The Nature of Offence

Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis

The experience of suffering offence relates to a constellation of unpleasant feelings stirred up when one’s expectations of being treated in a certain way are frustrated. This chapter explores how the nature of offence matters for the way the law responds to offensive conduct. Prohibiting speech which offends poses a special problem because it clashes with the free speech principle, i.e. the idea that there is something particularly important in being allowed to speak our minds, which sets free expression apart from a general liberty claim to choose a way of life. It is suggested that when deciding what should count as properly offensive for the purpose of exercising state coercion, only a very narrow definition of offensive speech is compatible with the values underlying freedom of expression. Then, offensive speech is distinguished from hate speech. As the two are morally different, it is inappropriate to borrow arguments from the hate speech debate to justify restrictions on offensive speech.

Author(s):  
Anushka Singh

On 1 February 2017 at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, mob violence erupted on campus with 1,500 protesters demanding the cancellation of a public lecture by Milo Yiannopoulos, a British author notorious for his alleged racist and anti-Islamic views.1 Consequently, the event was cancelled triggering a chain of reactions on the desirability and limits of freedom of expression within American democracy. The Left-leaning intellectuals and politicians were accused of allowing the mob violence to become a riot on campus defending it in the name of protest against racism, fascism, and social injustice. In defending the rights of the protesters to not allow ‘illiberal’ or hate speech on campus, however, many claimed that the message conveyed was that only liberals had the right to free speech....


Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey ◽  
Elizabeth Wicks ◽  
Andclare Ovey

This chapter examines the protection of the freedom of expression in the European Convention on Human Rights, discusses the provisions of Article 10, and explains that the majority of cases concerning Article 10 are brought by persons who have received some penalty for defaming or insulting other people. It analyses what constitutes an interference with free expression and considers the limitations on freedom of expression. The chapter also examines the judgments made by the Strasbourg Court on several related cases, including those that involved incitement to violence and hate speech, obscenity, and blasphemy. It also covers the development of case-law concerning social media and the internet.


Significance The arrest is part of a global crackdown on freedom of expression since the Arab uprisings, which has led to unprecedented numbers of journalists, bloggers and cyber activists being killed or imprisoned. The attack on satirical French weekly Charlie Hebdo's offices on January 6, in which two cartoonists were among the 11 slain, highlighted the increasing antipathy towards the press and civil society, both from certain governments and non-state actors. Impacts Pressure will grow to hold social media networks and other internet intermediaries responsible for censoring violent and extremist content. The rise of Islamist extremist attacks on Western journalists will increase opaqueness and reliance on citizen journalism and propaganda. Greater reliance on citizens to generate content may spur investment into authentication and verification tools. The resurgence of calls for a global law prohibiting 'defamation of religions' will hinder addressing discrimination and intolerance. It will provide cover to countries with blasphemy laws that are used to restrict free expression and dissent.


