Offensive speech

2009 ◽  
pp. 537-675
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kunal Srivastava ◽  
Ryan Tabrizi ◽  
Ayaan Rahim ◽  
Lauryn Nakamitsu

<div> <div> <div> <p>Abstract </p> <p>The ceaseless connectivity imposed by the internet has made many vulnerable to offensive comments, be it their physical appearance, political beliefs, or religion. Some define hate speech as any kind of personal attack on one’s identity or beliefs. Of the many sites that grant the ability to spread such offensive speech, Twitter has arguably become the primary medium for individuals and groups to spread these hurtful comments. Such comments typically fail to be detected by Twitter’s anti-hate system and can linger online for hours before finally being taken down. Through sentiment analysis, this algorithm is able to distinguish hate speech effectively through the classification of sentiment. </p> </div> </div> </div>


Author(s):  
Danilo Kostić

This scientific article analyzes the basic features and elements of the criminal offense of insult from the theoretical and normative aspect, with specific reference to the analysis of the conditions necessary for the application of the special legal ground for excluding illegality of offensive speech, stipulated in Article 170 (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia. Relying on the critical analysis of national criminal legislation and a brief review of national courts’ practice, the author points out to the contradiction of adopted legal standpoints when interpreting the disputed provisions, and emphasizes the importance of ensuring uniform and consistent court practice in this field. Proper and complete consideration of the criminal offense of insult, and especially the ground for excluding the illegality of the taken actions, stipulated in the provisions of Article 170 (4) of the Serbian Criminal Code, calls for precise interpretation of these provisions. Inadequate conduct of judicial bodies entails the possibility of convicting the perpetrator of the criminal offense of insult, even if the requisite conditions prescribed in the positive law have not been satisfied.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0261927X2110657
Author(s):  
Cristina Jayme Montiel ◽  
Joshua Uyheng ◽  
Nmanuel de Leon

Swearing in public discourse represents a contentious rhetorical feature of populist leaders’ transgressive politics. This paper argues that, beyond constituting merely “offensive” speech, swearing generatively accomplishes a host of discursive functions which contribute to the fortification of a populist regime. Taking populist President Duterte of the Philippines as a case in point, we utilize a critical text analytics approach to examine his use of profane language across a corpus of 746 of his public speeches. We find that Duterte discursively harnesses swear words to: (a) affirm vernacular identities with hostile humor, (b) claim outsider virtues against corrupt institutions, and (c) marshal insider force as the nation's sovereign leader. Swearing thus represents a rich discursive resource for populist leaders to navigate their contradictory positions as insiders and outsiders to political power, toward both public endearment and coercion of the nation's people. Our findings suggest the importance of critically examining language in relation to collective-level phenomena like populism and the utility of mixed methods approaches for enriching global psychologies of politics and language.


Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis

The experience of suffering offence relates to a constellation of unpleasant feelings stirred up when one’s expectations of being treated in a certain way are frustrated. This chapter explores how the nature of offence matters for the way the law responds to offensive conduct. Prohibiting speech which offends poses a special problem because it clashes with the free speech principle, i.e. the idea that there is something particularly important in being allowed to speak our minds, which sets free expression apart from a general liberty claim to choose a way of life. It is suggested that when deciding what should count as properly offensive for the purpose of exercising state coercion, only a very narrow definition of offensive speech is compatible with the values underlying freedom of expression. Then, offensive speech is distinguished from hate speech. As the two are morally different, it is inappropriate to borrow arguments from the hate speech debate to justify restrictions on offensive speech.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Pachón Álvarez ◽  
Jacinto Mata Vázquez ◽  
José Manuel López Betanzos ◽  
José Luis Arjona Fernández

Daímon ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Almagro Holgado ◽  
Neftalí Villanueva

El propósito de este trabajo es explorar los límites de un subconjunto de los usos evalua-tivos del lenguaje: el discurso ofensivo. Nuestro objetivo es doble. Primero, introducimos la rela-ción que hay entre el contexto y las proferencias evaluativas, tal y como puede rastrearse en la literatura reciente acerca de la cuestión. Segundo, nos centramos en el estudio experimental de una interacción particular entre la información contextual y nuestras afirmaciones evaluativas: cuándo el contexto es capaz de convertir una pro-ferencia aparentemente descriptiva en una evalua-tiva. Para este segundo propósito, argumentamos, ciertas propuestas positivas recientes, a pesar de su mérito, son insuficientes. The purpose of this paper is to explore the limits of a subset of the evaluative uses of language: offensive speech. More in particular, our goal is twofold. Firstly, we want to chart the relationship between context and evaluative utterances, as it stands in the current literature. Secondly, we focus on the experimental study of a particular interaction between contextual information and our evaluative claims –when the context is able to turn a seemingly descriptive utterance into an evaluative one. For this second purpose, we argue, certain recent positive proposals, in spite of their merit, come a bit short.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Ford ◽  
Christopher J. Breeden ◽  
Emma C. O'Connor ◽  
Noely C. Banos

Humor fundamentally trivializes its topic and invites people to think about it playfully and non-seriously. Intergroup humor, humor that disparages a social group or its representatives thus disguises expressions of prejudice in a cloak of fun and frivolity, affording it the appearance of social acceptability. As a result, disparagement humor represents a pervasive mechanism for communicating prejudice particularly since society has become increasingly sensitive to expressions of prejudice and other forms of offensive speech. Indeed, disparagement humor is perhaps more readily available to us now in the digital age than ever before. Because of its disguise of social acceptability, disparagement humor serves unique paradoxical functions in intergroup settings. It can function as a social “lubricant” and as a social “abrasive.” Disparagement humor directed at social out-groups functions as a social abrasive by threatening the social identity of members of the targeted group, by transmitting negative stereotypes and prejudice, by intensifying prejudice in the service of social dominance motives, and by fostering the release of prejudice against targeted out-groups. It simultaneously serves as a social lubricant for members of the in-group (the non-disparaged group) by enhancing personal and social identities. Finally, it can be co-opted by members of oppressed groups to serve social lubricant functions, including the subversion of prejudice, provided audiences understand and appreciate the subversive intent.


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