al-Farabi, Abu Nasr (c.870–950)

Author(s):  
Ian Richard Netton

Al-Farabi was known to the Arabs as the ‘Second Master’ (after Aristotle), and with good reason. It is unfortunate that his name has been overshadowed by those of later philosophers such as Ibn Sina, for al-Farabi was one of the world’s great philosophers and much more original than many of his Islamic successors. A philosopher, logician and musician, he was also a major political scientist. Al-Farabi has left us no autobiography and consequently, relatively little is known for certain about his life. His philosophical legacy, however, is large. In the arena of metaphysics he has been designated the ‘Father of Islamic Neoplatonism’, and while he was also saturated with Aristotelianism and certainly deploys the vocabulary of Aristotle, it is this Neoplatonic dimension which dominates much of his corpus. This is apparent in his most famous work, al-Madina al-fadila (The Virtuous City) which, far from being a copy or a clone of Plato’s Republic, is imbued with the Neoplatonic concept of God. Of course, al-Madina al-fadila has undeniable Platonic elements but its theology, as opposed to its politics, places it outside the mainstream of pure Platonism. In his admittedly complex theories of epistemology, al-Farabi has both an Aristotelian and Neoplatonic dimension, neither of which is totally integrated with the other. His influence was wide and extended not only to major Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina who came after him, and to lesser mortals such as Yahya ibn ‘Adi, al-Sijistani, al-‘Amiri and al-Tawhidi, but also to major thinkers of Christian medieval Europe including Thomas Aquinas.

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-131
Author(s):  
Niels de Haan

AbstractThere is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that a non-agential group can be collectively responsible without thereby violating a collective duty. To show this I distinguish between four types of responsibility and duty in collective contexts: corporate, distributed, collective, shared. I set out two cases: one involves a non-reductive collective action that constitutes irreducible wrongdoing, the other involves a non-divisible consequence. I show that the violation of individual or shared duties both can lead to irreducible wrongdoing for which only the group is responsible. Finally, I explain why this conclusion does not upset any work on individual responsibility.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (03) ◽  
pp. 585
Author(s):  
William L. Rosenberg

Dr. Edward W. Arian, a renaissance man. He navigated two very successful careers, one as a world class professional musician and one as a political scientist. In addition to his family, which was most important to him, these were the other important components of his life.


1976 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 101-116
Author(s):  
Paul Woodruff

Plato represents Socrates as believing in the unity of the virtues, quarreling with those who, like Protagoras or Meno, wish to treat the virtues as distinct objects of inquiry (Protagoras 329c2ff., Meno 71e1ff.). On the other hand, there is good reason to deny that Plato's Socrates believed in the numerical identity of the virtues (cf. Meno 79a3-5). What Socrates did believe, I shall argue, is that the various virtues are one in essence. I shall show what this means and how it clears up prima facie inconsistencies among Plato's early dialogues.If I am right, Socrates’ theory has startling consequences. Since essence is exactly what Socrates wants a definition to state, it follows that all virtues will have one and the same definition. And if this is so, no wonder the quest for separate definitions of virtues fails in every case! For example in the Laches the generals are baffled by Courage because Courage has no private essence and cannot be marked off from the other virtues by stating its essence. Its essence is Virtue entire. That is a radical view, but there are good reasons for attributing it to Socrates.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 817-817
Author(s):  
P. Starr

The pivotal long-range question in medical reform is whether medicine should be viewed as a technical activity with occasional moral or social overtones or, alternatively, as a social and moral activity with a technical substratum. Is . . . medical care . . .more like the supply of water or the provision of education? If medical care is ultimately a technical activity like water supply, its management can be safely entrusted to experts in the field. If, on the other hand, medical care is primarily a moral and social activity like education, the situation is quite different . . . . Consequently, in organizing our institutions, we have good reason to provide for both participation and diversity. We may also wish to sacrifice some of the "efficiency" of a single, professionally run system for the relative inefficiency of variegated institutions sometimes in conflict with one another. In the system advocated . . . the government would pay the basic annual cost, although families would choose to spend more for additional services. What I am proposing here is an organized system that uses competition in a premeditated fashion: competition under constraint.


