The Practice of Following Rules
AbstractRule following has been estimated as a major issue in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It seemed to be a key to understand his philosophy of language, and a criterion for the correct use of words. It was further valued as a notion, which conforms to standards required in a theory of language. In this essay I shall argue that these views are neither supported in the Philosophical Investigations nor in any other of Wittgenstein’s writings. In my view rule following serves as a default option to clarify that there are no definite standards of the correct use of words and in consequence, that the actual use of a language is not to be explained at all. Any approach to an explanation of the actual language use by means of rules appears to be nonsensical and beside the point. In order to recognize this view one has to take Wittgenstein’s proposition seriously and at face value that the use of a language is a practice. Providing that only the practice counts the famous “paradox” reappears in a new light.