Author(s):  
Letetia Van der Poll

Under the pervasive influence of United States First Amendment jurisprudence, adult gender-specific sexually explicit (or “pornographic”) material is conceptualized, and thus protected in the “marketplace of ideas”, as a particular mode of expression; to be viewed as part of the fabric of an open, free and democratic society. The values which free expression are seen to promote centre upon the advancement of political debate and promotion of personal self-fulfilment and autonomy. Attempts to conceptualise sexually explicit material within a gender-specific human rights framework present distinct challenges which, in a patriarchal legal and political design, appear to be near insurmountable. These challenges seem to be related to the enduring impact of the common law conception of obscenity (with its strong moralistic overtones) on the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, coupled with a subjective libertarian-inspired test, and the Supreme Court’s general reluctance (also echoed by the South African Constitutional Court) to consider a gender-specific conception of harm emanating from feminist arguments premised upon women’s constitutional interests in human dignity, equality and bodily integrity.  The social revolution of the 1960s, coupled with the women’s liberation movement, called for a distinct departure from the traditional conception of sexually explicit material as a mode of constitutionally defendable free speech and expression, a conception which unavoidably calls for a moralistic approach, separating acceptable forms of expression from those not deemed worthy of (constitutional) protection (termed “obscenity”, specifically created to satisfy the “prurient interest”).  The Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence is characterised by two key features. First, the court subscribes to an abstract concept of free speech, which proceeds from the assumption that all speech is of equal value, and thereby surmises that “non-obscene” sexually explicit material has social value, as do esteemed works of literature and art. Secondly, the court assumes that all individuals have equal access to the means of expression and dissemination of ideas and thus fails to acknowledge substantive (and gendered) structural inequalities. A closer inspection reveals that the Supreme Court’s justification of why freedom of expression is such a fundamental freedom in a constitutional democracy (and the reason that “non-obscene” sexually explicit material consequently enjoys constitutional protection) is highly suspect, both intellectually and philosophically. And yet the South African Constitutional Court has explicitly recognised the same philosophical justification as the basis for free speech and expression. The Constitutional Court has, in fact, both supported and emphasised the idea that freedom of expression stands central to the concepts of democracy and political transformation through participation, and has expressly confirmed the association between freedom of expression and the political rights safeguarded under the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has also endorsed the conception of adult gender-specific sexually explicit material as a form of free expression. And yet by embracing a moralistic, libertarian model of free expression, the very ideal of a free, democratic and equal society, one in which women can live secure from the threat of harm, is put at risk. A moralistic, libertarian model is simply not capable of conceptualising sexually explicit material as a possible violation of women’s fundamental interests in equality, dignity and physical integrity. This article has a two-fold objective. The first is to critically examine the dominant discourse on adult gender-specific sexually explicit material emanating from United States jurisprudence (and its resonance in South African constitutional thought), and secondly, to assess whether this particular conception is sensitive to the possible constitutional harm which may result from an abstract liberal-inspired accommodation of sexually explicit material in an imagined free and open democratic society, such as the one presented by the South African legal and constitutional contexts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
László Vári

Az online kommunikációs tér kínálta lehetőségekkel, illetve annak egyre terjedő használatával felértékelődött a vélemény és a kifejezés szabadságának jelentősége, a mindennapok szóhasználatával pedig a szólás- és sajtószabadság szerepe. Nemcsak azért, mert a mobil világ kiváló, eddig nem ismert lehetőségeket hordoz magában a szabadságjog gyakorlásához, érvényesüléséhez, hanem mert a digitális korban újabb, eddig ismeretlen vagy kevésbé jelentős problémák is felerősödnek. A félrevezető és álhírek, a profilfelfüggesztés, a kommenttörlés, a rágalmazás, és a gyűlöletbeszéd még sokáig lehetne sorolni azokat a problémákat, melyek egytől egyig a kifejezés szabadságának jogszerűtlen gyakorlatára vezethetők vissza. Mindezek nemcsak egyéni, de társadalmi szinten is komoly veszélyt jelentenek, így befolyásolva a demokratikus társadalmakat és azok fejlődését. Éppen ezért válik jelentőssé az a kérdés, hogy hogyan lehet a szólásszabadság sérelmére visszavezethető problémákat kiküszöbölni, és az említett kihívásokra megoldást találni. A következő oldalakon a nemzetközi és európai jogból, azok magyarázataiból és az európai joggyakorlatból kiolvasható válaszokat gyűjtjük össze, hogy rávilágítsunk a jogsértések okaira, és európai megoldásokat keressünk azok orvoslására. --- Liberty with limitations, a European guide to the rightful exercise of the freedom of expression In the digital age, in line with the opportunities of cyberspace and the increasing use of mobile communication the importance of freedom of expression, the so-called free speech and freedom of the press have become more salient. Not only because they carry new opportunities for the practice and the prevalence of freedom, but because new challenges emerge alongside new opportunities. Misleading and fake news, profile suspensions, deleted comments, defamation, hate speech and many other problems, can all stem from the violation of the freedom of opinion and expression. These violations of freedom carry dangers both at an individual and sociatal level, thus influencing the everyday life of democratic societies and their development. Therefore, the question becomes crucial: how can we fix these problems and provide the best solution to these challenges. In the following we will explore international and European law, their explanations and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in order to find European explanations behind the reasons for violations, as well as legal solutions for exercising freedom of expression. Keywords: freedom of expression, international and regional freedom of expression law, European case-law, 3rd party liability, public watchdogs, misleading and fake news, defamation, hate speech, copyright


