Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Cooperation and Competition between Mobile Operators and Financial Institution in Mobile Payment Industry Chain

Author(s):  
Fan Zifu ◽  
Zhou Yan ◽  
Wan Xiaoyu
2014 ◽  
Vol 496-500 ◽  
pp. 2784-2787
Author(s):  
Mu Hua Wei ◽  
Shou Lian Tang

Mobile operators and financial institutions are the two major participants in the near field communication (NFC) payment service industry. They provide this service in four different operation modes: mobile operator-financial institution cooperation mode, mobile operators leading mode, financial institutions leading mode, and independent operating mode. The relationship between these two groups is complex because it includes both competition and cooperation. This paper sets up an evolutionary game model to study this special relationship and analyzes the cooperation motives of mobile operators and financial institutions in the NFC mobile payment industry.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 221-224
Author(s):  
Minghua Zhong ◽  
Hong Wu

The rapid development of mobile payment business makes the financial institution, the telecom carrier and the third party payment company to compete to purse the mobile payment market. However, the operation model of mobile payment market is disordered, it affects the development of mobile payment business. Mobile payment main bodies develop quickly. Who will dominate the market, the relationships among them is whether cooperation or competition, how to define the values of the financial institution, the telecom carrier and the third party payment company, are the main questions to be explained. This paper mainly researches on the game among the financial institution, the telecom carrier and the third party company. Through building the game model and the analysis, we draw the conclusion that reasonable resource sharing and income distribution mechanism can help to achieve an all-win result in mobile payment market.


Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.


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