Building Institutional Democracy: Parliamentary and Presidential Systems

2014 ◽  
pp. 84-100
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Systems

scholarly journals Who Gets what and how Does it Matter? Importance-Weighted Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Support in Brazil

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana Batista
Keyword(s):  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Weighted Portfolio ◽  
Dimension 2 ◽  
Legislative Support ◽  
Presidential Systems

Who gets what in portfolio allocation, and how does it matter to coalition partners’ legislative support in presidential systems? I propose that portfolios are not all alike, and that their allocation as well as the support for the president's agenda depends on the particular distribution of assets within the executive. The portfolio share allocated to coalition parties is weighted by a measure of importance based on the assets controlled by the ministry in question, such as policies, offices, and budgets. Once the weighted allocation of ministries has been identified, the results show that: 1) the president concentrates the most important ministries in their own party, mainly considering the policy dimension; 2) the positive relationship between portfolio allocation and legislative support remains, with the importance of specific dimensions being considered; and, 3) coalition partners do not respond differently in terms of legislative support in light of the different assets’ distribution within the portfolio allocation.

scholarly journals Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

Shaping Presidential Powers in Hungary: Convention, Tradition and Informal Constitutional Amendments

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-320
Author(s):  
Attila Vincze
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Exact Role ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Judicial Interpretations

Abstract There was no tradition of a republican president in Hungary before the fall of communism, and the transitory constitution of 1989 was unclear about the exact role the President should play in the constitutional system of Hungary. Some provisions even resembled those of presidential or semi-presidential systems; some ambiguities were clarified during the first two decades after the transition. Conventions, however, were established to some extent and sometimes very quickly. This period gave rise to guidelines as to how the powers of the President should be exercised. Some other powers were concretized and interpreted foremost by the Constitutional Court. These conventions and judicial interpretations formed the character of the Presidency to the extent of informal constitutional change. Some of these elements have even been incorporated into and formalized by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The present contribution will point out how the originally broad competencies of the President have been narrowed in the practice, and what role the Constitutional Court and political actors played in this process.

scholarly journals Electoral rules, forms of government, and political budget cycles in transition countries

2008 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Klasnja
Keyword(s):  
Transition Process ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Political Budget Cycles ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Optimal Outcomes ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

Recent studies have suggested the existence of 'election-year economics' in fiscal policy in transition countries. This study asks whether such electoral cycles in aggregate measures (overall expenditures, revenues and balance) and spending composition (broad vs. targeted outlays) differ among countries with different political systems. This question is motivated by a sharp division between majoritarian presidential systems in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and proportional-parliamentary systems in the Baltic's, Central and Southeastern Europe. Further, in the absence of context-sensitive theories, the paper asks whether observed outcomes in the transition process conform to the theoretical priors developed for conditions in stable democracies. Finally, the paper attempts to normatively establish whether either of the alternative combinations yields more optimal policy outcomes. The results suggest that the differences indeed exist, primarily on the revenue side and in the composition of expenditures. These results differ markedly from those for stable democracies, especially in the case of composition of spending. Normatively, presidential yields sub optimal outcomes in comparison to parliamentarians, likely due to inefficient system of constitutionally intended checks and balances. .

scholarly journals INTERACTION OF PARLIAMENTS WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCHES IN POST-SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND KAZAKHSTAN: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 383-389
Author(s):  
Timur Kanapyanov ◽  
Naubat Kaliyev
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Political Studies ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Presidential Systems

Studies on legislature-executive relations have gained a crucial place in the field of comparative politics. However, the most intriguing challenge for comparative political studies has been investigating the collapse of socialist regimes and development of new institutions in post-communist and post-Soviet countries. Accordingly, this article compares legislative-executive relations in Kazakhstan and Romania, in a longitudinal perspective, from the time of communism’s collapse. These relationships have evolved somewhat differently in Romania compared to Kazakhstan, despite both countries having semi-presidential systems. A comparative analysis helps us to better understand the role and place of the parliament in each of the respective countries. The authors identify similarities and differences of legislature-executive relations in post-communist Romania and post-Soviet Kazakhstan, while making some inference about the strength of legislatures. The article concludes with a summation that the frequent cases of no-confidence votes in Romania has resulted in an unstable government and, often, governmental crises, but at the same time, this indicates a relatively powerful parliament, whereas the non-existence of such practices in Kazakhstan has contributed to a strong, stable, and unanimous cabinet, but with a weak and subservient parliament.

