scholarly journals Fascism, Foreign Policy, and World War II

Fascism ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 79-88
Author(s):  
E. Komkova

The management of the Canada–U.S. asymmetry might be defined as rather successful example. After the World War II Canadian and American officials have developed a set of specific bargaining norms, which can be referred to as the “rules of the game”, and “diplomatic culture”. Their existence leads to predictability of relationships, to empathy, and to expectations of “responsible” behavior. The study of the Canada–U.S. model of civilized asymmetrical relationship lays grounds for further investigation on how it can be applied to the foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation in its relations with asymmetrical partners from the “near neighbourhood”.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-218
Author(s):  
Stanislav Gennadyevich Malkin

The following paper deals with methodological features of studying of empires legacy role in policy of the leading powers in the countries of the third world through a prism of asymmetric conflicts historical modeling. The author pays special attention to the role of Great Britain and the USA foreign policy course defining after World War II during Cold War in the second half of the 20th century and Global War on Terror at the beginning of the 21st century. The author pays attention to methodological traps (such as the probability of the research problem on the given variable and terminological confusion) as well as to research opportunities which are opened by such approach in the field of the historical and political analysis (for example, evolution of the international relations theory and practice in the conditions of the world order transformation after World War II). Special attention is given to the value of such methodological reception as asymmetric conflicts historical modeling in expert estimates of the leading powers foreign policy. The paper also deals with the role of expert community and academic expertize as an important component of that analytical operation which is carried out within historical simulation of the asymmetrical conflicts.


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

Assessing the application of the liberal consensus idea to postwar foreign policy, this chapter contends that myths about the bipartisan spirit of U.S. foreign policy have too long found ready acceptance from historians. Politics did not stop at the water’s edge, even when bipartisanship was at its supposed zenith during World War II and the early Cold War. While there was unanimity during the post-war era that the growth of international communism was a threat to U.S. interests, this did not mean that foreign policy was free of political conflict, and partisan charges that the government of the day was losing the Cold War were commonplace. Meanwhile, non-elite opinion evinced little support for confrontation with the main Communist powers, reluctance to engage in another land war like Korea, and concern about survival in the nuclear era. The divisiveness wrought by Vietnam was supposed to have brought an end to the “Cold War consensus,” but uncertainty over its meaning was evident well before this.


Author(s):  
Joseph M. Siracusa

Did the nuclear revolution contribute to an era of peace? ‘Nuclear deterrence and arms control’ looks at the post-World War II stalemate and Cold War détente. The concept of deterrence did not come up until the second decade of the nuclear age. The introduction of thermonuclear weapons and nuclear-tipped, long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles turned foreign policy on its head. Mutual deterrence was less of a policy than a reality. With the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow mounted a show of defiance at a moment when it was relatively weak. The Carter and Reagan administrations were beset by external and internal disagreements, but prudence and luck prevailed.


Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Donald Brandon

For a generation now, America has played a significant role in world affairs. Until Pearl Harbor a reluctant belligerent in World War II, this country was also slow to respond to the challenge of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of that gigantic conflict. But for almost twenty-five years American Presidents have been more or less guided by the policy of “containment.” Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all introduced variations on the multiple themes of the policy adopted by Harry Truman. Yet each concluded that the world situation allowed no reasonable alternative to an activist American foreign policy in most areas of the globe.


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