Prior, Arthur Norman (1914–69)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.F. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Tense Logic ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Change Events ◽  
Nature Of Time ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
Time Existence ◽  
The Way

Prior is most often thought of as the creator of tense logic. (Tense logic examines operators such as ‘It will be the case that’ in the way that modal logic examines ‘It must be the case that’.) But his first book was on ethics, and his views on metaphysical topics such as determinism, thinking, intentionality, change, events, the nature of time, existence, identity and truth are of central importance to philosophy. Using methods akin to Russell’s in his Theory of Descriptions, he showed that times, events, facts, propositions and possible worlds were logical constructions. For example, we get rid of events by recognizing among other things that to say that the event of Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon took place later than the event of Caesar’s invading Britain is to say that it has been the case that both Caesar is crossing the Rubicon and it has been the case that Caesar is invading Britain. The title of the posthumous work, Worlds, Times and Selves (1977), indicates the breadth and depth of his thought. He is also fun to read. He died at the age of fifty-four, at the height of his powers.

Time and Modality

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Tense Logic ◽  
Linguistic Theory ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
The Third ◽  
Metaphysical Theory ◽  
Verb Tense ◽  
The Way

This chapter discusses modal logic: the logic of possibility and necessity. After a brief review of modal logic in the second section, the third section presents basic results of propositional tense logic. The fourth section develops a system of quantified tense logic. With these technical preliminaries out of the way, the fifth section explains why tense logic ultimately fails as a linguistic theory of verb tense. The sixth section presents the main objection to tense primitivism: that tense logic has insufficient expressive resources to serve as a metaphysical theory of time. The seventh section argues that the tense primitivist can overcome these problems by treating times as maximally consistent sets of sentences. The eighth section discusses a key difference between time and modality: the lack of a temporal analogue of actualism.

Reduction of tense logic to modal logic II

Theoria ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 154-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. K. THOMASON
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Tense Logic

scholarly journals Possible Worlds in Translation: Coleman Barks’s Rendition of a Story from Rumi’s Masnavi

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahid Medhat ◽  
Hossein Pirnajmuddin ◽  
Pyeaam Abbasi
Keyword(s):  
Internal Structure ◽  
English Translation ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Translation Studies ◽  
Original Text ◽  
Main Character ◽  
Source Text ◽  
Narrative Worlds ◽  
The Way

This article applies the theory of possible worlds to the field of translation studies by examining the narrative worlds of original and translated texts. Specifically, Marie-Laure Ryan’s characterization of possible worlds provides an account of the internal structure of the textual universe and the progression of the plot. Based on this account, one of the stories from Rumi’s Masnavi is compared to Coleman Barks’s English translation. The possible worlds of the characters and the unfolding of the plots in both texts are examined to assess the degree of compatibility between the textual universes of the original and the translated texts and how significant this might be. It also examines how readers reconstruct the narrative worlds projected by the two texts. The analysis reveals some inconsistencies in the way the textual universes of the original and translated texts are furnished and in the way readers reconstruct the narrative worlds of the two texts. The inability of translation to fully render the main character results in some loss in terms of the pungency and pithiness of the original text. It is also shown that the source text presents a richer domain of the virtual in comparison, suggesting a higher degree of tellability in the textual universe of the Masnavi’s narrative.

The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Maller
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
Free Will Defense

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

Language, Meaning, and Information

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Language Meaning

This chapter is a case study of the process by which the attempt to solve philosophical problems sometimes leads to the birth of new domains of scientific inquiry. It traces how advances in logic and the philosophy of mathematics, starting with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, provided the foundations for what became a rigorous and scientific study of language, meaning, and information. After sketching the early stages of the story, it explains the importance of modal logic and “possible worlds semantics” in providing the foundation for the last half century of work in linguistic semantics and the philosophy of language. It argues that this foundation is insufficient to support the most urgently needed further advances. It proposes a new conception of truth-evaluable information as inherently representational cognitive acts of certain kinds. The chapter concludes by explaining how this conception of propositions can be used to illuminate the notion of truth; vindicate the connection between truth and meaning; and fulfill a central, but so far unkept, promise of possible worlds semantics.

