innovation problem as an allocation problems and the innovation problem as a collective action problem of coordination and discovery. Defines the innovation commons as the zeroth phase of the innovation trajectory. Introduces the concept of discovery failure and discovery costs. This locates the argument of the book in the broader context of Schumpeterian, evolutionary, and Austrian “mainline economics” with a contextualization of the innovation problem simultaneously as both a knowledge problem and a coordination problem, and therefore as a governance problem solved with institutions.

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