scholarly journals Electoral rules, forms of government, and political budget cycles in transition countries

2008 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Klasnja

Recent studies have suggested the existence of 'election-year economics' in fiscal policy in transition countries. This study asks whether such electoral cycles in aggregate measures (overall expenditures, revenues and balance) and spending composition (broad vs. targeted outlays) differ among countries with different political systems. This question is motivated by a sharp division between majoritarian presidential systems in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and proportional-parliamentary systems in the Baltic's, Central and Southeastern Europe. Further, in the absence of context-sensitive theories, the paper asks whether observed outcomes in the transition process conform to the theoretical priors developed for conditions in stable democracies. Finally, the paper attempts to normatively establish whether either of the alternative combinations yields more optimal policy outcomes. The results suggest that the differences indeed exist, primarily on the revenue side and in the composition of expenditures. These results differ markedly from those for stable democracies, especially in the case of composition of spending. Normatively, presidential yields sub optimal outcomes in comparison to parliamentarians, likely due to inefficient system of constitutionally intended checks and balances. .

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.


2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Kihlgren

In Russia the growth of small business has been much slower compared with the leading transition countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). In Poland, and to a lesser degree in the Czech Republic and Hungary, this sector has been the engine of the economic recovery. A natural question is why Russia differs. Apart from the fact that in contrast to these countries Russia does not have an entrepreneurial tradition and has experienced communist rule longer what is especially distinctive about Russia has been the strong influence of interest groups during the transition process which favoured the allocation of entrepreneurship to largely unproductive activities.


Ekonomika ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruta Aidis ◽  
Arnis Sauka

An issue that has recently gained in importance in transitional literature is the need to develop a thriving small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector since it can contribute significantly to innovation, job creation and economic growth. However, the specific characteristics of SMEs make them especially vulnerable to changes in the legal, social and environmental context. In this paper we are interested in the barriers that SME development encounters during different stages in the transition process. There is no consensus regarding ‘transition stages’, yet various indicators measuring certain aspects of transition progress have been developed. For this paper, we apply a selection of indicators proposed in previous research to approximate three transitional stages that would make sense from an entrepreneurship development perspective. We utilise these indicators to categorise 23 transition countries into transitional stages. On the basis of that utilisation we develop a framework in which we can identify SME development trends based on our analysis of the 25 empirical studies on constraints facing SMEs in transition countries. Our preliminary results indicate that more fundamental barriers related to legal issues are more characteristic of the early stages of transition, while more specific constraints related to human resources and skill development characterise later transition stages.


Author(s):  
Jovan Zubovic ◽  
Dejana M. Pavlovic

Transition in WB countries was supposed to enable the establishment of a better economic system. However, not all transitional countries have been conducting appropriate follow-up activities during their transition process. Success of transition depended on the country's internal factors and on their pre-transition economic situation? In all WB countries privatization led to high unemployment rates, low GDP growth and poor living standards especially for youth. At the same time, the transition has had positive effects in other transition countries like the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia etc. The aim of this paper is to research a position of the youth in WB transition countries including Serbia, Montenegro, B&H, and Macedonia. The paper will follow the changes in youth unemployment in the period 2000 to 2014 in WB, other transition and EU15 countries. Comparisons of the achieved youth unemployment levels will give the opportunity to determine which the good practices are used in other developed countries that have resulted with significantly lower youth unemployment rates.


Author(s):  
Javier García Roca

Es posible comparar presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en los controles parlamentarios. Sin control parlamentario, no puede existir democracia representativa, tampoco en el presidencialismo. Las normas constitucionales y de los Reglamentos ya reflejan ya esa tendencia en Iberoamérica. Esta conclusión lleva a que el clásico debate sobre ambos sistemas de gobierno deba contemplarse de una manera distinta. Hay una pluralidad de tipos presidenciales y semipresidenciales de confusa diferenciación en la realidad. El presidencialismo originario estadounidense es antiguo y difícilmente exportable. El presidencialismo iberoamericano contemporáneo se ha ido parlamentarizando. Existe actualmente un continuum en el binomio presidencialismo/ parlamentarismo con diferencias de grado más que cualitativas. Se advierten tres tendencias: la presidencialización del parlamentarismo europeo, la parlamentarización del presidencialismo iberoamericano, e influencias recíprocas entre los Reglamentos parlamentarios. Pluripartidismo extremado, representación proporcional, y un entendimiento absolutista de la separación de poderes presidencial, que impida los controles parlamentarios, son rasgos incompatibles. La solución más fácil está en abandonar ese entendimiento absolutista que no garantiza bien constitucional alguno. La duración fija del mandato presidencial y la idea de que el Presidente debe responder de forma diferida y directa ante el electorado hacen imposible mecanismos de control- responsabilidad política de su figura, pero puede bastar con reforzar los de control-fiscalización para construir checks and balances y representación política en el Parlamento.It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist, not even in the presidential system. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. There are various kinds of presidential and semi-presidential systems in practice and the differences among them become confusing. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. Current Latin American presidentialism has adopted parliamentary patterns. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree rather than in quality. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation: such a strong separation on behalf of what? The fixed presidential term of office and the idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make mechanisms of political responsibility especially difficult, but certain devices of control-supervision could be enough to achieve checks and balances and parliamentary political representation.


