Individual Differences in Implicit Learning

Author(s):  
Daisuke Nakamura

This chapter reviews research on whether individual differences in psychometric intelligence, working memory, and other less investigated variables, such as emotion and personality, affect implicit learning, with particular focus on Reber's evolutionary theory and Kaufman's dual-process theory for implicit learning. The review shows that while the null effects of psychometric intelligence on implicit learning seems robust as both theories claim, those of working memory were unclear due to methodological insufficiency. For the effects of emotion and personality, further investigation is needed as studies in this direction have just begun to proliferate. The chapter concludes that the research findings on the effects of these individual difference variables on implicit learning are still inconclusive, except for psychometric intelligence, and provides suggestions for future research.

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brant R. Burleson

Numerous factors affect the outcomes of supportive interactions, including aspects of the supportive message, the helper, the interaction context, and the recipient. This article proposes that the direct and interactive effects of these factors can be explained through a dual-process theory of supportive communication outcomes, which provides a comprehensive, integrative treatment of when and why collections of variables in supportive interactions generate the effects they do. The article reviews some of factors that influence the outcomes of supportive interactions, explicates the dual-process theory of supportive communication outcomes, illustrates the theory by describing recent studies designed to test it, and discusses aspects of the theory that need attention and directions for future research.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.


Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.


Author(s):  
Matthew L. Hall

Deaf and hard of hearing (DHH) children have been claimed to lag behind their hearing peers in various domains of cognitive development, especially in implicit learning, executive function, and working memory. Two major accounts of these deficits have been proposed: one based on a lack of auditory access, and one based on a lack of language access. This chapter reviews these theories in relation to the available evidence and concludes that there is little evidence of direct effects of diminished auditory access on cognitive development that could not also be explained by diminished language access. Specifically, reports of deficits in implicit learning are not broadly replicable. Some differences in executive function do stem from deafness itself but are not necessarily deficits. Where clinically relevant deficits in executive function are observed, they are inconsistent with the predictions of accounts based on auditory access, but consistent with accounts based on language access. Deaf–hearing differences on verbal working memory tasks may indicate problems with perception and/or language, rather than with working memory. Deaf–hearing differences on nonverbal tasks are more consistent with accounts based on language access, but much more study is needed in this area. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of these findings for psychological theory and for clinical/educational practice and by identifying high-priority targets for future research.


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