Expanding Technology-Based Transcultural Diffusion

2014 ◽  
pp. 1512-1529
Author(s):  
Margee Hume ◽  
Paul Johnston ◽  
Mark Argar ◽  
Craig Hume

This chapter focuses on addressing: the screening criteria used to evaluate potential new energy- related technology ventures in two international markets, namely the Philippines and Brazil; adopting a single case methodology to communicate the firm strategies used to attract investment and the behaviour adopted to try and effectively and efficiently enter the global market; and based on the descriptions and behaviours found, the case offers a holistic entry framework which will advance understanding of transcultural marketing and entry needs of the Philippines and Brazil regarding new energy-related innovations. This chapter uses qualitative case analysis of a single case technology commercialisation organisation and the experience of entering two new world markets: the Philippines and Brazil. These two markets have been selected as they are focused on energy securitisation, possess a distinct business culture related to early stage and Venture Capital (VC) investment and the behaviour of VCs, and are currently commercially attractive and interested in international investment and new technology market development (Broad & Cavanagh, 2011; Castells, 2011). This chapter reports on data focused on investment activity within the technology market in Brazil and the Philippines and cultural factors affecting investment and market entry specific to these markets. The chapter integrates the cultural issues of each destination with current literature and develops a checklist of actions related to each market destination. The chapter will assist with the success of attracting investment, sales growth, and performance in the new market and enhance profitability of the venture. The chapter will offer specific actions related to the entry and investment in each market and contribute to international marketing knowledge. This chapter offers a new transcultural marketing perspective on international venture capital exploring and learning from these two diverse emerging world markets. The lessons learnt from each market creates a shared and advanced outlook on seeking successful venture capital in newer global markets (Broad & Cavanagh, 2011).

Author(s):  
Margee Hume ◽  
Paul Johnston ◽  
Mark Argar ◽  
Craig Hume

This chapter focuses on addressing: the screening criteria used to evaluate potential new energy- related technology ventures in two international markets, namely the Philippines and Brazil; adopting a single case methodology to communicate the firm strategies used to attract investment and the behaviour adopted to try and effectively and efficiently enter the global market; and based on the descriptions and behaviours found, the case offers a holistic entry framework which will advance understanding of transcultural marketing and entry needs of the Philippines and Brazil regarding new energy-related innovations. This chapter uses qualitative case analysis of a single case technology commercialisation organisation and the experience of entering two new world markets: the Philippines and Brazil. These two markets have been selected as they are focused on energy securitisation, possess a distinct business culture related to early stage and Venture Capital (VC) investment and the behaviour of VCs, and are currently commercially attractive and interested in international investment and new technology market development (Broad & Cavanagh, 2011; Castells, 2011). This chapter reports on data focused on investment activity within the technology market in Brazil and the Philippines and cultural factors affecting investment and market entry specific to these markets. The chapter integrates the cultural issues of each destination with current literature and develops a checklist of actions related to each market destination. The chapter will assist with the success of attracting investment, sales growth, and performance in the new market and enhance profitability of the venture. The chapter will offer specific actions related to the entry and investment in each market and contribute to international marketing knowledge. This chapter offers a new transcultural marketing perspective on international venture capital exploring and learning from these two diverse emerging world markets. The lessons learnt from each market creates a shared and advanced outlook on seeking successful venture capital in newer global markets (Broad & Cavanagh, 2011).


Author(s):  
Menghan TAO ◽  
Ning XIAO ◽  
Xingfu ZHAO ◽  
Wenbin LIU

New energy vehicles(NEV) as a new thing for sustainable development, in China, on the one hand has faced the rapid expansion of the market; the other hand, for the new NEV users, the current NEVs cannot keep up with the degree of innovation. This paper demonstrates the reasons for the existence of this systematic challenge, and puts forward the method of UX research which is different from the traditional petrol vehicles research in the early stage of development, which studies from the user's essence level, to form the innovative product programs which meet the needs of users and being real attractive.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Maria Accioly Fonseca Minardi ◽  
Adriana Bortoluzzo ◽  
Lucas do Amaral Moreira

Author(s):  
DongBack Seo

For first generation (1G) wireless communications technology standards, the Japanese government’s early decision provided an opportunity for its national manufacturers to be first movers in the global market, while the late development of wireless communications in Korea made the Korean market dependent on foreign manufacturers by adopting the U.S. standard (AMPS). Moving toward the 2G wireless technology market, both countries decided to develop standards instead of adopting a technology from outside their regions. Japan developed its own standard, PDC, while Korea developed CDMA systems with Qualcomm, the U.S. technology provider. Although these governments’ decisions on technologies looked only slightly different, the socio-economic consequences were greatly distinctive. The Korean success brought not only the rapid development of its domestic market but also opportunities for its manufacturers to become global leaders, while the PDC standard only provided the fast growth of the Japanese domestic market without any opportunities for the Japanese manufacturers to grow further internationally in the 1990s. By the end of 1990s, two nations again had to decide a 3G technology standard with vast challenges and pressures.