Author(s):  
Robert Elgie

The relationship between presidents and cabinets has attracted less scholarly attention than the prime minister/cabinet relationship. The relationship is typically captured in the theoretical and conceptual terms of the principal-agent framework. In presidential systems, cabinet is the agent of the president, as it is the agent of parliament in parliamentary systems, but in semi-presidential systems, and especially in the president-presidentialism variety, cabinet has two principals. This has resulted in hypotheses for empirical research into the powers of the president over cabinet, and the level of conflict between president and cabinet. With regard to the dominance of the president, the proportion of non-partisan ministers in the cabinet has been shown to be an important indicator. However, the chapter ends with the suggestion to look beyond regime-level differences. The category of presidential systems in particular hides considerable variety, and the study of presidential systems, especially in Latin America, has important potential in this regard.


2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ko Maeda ◽  
Misa Nishikawa

Most of the previous work on political stability uses cabinet duration or leadership duration to measure stability. This study, however, focuses on another area of stability, namely the party control of the executive branch. This approach not only allows us to compare political durability in presidential and parliamentary systems directly, but it also, we believe, better reflects policy changes that stem from government party composition. Our analysis of longitudinal data from 65 democracies reveals that presidential and parliamentary governments create different patterns of government survival. Ruling parties in parliamentary systems encounter a declining hazard rate over time, whereas those in presidentialism face an increasing hazard rate in their survival. We explain this difference by focusing on how parliamentary and presidential systems create different incentive structures for political parties.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Manzoor Malik

The only problem which is the root cause of many problems in the contemporary Muslim world and in its history is the political one.To overcome the above problems, Muslim world is in need of unanimity in politics and political systems. So they will not conceive each other a threat. The unanimity is possible only by constitutional democracy. The constitution guarantees the basic law, rights, liberties, and checks and balances in the system. And democracy is of use to make public representation possible and changing hands on power time to time by public franchise without any bloodshed and revolution. This solution will face less trouble and complications in the countries which are free from monarchies. Whereas, it can face more trouble and complications in the countries under absolute monarchies. However, any political movement in such countries may receive sympathy from the governments if they chose constitutional monarchy. And this choice will save people from bloodshed in making the desired political transformation possible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelena Andrašić ◽  
Branimir Kalaš ◽  
Vera Mitrović ◽  
Nada Milenković

Based on a theoretical review of investment models through full and partial ownership, the aim of the paper is to provide an examination of factors that influence to the choice of investment model in six transition countries from region provide recommendations that which investment models would be appropriate between observed countries. Using a multivariate cluster analysis on a sample of six transition countries from region, a grouping of countries was carried out according to next criteria in the period 2000- 2014: a) economic growth, b) competitiveness and c) institutional distance. The results of analysis have shown that Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia should choose the investment model of partial ownership when investing in Croatia and Slovenia. Slovenia and Croatia should choose investment model of full ownership when investing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, especially in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina because they represent a growing market. Also, in mutual exchange, Slovenia and Croatia should choose models of full ownership, as well as Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.


Author(s):  
Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson ◽  
Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon

To make lasting policy executives must get the legislature to pass their proposals. How do executives form working relationships with the legislative branch, and when do they seek control over rather than negotiation with the legislature to achieve their preferred policy outcomes? Scholars of presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential systems have sought to answer this question from a variety of angles. We consider how executives use and manage coalitions to achieve their preferred outcomes; the constitutional or chamber rules that allow them to influence which bills become law; and the way changes in the external environment can lead to shifts in the executive’s strategy. We conclude by offering suggestions for extending the study of executive-legislative relations including advocating for more comparisons across different institutional structures and party systems and a recognition that increased diversity in the executive branch may impact executive-legislative relations.


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