A realist view of perception

2019 ◽  
pp. 239-254
Author(s):  
Bimal Krishna Matilal
Keyword(s):  
Realist View

Reality and Morality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Billy Dunaway
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Realist View

This book develops and defends a framework for moral realism. It defends the idea that moral properties are metaphysically elite, or privileged parts of reality. It argues that realists can hold that this makes them highly eligible as the referents for our moral terms, an application of a thesis sometimes called reference magnetism. And it elaborates on these theses by introducing some natural claims about how we can know about morality, by having beliefs that are free from a kind of risk of error. This package of theses in metaphysics, meta-semantics, and epistemology is motivated with a view to an explanation of possible moral disagreements. Many writers have emphasized the scope of moral disagreement, and have given compelling examples of possible users of moral language who appear to be genuinely disagreeing, rather than talking past one another, with their use of moral language. What has gone unnoticed is that there are limits to these possible disagreements, and not all possible users of moral language are naturally interpreted as capable of genuine disagreement. The realist view developed in this book can explain both the extent of, and the limits to, moral disagreement, and thereby has explanatory power that counts significantly in its favor.

scholarly journals How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Poslajko
Keyword(s):  
Traditional Form ◽  
Realist Approach ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Belief Attributions ◽  
Background Assumption ◽  
Realist View

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about truth and existence: it will be assumed that beliefs can be said to exist and their attributions can said to be true. The aim is to show that even when we buy into such assumptions we can meaningfully distinguish between the realist and anti-realist approach to belief. According to the proposal, the paradigmatic anti-realist view on beliefs should be seen as a conjunction of three claims: that belief attributions do not track objective similarities, that beliefs are not causally active, and that there is no viable way of naturalizing content. It will be shown that seeing the debate in the proposed way has important advantages as it allows the issue of belief realism to be made non-trivial and tractable, and it introduces theoretical unity into contemporary metaphysics of beliefs.

The Easy Approach to Group Agency. A Simple Realist View on Group Agents

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-102
Author(s):  
Andreea Popescu
Keyword(s):  
Group Agency ◽  
Group Agents ◽  
Realist View ◽  
As If

"We talk about groups as doing something, we talk as if groups have agency. Is our talk legitimate? Are there group agents? Is there something like group agency? In this paper, I discuss two ontological frameworks concerning existence questions: the Quinean framework and the Thomasson-Carnap framework. I apply them to the problem of group agency. I review the Quinean-oriented literature debating the existence of group agents and its methodological background. I argue, via Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology, that deflationism can simplify the debate surrounding group agents. Thus, I argue for a Thomasson-Carnap framework and show that it is better suited to answer the particular question whether there are group agents. More specifically, I argue for a non-reductive simple realist view on group agents, i.e. I argue for the truth of “There are group agents,” via analytic entailments, by truths about the actions and deeds of groups. Keywords: Analytic Entailments, Deflationism, Group agency, Group agents, Simple Realism "

The New Legal Realism and The Realist View of Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (02) ◽  
pp. 528-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanoch Dagan ◽  
Roy Kreitner
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Academic Discipline ◽  
Legal Discourse ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Lingua Franca ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Realist View

New legal realism (NLR) furthers the legal realist legacy by focusing attention on both the pertinent social science and the craft that typifies legal discourse and legal institutions. NLR's globalized ambitions also highlight the potential of a nonstatist view of law. The realist view of law raises three challenges facing NLR: identifying the “lingua franca” of law as an academic discipline within which NLR insights on translation and synthesis should be situated; conceptualizing NLR's focus on bottom-up investigation, so that it does not defy the rule of law; and recognizing the normative underpinning for NLR's reformist impulse.

Book-Review : Vietnam: A Realist View

China Report ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 26-29
Author(s):  
M.K. Haldar
Keyword(s):  
Realist View

scholarly journals Mobile Phones and Children: An Australian Perspective

10.28945/3252 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niranjala Weerakkody
Keyword(s):  
Umbilical Cord ◽  
Mobile Phones ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
Technological Adoption ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Mixed Blessing ◽  
Realist View

Mobile phones in Australia record one of the world’s highest rates of ownership among children under 18. This paper examines issues of mobile phones and Australian children and the various discourses (systematic frames) used in discussing their effects. These are the optimistic (gains); pessimistic (losses, costs or harms); pluralistic (technology per se is neutral but how it is used matters); historical development (importance and skills learnt); futuristic predictions (promises and dangers); current uses (connectivity, convergence and interactivity); and techno-realist view (as a mixed blessing). Taking the Justification View of Technology that sees technological adoption as a gamble and borrowing from Joshua Meyrowitz, it examines how mobile phones have eroded parental power over how, when, where and with whom their children communicate, while at the same time, becoming a ‘digital leash’ for parents to re-establish their control and an ‘umbilical cord’ of children to remain connected with parents at all times.

Three Views of Human Knowledge

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Traditional Account ◽  
To Come ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Realist View ◽  
Radical Knowledge

This chapter considers a traditional account of knowledge along with its indirect realist view of perception. On a traditional approach, perceptual knowledge is a special case of “justified true belief plus.” Such justification is alleged to come from the evidence of our senses. The chapter also compares a radically opposed, knowledge-first account, one that claims an important advantage: it is said to make room for reasons that can establish answers to our questions, enabling us to vouch for those answers. There is, however, a further alternative to consider. While better aligned with the tradition, this further alternative, as the chapter describes, still claims the same advantage as the radical knowledge-first approach.

Medical Cosmopolitanism

2019 ◽  
pp. 181-208
Author(s):  
Alex Broadbent
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Epistemic Humility ◽  
Standards Of Evidence ◽  
Realist View

This chapter seeks an attitude to medicine that does not commit the error of EBM in committing to an unjustifiably rigid notion of evidence, nor the reaction of Medical Nihilism of adopting EBM’s standards of evidence and then raising the bar even higher. Cosmopolitanism is a position developed by Appiah in the context of ethical disagreement, designed to facilitate conversation without falling into epistemic relativism. The chapter unpacks Cosmopolitanism into four stances: metaphysical, epistemic, moral, and practical. It applies these stances to medicine to yield Medical Cosmopolitanism. On this realist view, medical facts (e.g., whether an intervention works, whether someone is sick) are not dependent on the perceiver. Nonetheless Cosmopolitanism promotes epistemic humility: the attitude that one has limited confidence in one’s medical beliefs (both of efficacy and of the inefficacy of someone else’s favored intervention). And it promotes Primacy of Practice: settle cases first, principles later.

scholarly journals Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

2019 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-243
Author(s):  
Matt E.M. Bower
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Perceptual Constancy ◽  
Extensive Discussion ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Phenomenological Movement ◽  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
Naive Realist ◽  
Realist View

Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.

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