ULUMUNA ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-372
Author(s):  
Mutawali Mutawali

Irfānī epistemology is one of the Islamic philosophical paradigms for understanding religious texts including the Qur'ānic texts. It maintains that the source of knowledge is intuition that puts emphasis on spiritual cultivation, not text or reason. Although this epistemology is criticized, it has been introduced Muslim scholars since the end of 4th and the beginning of 5th-century hijra as shown by Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Sullāmī, Abū al-Ḥusayn Nūrī, Abū Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj and Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh through their work Ḥaqā’iq al-Tafsīr. ‘Abd al-Karīm bin Hawazan Qushayrī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn ‘Arabī, and Ṣadr al-Dīn Qunāwī, just to mention some, are the next generation of Muslim scholars who are concerned with it. This study examines the construction and the development of ‘irfānī epistemology as it is seen from the work of those scholars. It argues that ‘irfānī epistemology constitutes one important and fundamental Islamic episteme that serves to complete the other types of episteme, such as burhānī and bayānī. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v20i2.887


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wellington José Santana

The present article analyses critically the paradox of phenomenon claimed by Danish Philosopher Kierkegaard and Marion’s new concept named saturated phenomenon. While the concept of God, by definition, must surpass the realm of empiricism, perhaps the something may shed light over what God must be: Excess. However, Marion developed a new concept of phenomenon that not only occupies the immanence world, but also goes beyond. It is called saturated phenomenon. In order to address the question one might understand the limit of the givenness and then what does it mean saturated givenness. We probably all have had the sense of being overwhelmed by something and this can lead toward a sense of torpor or numbness. In the other hand, Kierkegaard affirms that God is so different than a human being, so totally other that we may think we’re right in demanding God make himself understood and be reasonable towards us. Kierkegaard upholds that we’re always dealing with God in the wrong way. I will argue that Marion, however, following phenomenological footsteps indicates a new path toward how to address God properly.   Key words: Paradox; Saturated phenomenon; freedom; Excess. 


Author(s):  
Andrea Possamai

The present essay aims, on the one hand, to recall the reasons of anti-naturalism, intended in a metaphysical perspective, of a large part of medieval philosophical and theological reflection and, on the other hand, to show how the same type of problems, specifically those concerning the possible mutability or immutability of the past, can be employed in favour of various conflicting positions on the matter. To demonstrate this, reference was made to some thinkers who could represent emblematic positions on the theme, in particular: Pliny the Elder for the ancient world, Augustine of Hippo, Peter Damian, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas for the medieval era.


2018 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 309-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  

AbstractRecently, a debate has developed between those who claim that essence can be explained in terms ofde remodality (modalists), and those who claim thatde remodality can be explained in terms of essence (essentialists). The aim of this paper is to suggest that we should reassess. It is assumed that either necessity is to be accounted for in terms of essence, or that essence is to be accounted for in terms of necessity. I will argue that we should assume neither. I discuss what role these key notions – essence and necessity – can reasonably be thought to contribute to our understanding of the world, and argue that, given these roles, there is no good reason to think that we should give an account of one in terms of the other. I conclude: if we can adequately explainde remodality and essence at all, we should aim to do so separately.


2019 ◽  
pp. 292-318
Author(s):  
Robert C. Roberts

That a virtue should be called magnanimity suggests that souls come in sizes. But what makes for this sizing? This chapter is framed between the Homeric heroic ideal embodied in the megalêtôr and the gentle but resolute American hero, the magnanimous Abraham Lincoln, interacting along the way with the other chapters in the volume. This chapter compares conceptions of greatness of soul (heart, spirit, mind), touching on Socrates, Aristotle, the New Testament, Stoicism, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī and al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, the Scottish Enlightenment, Kant, and Nietzsche. The story is one of diversity, indeed in some cases mutual exclusion, with overlap and continuities. But in the end the chapter suggests a certain evolution of our conception of human greatness in which the virtues of strength and toughness are integrated with those of generosity and compassion.


Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.


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