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Ceci ◽  
Wendy M. Williams

Recent protests on dozens of campuses have led to the cancellation of controversial talks, and violence has accompanied several of these protests. Psychological science provides an important lens through which to view, understand, and potentially reduce these conflicts. In this article, we frame opposing sides’ arguments within a long-standing corpus of psychological research on selective perception, confirmation bias, myside bias, illusion of understanding, blind-spot bias, groupthink/in-group bias, motivated skepticism, and naive realism. These concepts inform dueling claims: (a) the protestors’ violence was justified by a higher moral responsibility to prevent marginalized groups from being victimized by hate speech, versus (b) the students’ right to hear speakers was infringed upon. Psychological science cannot, however, be the sole arbiter of these campus debates; legal and philosophical considerations are also relevant. Thus, we augment psychological science with insights from these literatures to shed light on complexities associated with positions supporting free speech and those protesting hate speech. We conclude with a set of principles, most supported by empirical research, to inform university policies and help ensure vigorous freedom of expression within the context of an inclusive, diverse community.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (7) ◽  
pp. 2335-2338
Author(s):  
Agim Poshka

It is believed that language policies aim to organize, encourage but sometimes even discourage language rights. Although slowly states in the Balkans started to believe that language rights could be used as a tool for creation of social cohesion, there is one aspect of language practice that is ignored but seems to cause quite negative impact, and that is hate speech. This paper investigated modes in which this dangerous tool is harming inter-ethnic and inter-cultural stability in the region. It is a long term interest to the judicial system of every country to limit the negative impact that hate speech has to certain fragile societies. The study also reflects on particular laws that aim to expand the span of freedom of speech and minimize the presence of hate speech in public life. This derogatory behavior can ultimately produce hatred and in some cases even human sacrifices. A definition that is often available in literature regarding hate speech is that “hate speech is an abusive or threatening speech or writing that expresses prejudice against a particular group, especially on the basis of race, religion, or sexual orientation”. In other words the basic concept of using language for solely communicational purpose has switched to use language to insult, intimidate, or threaten a group or an individual and is primarily based on a particular characteristic or disability. In its violent history, Europe has witnessed a considerable number of cases of human rights violations, and recent ones often get the “prefix” of hate speech. Certain domains of public speaking undoubtedly require legal measures and few societies have already designed their legal framework in order to address the issue The conditions have become even more dramatic with the introduction of social media. There are thousands of pages and blogs in which hate speech is expressed publicly. In an article published by the legaldictionary.net it states that with the advent of social media, the issue of offensive and threatening speech has become a global problem”. There are many cases in which hate speech is used as an argument of free speech. The process becomes even more challenging when the officials are expected to draw a line between where free speech ends and hate speech begins. Certain domains of public speaking undoubtedly require legal measures and as a result few societies have designed legal framework in order to address the issue and this study provides different methods and approaches are considered in the process. The study also cites a number of international cases which aim to create a greater picture of these deleterious phenomena and although there are many elements of the ethical and moral dilemma in regards to the freedom of expression it is important that we are aware of the responsibility and the impact we have when using hate speech in any public appearances.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

This chapter focuses on democratic persuasion. Although democratic persuasion stresses the importance of an active role for the legitimate state in promoting democratic values, value democracy does not abandon all accounts of neutrality in thinking about freedom of expression. The Supreme Court's doctrine of viewpoint neutrality is appropriate as a standard for limiting state coercion. Viewpoint neutrality means that all viewpoints, regardless of their content, should be protected by freedom of expression, provided they are not direct threats to individuals. However, while viewpoint neutrality is appropriate as a standard for applying the right of free expression to citizens, it is misplaced as a guide to determining the state's own expression and what it should say. The chapter argues that the state should be non-neutral in its persuasive and expressive roles.


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