Meaning and rule-following

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry C. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Foundations Of Mathematics ◽  
Final Position ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Linguistic Practice ◽  
Competent Speaker ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Sceptical Conclusion

Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules and rule-following, and the recent responses to it, have been widely regarded as providing the deepest and most challenging issues surrounding the notions of meaning, understanding and intention – central notions in the philosophy of language and mind. The fundamental issue is what it is for words to have meaning, and for speakers to use words in accordance with their meanings. In Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein explores the idea that what could give a word its meaning is a rule for its use, and that to be a competent speaker is to use words in accordance with these rules. His discussion of the nature of rules and rule-following has been highly influential, although there is no general agreement about his conclusions and final position. The view that there is no objectivity to an individual’s attempt to follow a rule in isolation provides one strand of Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language. To some commentators, Wittgenstein’s discussion only leads to the sceptical conclusion that there are no rules to be followed and so no facts about what words mean. Others have seen him as showing why certain models of what it takes for an individual to follow a rule are inadequate and must be replaced by an appeal to a communal linguistic practice.

How Private Must an Objectionably Private Language Be?

1998 ◽  
pp. 62-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Lillegard
Keyword(s):  
Community Correction ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Private Practices ◽  
Simon Blackburn ◽  
Mental Events

Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243-315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. Others (notably Kripke) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionable private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I attempt to defend Kripke's account against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. Blackburn supposes that individuals are no worse off than communities with respect to the difficulties raised by Kripke, and argues that the "paradox" of PI 201 can be avoided by a proper understanding of extended dispositions, and by grasping the possibility of private practices. But Blackburn misconstrues what it is to go on in the "same" way in following a rule, and ignores the place of constitutive rules in practices.

Artifacts as Rules

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-399
Author(s):  
Mark Thomas Young ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Geiger Counter ◽  
Physical Design ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Linguistic Practice ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
The Common ◽  
Technical Artifacts ◽  
Sociology Of Technology

My goal in this article is to explore the extent to which the conception of rule-following which emerges from Wittgenstein’s later works can also yield important insights concerning the nature of technological practices. In particular, this article aims to examine how two interrelated themes of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations can be applied in the philosophical analysis of technology. Our first theme concerns linguistic practice; broadly construed, it is the claim that the use of language cannot be understood as determined by a system of context independent rules. The second, interrelated theme emerges as a consequence of the first; that the meaning of language is rendered indeterminate when analyzed in isolation from contexts of practice. Following the common tendency in the sociology of technology to draw analogies between language and technology, I aim to show how the arguments that Wittgenstein makes for these two claims concerning language can also help us to understand the relation between technical artifacts and technological practices. For, similar to Wittgenstein’s account of rules, it will be shown how artifacts cannot be adequately understood in isolation from a wider background of skillful practice and interpretation. To illustrate this idea, we will examine the case of the Geiger counter, with a view towards illustrating how important aspects of the function of the device are rendered indeterminate when assessed on the basis of physical design alone.

scholarly journals Dennis Patterson on Wittgenstein

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106
Author(s):  
V. V. Ogleznev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Legal Interpretation ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Special Approach ◽  
Legal Theorist

Dennis Patterson, modern American legal theorist, is one of the active supporters of the importance and significance of later Wittgenstein’s ideas for resolving legal philosophy problems, including legal indeterminacy problem. On the basis of Wittgenstein’s ideas about rule-following and acting in accordance with rule, he developed his own special approach to law and legal interpretation. Although there are some doubts and possible objections that he understood and interpreted «Philosophical Investigations» correctly, it should be recognized that Patterson made a full-scale (and sometimes very convincing) attempt to explicate Wittgenstein’s thoughts in a quite different context, namely, in the context of legal theory. His treatment of wittgensteinian philosophy of language continues to be interesting and sound, despite the criticisms that have been made against his approach. It is in fact very hard to find among modern legal philosophers or theorists someone who could interpret Wittgenstein in a more sophisticated way than Patterson has done

Möchte Chomsky erklären, was Wittgenstein beschreibt?

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-123
Author(s):  
Melanie Uth
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Complementary Distribution ◽  
Linguistic Research ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
The One ◽  
Language Meaning

AbstractThis article examines the relation between the philosophy of language proposed by the later Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, and his ambition to cure philosophy from the mapping of linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic entities, on the one hand, and Chomsky's statements regarding language, meaning, and thought, and regarding the sense and non-sense of different fields of linguistic research, on the other. After a brief descriptive comparison of both approaches, it is argued that Chomsky's criticism on Wittgenstein's theory of meaning (Chomsky 1974 – 1996), or on Wittgenstein's basic concepts such as e. g. rule-following (Chomsky 2000 onwards), respectively, is (a) unwarranted and (b) caused by a fundamental misconception. Moreover, it is argued that the hypothesis evoked by Grewendorf (1985: 126), according to which „Chomsky would like to explain what Wittgenstein describes“, is misleading since the objects of investigation of Chomsky and Wittgenstein are in complementary distribution one to the other.

scholarly journals Exposition of two forms of semantic skepticism: Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following and Kripke’s semantic paradox

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-143
Author(s):  
Ken Shigeta
Keyword(s):  
Private Language ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Semantic Paradox ◽  
Semantic Paradoxes ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The One

Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke?s argument (Kripke 1982), analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do not agree with Kripke?s view have directly contrasted his understanding of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein?s own perspective (LW) in or after Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language without any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable. In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by formulating the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and revealing the complicated relation between the two forms of semantic paradoxes. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics that I think holds by itself, independent from exegetical matters.