Logical Tools

2021 ◽  
pp. 14-52
Author(s):  
Cian Dorr ◽  
John Hawthorne ◽  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
System P

This chapter presents the system of classical higher-order modal logic which will be employed throughout this book. Nothing more than a passing familiarity with classical first-order logic and standard systems of modal logic is presupposed. We offer some general remarks about the kind of commitment involved in endorsing this logic, and motivate some of its more non-standard features. We also discuss how talk about possible worlds can be represented within the system.

Comments on Friederike Moltmann’s “Variable Objects and Truth-Making”

2020 ◽  
pp. 496-502
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Broad Agreement ◽  
Montague Semantics ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Way

I have long admired Friederike Moltmann’s work at the intersection of linguistics and philosophy; and I have always been especially impressed by the way in which she has attempted to break free of the stranglehold of the possible worlds approach by showing how the diversified ontology of objects commonly associated with traditional metaphysics provides a much better tool for the investigation of natural language than the simple and stylized ontology of Montague semantics. The present paper is a characteristically rich, original and thought-provoking contribution to the subject; and I am afraid that I can do no more than pick my way through one or two of the many interesting issues that she raises. However, any criticisms I make on this score should not be seen to detract from my broad agreement with much of what she says....

Modal logic, philosophical issues in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Modal Claim ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Bull's Eye ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Richard Montague

In reasoning we often use words such as ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘must’ and so on. For example, if we know that an argument is valid, then we know that it is necessarily true that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Modal logic starts with such modal words and the inferences involving them. The exploration of these inferences has led to a variety of formal systems, and their interpretation is now most often built on the concept of a possible world. Standard non-modal logic shows us how to understand logical words such as ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’, which are truth-functional. The modal concepts are not truth-functional: knowing that p is true (and what ‘necessarily’ means) does not automatically enable one to determine whether ‘Necessarily p’ is true. (‘It is necessary that all people have been people’ is true, but ‘It is necessary that no English monarch was born in Montana’ is false, even though the simpler constituents – ‘All people have been people’ and ‘No English monarch was born in Montana’– are both true.) The study of modal logic has helped in the understanding of many other contexts for sentences that are not truth-functional, such as ‘ought’ (‘It ought to be the case that p’) and ‘believes’ (‘Alice believes that p’); and also in the consideration of the interaction between quantifiers and non-truth-functional contexts. In fact, much work in modern semantics has benefited from the extension of modal semantics introduced by Richard Montague in beginning the development of a systematic semantics for natural language. The framework of possible worlds developed for modal logic has been fruitful in the analysis of many concepts. For example, by introducing the concept of relative possibility, Kripke showed how to model a variety of modal systems: a proposition is necessarily true at a possible world w if and only if it is true at every world that is possible relative to w. To achieve a better analysis of statements of ability, Mark Brown adapted the framework by modelling actions with sets of possible outcomes. John has the ability to hit the bull’s-eye reliably if there is some action of John’s such that every possible outcome of that action includes John’s hitting the bull’s-eye. Modal logic and its semantics also raise many puzzles. What makes a modal claim true? How do we tell what is possible and what is necessary? Are there any possible things that do not exist (and what could that mean anyway)? Does the use of modal logic involve a commitment to essentialism? How can an individual exist in many different possible worlds?

scholarly journals EVERYONE KNOWS THAT SOMEONE KNOWS: QUANTIFIERS OVER EPISTEMIC AGENTS

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAVEL NAUMOV ◽  
JIA TAO
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Completeness Theorem ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Distributed Knowledge ◽  
First Order ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
First Order Modal Logic

AbstractModal logic S5 is commonly viewed as an epistemic logic that captures the most basic properties of knowledge. Kripke proved a completeness theorem for the first-order modal logic S5 with respect to a possible worlds semantics. A multiagent version of the propositional S5 as well as a version of the propositional S5 that describes properties of distributed knowledge in multiagent systems has also been previously studied. This article proposes a version of S5-like epistemic logic of distributed knowledge with quantifiers ranging over the set of agents, and proves its soundness and completeness with respect to a Kripke semantics.

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