Author(s):  
Sudhakar Y. Reddy

Abstract This paper describes HIDER, a methodology that enables detailed simulation models to be used during the early stages of system design. HIDER uses a machine learning approach to form abstract models from the detailed models. The abstract models are used for multiple-objective optimization to obtain sets of non-dominated designs. The tradeoffs between design and performance attributes in the non-dominated sets are used to interactively refine the design space. A prototype design tool has been developed to assist the designer in easily forming abstract models, flexibly defining optimization problems, and interactively exploring and refining the design space. To demonstrate the practical applicability of this approach, the paper presents results from the application of HIDER to the system-level design of a wheel loader. In this demonstration, complex simulation models for cycle time evaluation and stability analysis are used together for early-stage exploration of design space.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Hockberger

The Quadrimaran was invented in France in the mid-1980s by Daniel Tollet. It was an inspired design and a radical departure from traditional ship design by a man from outside the marine industry unconstrained by industry technical practices and education. Technical experts could see it would entail more structure and subsystems than other high-performance vessels, but its promise was that those penalties would be more than offset by its claimed low power and fuel consumption. A prototype/demonstrator, Alexander, was built in 1990 and operated for five years carrying and impressing many hundreds of riders. Alexander performed beautifully and appeared to bear out what was claimed. Contracts for several Quadrimarans of different sizes came quickly, especially considering how conservative an industry this is. That was significantly due to Tollet's personal charisma and skill in selling riders on the dream of carrying passengers and freight over the water fast and in comfort, yet economically. Great skepticism prevailed in some quarters, especially among naval architects knowledgeable about AMVs (advanced marine vehicles) and early-stage whole-ship design. At technical meetings, one Quadrimaran principal would comment, for example, "Why would you carry freight across the Atlantic at 38 knots on 230,000 horsepower (a reference to the planned Fastship Atlantic TG-770) when you could do it at 60 knots on only 65,000 horsepower?" Listeners would ask how this could be possible, and he would assert again that the Quadrimaran could do it, but would decline to explain. Respected technical people were working with Tollet and his company and becoming convinced of the Quadrimaran's merit. Along with the contracts came engineers with experience in ship detail design and construction (very different from early-stage whole-ship design), or responsibilities for assessing and approving ships for service. Others were with engine and equipment suppliers. Their opinion that there was something unique and special about the Quadrimaran gave it credibility and influenced more people to accept the major claims made for it. Some dismissed the most extreme claims but still accepted the idea that the Quadrimaran was capable of unusually high performance - considerably less than was being claimed, perhaps, but high nevertheless. In hindsight it is clear the skeptics were right. Results never met expectations, nor could they have. In reality, the Quadrimaran has aspects that inherently prevent it from achieving the characteristics and performance its inventor believed attainable. It cannot be built in a commercially useful size and actually perform as intended. Why this is so will be explained. A crucial fact in the Quadrimaran's history is that Daniel Tollet and his close associates believed strongly that naval architects and engineers who had been immersed in working with the existing ship types would be unable to give the Quadrimaran the very different treatment they believed it required. (Their own educations and professional work were nontechnical.) Such people were excluded from the development of Quadrimaran designs, and the belated discovery of many fundamental technical problems can be attributed to this. The company Tollet established had a number of names over the years, and other associated entities were created at times for various purposes. In this paper they are referred to collectively as QIH (Quadrimaran International Holdings) so as not to confuse things unnecessarily. In 2004 QuadTech Marine LLC was established and acquired the Quadrimaran patent (US Patent No. 5,191,849) and related intellectual property from QIH. QuadTech laid out an extensive R&D program to close gaps in the technical background and address identified issues. In the process, additional information on earlier QIH projects and products was obtained and studied, which brought to light problems that significantly compromised the Quadrimaran's prospective performance and utility. The resulting much-reduced set of potential uses and users led the company to effectively stop pursuing Quadrimaran projects after 2009. (Note: The author was Chief Technology Officer for QuadTech Marine during 2006-9, studying the Quadrimaran and planning the R&D.)


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