Presidents in Charge

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Auerswald ◽  
Stephen M. Saideman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
The United States ◽  
Leadership Selection ◽  
Presidential Transition ◽  
French Case ◽  
Primary Means ◽  
Agent Selection ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Nicolas Sarkozy

This chapter focuses primarily on two presidential systems, those of the United States and France. In each country, an individual is empowered to make significant military decisions or delegate those decisions to subordinates. There are two particular elements that distinguish how the Americans ran their war compared to many of the other countries: agent selection and incentives. Because the United States led an ad hoc effort (Operation Enduring Freedom) and only later became the leader of the NATO effort, the primary means of control was leadership selection and termination. The chapter then turns to the French case, where there is a significant change in behavior on the ground that followed the presidential transition from Jacques Chirac to Nicolas Sarkozy. Chirac placed significant restrictions on where the French were deployed and with what capabilities. Sarkozy lifted those restrictions but still answered the phone when questions arose in the field. The chapter also briefly addresses the case of Poland.

11. Institutional Drivers of Democracy

2019 ◽  
pp. 210-228
Author(s):  
Andrea Kendall-Taylor ◽  
Natasha Lindstaedt ◽  
Erica Frantz
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
P System ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Central Asian Countries ◽  
Soviet Space ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Institutional Drivers

Political parties 212 Electoral systems 217 System of government 220 Federal versus unitary states 222 Consociationalism 223 Political institutions and democratization: A double-edged sword 226 Conclusion 227 Key Questions 228 Further Reading 228 In the former Soviet space (excluding the Baltics), some countries are more open and less authoritarian than others. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan, for example, have enjoyed relatively greater political and civil liberties—and even periods of nascent democracy. Freedom House rated Ukraine as ‘Free’ shortly after the country’s Orange Revolution in 2004–05. In contrast, Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and the other Central Asian countries have been far more closed. What accounts for this difference? The former Soviet states share a number of common features like their communist history and high levels of corruption, making these factors poor candidates for explaining the political divergence. Economic factors also have little explanatory power, as some of the poorest countries like Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have been among the relatively more democratic. Instead, some scholars have emphasized the importance of institutions for explaining the different levels of freedom within the region. The relatively more open counties have parliamentary systems, while the more authoritarian countries have presidential systems (Hale 2016, 2011). When power is vested in a president rather than divided between a president and prime minister, the argument goes, it facilitates a president’s expansion of executive power....

How to Qualify for Cabinet

2019 ◽  
pp. 108-132
Author(s):  
Claire Annesley ◽  
Karen Beckwith ◽  
Susan Franceschet
Keyword(s):  
Educational Background ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Presidential Systems

Chapter 5 focuses on experiential criteria as qualifications for inclusion in cabinet. The chapter shows that across all country cases, ministrables qualify by demonstrating their political experience and/or policy expertise, and in some cases, their educational background. There is no evidence that ministers in presidential systems are more likely to qualify through policy experience, or that ministers in parliamentary democracies are more likely to qualify through generalist political experience. The chapter shows that experiential criteria are strongly prescriptive rules, but they are non-specific and flexible rather than straightforward. The chapter concludes that experiential criteria are employed strategically by selectors to justify the choices of ministers and are post facto rationalizations. If all ministrables must meet some experiential criteria, additional qualifying criteria are necessary to determine the subset among them selected for cabinet.

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