scholarly journals Personalismo e biodiritto

2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Palazzani

Dopo aver approfondito il significato di ciascuno dei termini, l’Autore indaga sul rapporto tra personalismo e biodiritto, in particolare sulla rilevanza del personalismo per il biodiritto. Se è rintracciabile, infatti, un paradigma tendente a separare o contrapporre personalismo e biodiritto, sulla base di una visione neutrale del diritto (fondata sulla “scientificità del diritto” e il “plularismo etico”), è altresì vero che è possibile riconoscere nel diritto una valenza etica “minimale” (quanto alla valutazione sostanziale) nella difesa della dignità oggettiva dell’essere umano. È in questa prospettiva che è possibile rintracciare una convergenza pratica tra personalismo e biodiritto su cui l’Autore cerca di argomentare anche attraverso la centralità della teoria dei diritti umani. ---------- The Author inquires into the relationship between personalism and biolaw, after making deeper the meanings of these two concepts, and in particular into the importance of personalism for biolaw. If it is findable a paradigm that distinguishes or opposes personalism and biolaw, on the growds of a neutral vision of law (founded on the “scientificity of law” and “ethical pluralism”), is also true that it’s possile to recognize in the law a “minimal” ethical value in defence of the objective dignity of the human being. In this perspective it’s possible to find a practical convergence between personalism and biolaw on which the Author argues through the centrality of theory of “human rights”.

Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 377-386
Author(s):  
Я. Ю. Конюшенко

The purpose of the article is to define the prosecutor's supervision over investigative (search) actions as a legal guarantee of human rights, as well as problematic issues in its implementation and to make proposals to improve the current criminal procedure legislation of Ukraine. The article defines doctrinal approaches to the concepts of "prosecutor's supervision over compliance with the law during the pre-trial investigation" and "prosecutor's procedural guidance of the pre-trial investigation" in the context of investigative (search) actions. The author came to the conclusion that the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine "On the Prosecutor's Office" and the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in terms of regulating the functions and powers of the prosecutor during the pre-trial investigation. Based on the study, it is proposed to consider procedural guidance as one of the forms of prosecutor's supervision over the pre-trial investigation, which is implemented directly by the prosecutor or a group of prosecutors who are appointed to carry it out in a particular criminal proceeding. The author also emphasizes the existence of forms of supervision of the highest level prosecutor on the legality of these actions, which are implemented through the demand and study of information on the progress and results of pre-trial investigation, criminal proceedings and certified copies of court decisions and study of compliance with criminal procedure. A number of problematic issues during the prosecutor's supervision in pre-trial criminal proceedings are outlined, which relate to the relationship between the prosecutor's supervision and judicial control over the legality of investigative (search) actions; subjects and subject of supervision of the prosecutor in this sphere; providing the prosecutor-procedural manager and prosecutors of the highest level with instructions and instructions during the investigative (search) actions. To address these issues, it is proposed to amend the current criminal procedure legislation of Ukraine. The study of the materials of criminal proceedings and the survey of the subjects of criminal proceedings indicate the existence of a number of problematic issues that exist during the implementation of the prosecutor's procedural guidance of investigative (search) actions in the context of human rights.


Author(s):  
Robert Jago

This chapter focuses on the lived experiences of gypsies (collectively referred to as gypsies rather than Roma or travellers). The author argues that the relationship between the legal system and the specific lifestyle of this group is itself causing many tensions which cannot be separated from the long-held myths about gypsies. Jago shows how the standing of gypsies in the UK legal system has, in turn, become the object of various myths. He demonstrates how judgements by the European Court of Human Rights in favour of gypsy claims created in many an image of the law being always on the side of the gypsy. A perception which Jago demonstrates is far from true. After addressing the nature and role of myths in general the author illustrates the tension between positive, romanticised myths about the freedom of gypsy lifestyle and three derogatory myths, namely gypsies as "child-snatchers", as thieves and as "land grabbers". Jago illustrates that these myths are linked to deep-rooted beliefs around property and its ownership.


Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hemel

This chapter suggests a human rights–based justification for national basic income schemes, contrasting it with justifications based on welfarist principles or notions of entitlement to a share of the global commons. Starting from the premise that a state is a collective enterprise that generates a surplus, it contends that any human being who is an “obedient” member of that state has a right to some share of the surplus. That right—which arises from the relationship between the individual and the state, and is independent of need—could justify the entitlement to a basic income. Such income should be provided in cash, not in kind, because the latter risks depriving the individual of the enjoyment of his share of the surplus—in effect, forcing him to forfeit or transfer it to others if he does not use the public goods or services provided by the state.


Author(s):  
Vera Bermingham ◽  
Carol Brennan

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. Nuisance protects against ‘indirect’ interference with the claimant’s use and enjoyment of land. There are two categories of nuisance: public nuisance and private nuisance. Private nuisance refers to an unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land. In order to sue in private nuisance, the claimant must have an interest in the land affected. This chapter examines the elements of liability in private and public nuisance and discusses the differences between them.. It also looks at the relationship between nuisance and fault-based liability and evaluates the human rights dimension to the law of nuisance.


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 


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