The Practice of Following Rules

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Vossenkuhl
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Language Use ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Default Option ◽  
Actual Use ◽  
Theory Of Language

AbstractRule following has been estimated as a major issue in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It seemed to be a key to understand his philosophy of language, and a criterion for the correct use of words. It was further valued as a notion, which conforms to standards required in a theory of language. In this essay I shall argue that these views are neither supported in the Philosophical Investigations nor in any other of Wittgenstein’s writings. In my view rule following serves as a default option to clarify that there are no definite standards of the correct use of words and in consequence, that the actual use of a language is not to be explained at all. Any approach to an explanation of the actual language use by means of rules appears to be nonsensical and beside the point. In order to recognize this view one has to take Wittgenstein’s proposition seriously and at face value that the use of a language is a practice. Providing that only the practice counts the famous “paradox” reappears in a new light.

On Rule-Following

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie McGinn
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Normative Constraint

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises difficulties for the idea that what comes before my mind when I hear, or suddenly understand, a word can impose any normative constraint on what I go on to do. The conclusion his reflections seem to force on us gives rise to a paradox: there is no such thing as going on to apply an expression in a way that accords with what is meant by it. The paradox can be seen as one horn of a dilemma, the other horn of which is Platonism about meaning. It is generally agreed that resolving the paradox means finding a middle course between the two horns of the dilemma. This chapter looks at three attempts to find the middle course: communitarianism, naturalized Platonism, and quietism. It then considers whether Charles Travis offers a way out of the dilemma which avoids the problems of the other views discussed.

Can One Recognize Kinds of Private Objects?

1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-227
Author(s):  
Charles E. Marks
Keyword(s):  
Private Language ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
The Individual

In § 243 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein characterizes a private language as follows: “The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.” A private language is what each of us would need to talk of his own sensations if two philosophical theses were true: namely, (1) that only the person who has a sensation can know that he has it and what kind of sensation it is and (2) that since (1) is true, the names he applies to his own sensations can only be understood by him. If (1) and (2) were true, could a person classify and talk about his own sensations?

scholarly journals Linguistic Mistakes

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrek Reiland
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Common View ◽  
Philos Stud ◽  
The Common ◽  
Semantic Correctness ◽  
Clear Cases

AbstractEver since the publication of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, there’s been a raging debate in philosophy of language over whether meaning and thought are, in some sense, normative. Most participants in the normativity wars seem to agree that some uses of meaningful expressions are semantically correct while disagreeing over whether this entails anything normative. But what is it to say that a use of an expression is semantically correct? On the so-called orthodox construal, it is to say that it doesn’t result in a factual mistake, that is, in saying or thinking something false. On an alternative construal it is instead to say that it doesn’t result in a distinctively linguistic mistake, that is, in misusing the expression. It is natural to think that these two construals of semantic correctness are simply about different things and not necessarily in competition with each other. However, this is not the common view. Instead, several philosophers who subscribe to the orthodox construal have argued that the alternative construal of correctness as use in accordance with meaning doesn’t make any sense, partly because there are no clear cases of linguistic mistakes (Whiting in Inquiry, 59:219–238, 2016, Wikforss in Philos Stud 102:203–226, 2001). In this paper I develop and defend the idea that there’s a distinctively linguistic notion of correctness as use in accordance with meaning and argue that there are clear cases of linguistic mistakes.

scholarly journals “Die Maschine als Symbol ihrer Wirkungsweise”: Wittgenstein, Reuleaux and Kinematics

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sébastien Gandon
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
General Science ◽  
Machine Model ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
The Future ◽  
Machine Configuration

In Philosophical Investigations 193–94, Wittgenstein draws a notorious analogy between the working of a machine and the application of a rule. According to the view of rule-following that Wittgenstein is criticizing, the future applications of a rule are completely determined by the rule itself, as the movements of the machine components are completely determined by the machine configuration. On what conception of the machine is such an analogy based? In this paper, I intend to show that Wittgenstein relied on quite a specific scientific tradition very active at the beginning of the twentieth century: the kinematic or the general science of machines. To explain the fundamental tenets of this line of research and its links with Wittgenstein, I focus on Franz Reuleaux (1829–1905), whose works were known to Wittgenstein.       The first payoff of this investigation is to help distance the functionalist framework from which this passage is often read: Wittgenstein’s machines are not (or not primarily) computers. The second payoff is to explain why Wittgenstein talks about machines at this place in his discussion on rule-following: it is not the machine model in itself that is criticized in PI 193–94, but the “philosophical” temptation to generalize from it.

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