scholarly journals (Weak) Institutions for the Advancement of Women: The Case of Women's Policy Agencies in Mexican States

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-710
Author(s):  
Alejandra Ríos Cázares
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The book identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, the book offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. It then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the book shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. This book considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 847-874 ◽  
Author(s):  
EVGUENIA BESSONOVA ◽  
KSENIA GONCHAR

AbstractThis paper addresses the link between the strong inflow of FDI into Russia in the 2000s and its weak institutions, using plant-level data across subnational regions. The findings imply that investors have responded positively to improved quality of institutions in certain regions, which offered a combination of wealth, skills and good infrastructure. High development levels in host regions helped to bypass some institutional shortcomings. Investors from source countries exhibiting comparable institutional environment appeared to be more immune to political conflict. Round-trip investors reacted to institutional determinants in almost the same manner as genuine investors, except for tolerance to labor market imperfections.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Besley ◽  
Torsten Persson

Low-income countries typically collect taxes of between 10 to 20 percent of GDP while the average for high-income countries is more like 40 percent. In order to understand taxation, economic development, and the relationships between them, we need to think about the forces that drive the development process. Poor countries are poor for certain reasons, and these reasons can also help to explain their weakness in raising tax revenue. We begin by laying out some basic relationships regarding how tax revenue as a share of GDP varies with per capita income and with the breadth of a country's tax base. We sketch a baseline model of what determines a country's tax revenue as a share of GDP. We then turn to our primary focus: why do developing countries tax so little? We begin with factors related to the economic structure of these economies. But we argue that there is also an important role for political factors, such as weak institutions, fragmented polities, and a lack of transparency due to weak news media. Moreover, sociological and cultural factors—such as a weak sense of national identity and a poor norm for compliance—may stifle the collection of tax revenue. In each case, we suggest the need for a dynamic approach that encompasses the two-way interactions between these political, social, and cultural factors and the economy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sihai Li ◽  
Huiying Wu ◽  
Xinfeng Jiang

AbstractWe examine whether engagement in rent-seeking improves firm value in China. Rent-seeking is defined as a firm's use of resources to establish a relationship with the government to obtain government-controlled resources. We incorporate political rents and associated costs into an analytical framework to examine the relationship between rent-seeking and firm value. Using a sample of non-state-owned firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2013, we find evidence of the presence of political rents in the form of government subsidies and evidence of associated costs in the forms of corporate philanthropy and excess management remuneration, which largely explains the insignificant relationship found between rent-seeking and firm value. Our further analysis shows that rent-seeking behavior of firms reduces production efficiency, providing additional evidence to support our thesis that engagement in rent-seeking does not enhance firm value in the Chinese context. In an economy with weak institutions, in particular with weak protection for shareholders, managers and politicians can become rent-seekers and take a considerable share of the economic benefits derived from rent-seeking.


Author(s):  
Christopher B. Barrett ◽  
Katrina Brandon ◽  
Clark Gibson ◽  
Heidi Gjertsen

Author(s):  
Jyoti Sharma ◽  
Homayoun Ludin ◽  
Monika Chauhan ◽  
Sanjay Zodpey

Background: Afghanistan is grappling with high burden of malnutrition in women and children and a rising burden of noncommunicable diseases. Aims: A narrative review was conducted with the aim of mapping current nutrition policies and capacity development initiatives to assess policy and the institutional environment and identify gaps and opportunities. Methods: A comprehensive, broad based search was conducted, including databases and websites and policy and programme documents. Results: The policy focuses on multisectoral efforts to address nutrition challenges; however; implementation of nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions is not delivered uniformly at the community level due to continued conflict situations and geographic inaccessibility, lack of availability of trained human resources and weak institutions. There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of nutrition programmes in Afghanistan. Limited policy provisions are available to address nutrition issues due to the rising burden of noncommunicable diseases, urbanization and changing dietary patterns. The shortage of skilled nutritional professionals is a critical issue. Lack of institutional capacity, educational standards and accreditation mechanism poses major challenges. Ongoing training programmes are fragmented and fail to meet the requirements of a professional nutrition workforce. Conclusion: The findings highlight that well-structured policies and strategies focusing on maternal and child nutrition provide an enabling policy environment to scale up nutrition interventions.Evidence on the implementation of programmes is needed to aid policy recommendations. The lack of an institutional mechanism for professional nutrition education highlights the great need for action in Afghanistan for public health nutrition and education.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 319-330
Author(s):  
Flaubert Mbiekop

It is now conventional wisdom that institutions shape household fertility choices, especially in developing countries. However, deeper insights into the mechanisms at play are still needed. This paper develops a game-theoretical framework with a simple overlapping-generations model to show how a typical household may come to prefer bearing and raising numerous children as a savings scheme for retirement and not rely on conventional outlets for saving when facing weak institutions. On the one hand weak institutions increase the risk that individuals may lose their savings if relying on conventional outlets. On the other hand, childbearing as an investment/savings scheme carries with it the risk that disguised or complete unemployment may prevent grown children from providing the expected old-age financial support. The typical household thus trades off between both types of risks, yet with more control in the latter case, as the likelihood of unemployment can be reduced by carefully selecting a child quality-quantity strategy. Mild conditions are sufficient to show that sound institutions induce less fertility and foster private saving and oldage consumption. A simple voting experiment unveils a tricky socio- economic dynamics whereby wealthier households may have stakes supporting weak institutions.


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