Efficiency in Health Care and Surge Capability in Disasters. Is it a Trade-Off?

2012 ◽  
Vol 02 (03) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sultan Al- Shaqsi ◽  
Robin Gauld
Keyword(s):  
1994 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe E. Reinhardt

Throughout the post-World War II decades, the United States has wrestled in its own unique style with a problem that is shared by all modern societies: how to achieve a reasonably equitable distribution of health care, without losing control of total spending on health care, and without suffocating the delivery system with controls and regulations that inhibit technical progress.Because an equitable distribution of health care inevitably requires at least some government regulation, and because government regulations tend to impose rigidity on any system, it is widely believed in the United States (and elsewhere) that a trade-off actually exists between fairness in the distribution of care and the health system’s ability to innovate. This troublesome trade-off bedevils American policy makers to this day.


2014 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 217-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianmaria Martini ◽  
Paolo Berta ◽  
John Mullahy ◽  
Giorgio Vittadini
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-500
Author(s):  
Visa Pitkänen ◽  
Signe Jauhiainen ◽  
Ismo Linnosmaa

AbstractWe study physiotherapy providers’ prices in repeated competitive biddings where multiple providers are accepted in geographical districts. Historically, only very few districts have rejected any providers. We show that this practice increased prices and analyze the effects the risk of rejection has on prices. Our data are derived from three subsequent competitive biddings. The results show that rejecting at least one provider decreased prices by more than 5% in the next procurement round. The results also indicate that providers have learned to calculate their optimal bids, which has also increased prices. Further, we perform counterfactual policy analysis of a capacity-rule of acceptance. The analysis shows that implementing a systematic acceptance rule results in a trade-off between direct cost savings and service continuity at patients’ usual providers.


Author(s):  
Adora D. Holstein

This study applies multivariate regression analysis to cross-section data of 30 OECD countries to determine if there is a trade-off between health care cost and the quality of the health system on one hand, and better health outcomes on the other. It also investigates whether a higher quality health system leads to superior health outcomes. The empirical results provide positive answers to the above two questions. Indices of responsiveness, fairness or accessibility, and overall efficiency of the health system developed by the World Health Organization were used in this study to measure health system quality. The rate of infant mortality and a disability-free or healthy life expectancy measure developed by the WHO are used as indicators of health outcomes. The empirical models control for the effects of cross-country differences in literacy level and health-risk or lifestyle. The study finds evidence that the more responsive and accessible the countrys health system is, the longer is the healthy life expectancy of its people. Moreover, the more accessible and efficient the countrys health system is, the lower is the rate of infant mortality.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Bunsis ◽  
Susan Riffe

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; tab-stops: -.5in .5in; mso-hyphenate: none;"><span style="letter-spacing: -0.15pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Batang;">We investigate what factors help explain postretirement health care benefit (PRB) reductions around the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 106 (SFAS 106). We find that firms with more motivation to make benefit cuts because of larger PRB-related obligations were more likely to decrease benefits.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Our primary contribution comes from examining the <strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">cost/benefit</strong> <strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">tradeoffs</strong> of making these reductions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>For example, we find a trade-off between reductions in PRB and increases in pension obligations, consistent with firms offering higher alternative forms of compensation to make up for the loss in PRB. In addition, firms with greater unionization among employees are somewhat less likely to reduce benefits.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Finally, we document that firms involved in more extensive efforts to reduce capacity and cut costs through firm restructurings are more likely to reduce benefits.</span></span></span></p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (5) ◽  
pp. 1355-1394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nava Ashraf ◽  
Oriana Bandiera ◽  
Edward Davenport ◽  
Scott S. Lee

We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition. (JEL H83, I11, I13, J24, M51, O15, Z13)


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