Strategic stability and arms control Strategic stability under the full triad 50 Strategic stability under the alternatives 62 Arms control and nuclear modernisation 63 Future-proofing 66

2018 ◽  
pp. 49-68
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
Strategic Stability

scholarly journals CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES REGARDING THE EXTENSION OF THE “NEW START” TREATY: CAN THE USA AND RUSSIA PRESERVE EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL?

2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4/2020) ◽  
pp. 123-149
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Security Challenge ◽  
The Cold War

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.

scholarly journals What History Can Teach

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-132
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
International System ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Century ◽  
Comprehensive Strategy ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

Most analyses of arms control during the Cold War focus on its role in maintaining strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, history shows that the superpowers' search for strategic stability is insufficient to explain the roots and course of negotiations. This essay argues that arms control was used as one tool in a broader strategy of war prevention, designed to contain a series of challenges to U.S. and Soviet dominance of the international system that both sides worried could upset bipolarity and increase the chances of conflict between them. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers balanced this joint superpower interest with Washington's extended deterrent commitment to its allies, which ultimately upheld the integrity of the system as a whole. The essay concludes that today's leaders should integrate arms control into a more comprehensive strategy of political accommodation fit for twenty-first-century conditions.

In Defence of Arms Control

1996 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 888-905
Author(s):  
Stuart Croft
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Cold War

Arms control has been strongly attacked from two quarters since the end of the Cold War. Some argue that it is flawed in essence, elaborating a conservative critique developed over 25 years. Others argue that arms control was a Cold War institution, and therefore its time has passed. Both are wrong, fundamentally because arms control is defined too narrowly. A typology of arms control is proposed with five distinct forms: the traditional interpretation, focusing on strategic stability; arms control at the end of major conflicts; arms control to develop the laws of war; controls on proliferation; and arms control by international organization. Arms control has a long history, and when seen in this broader perspective, it is clear that it has a future.

scholarly journals Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Natalia Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Transformative Impact ◽  
The Military ◽  
Control Regime

Two weeks after Joseph Biden took office as President, the U.S. and Russia extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. This landmark arms control treaty limits the number of strategic offensive weapons each country can have. A ‘window of opportunity’ for a new stage of strategic stability discussions on arms control has opened. Strategic competition between the world’s most powerful countries, escalating global and regional threats, accelerating technological advances in the military sphere, which hold the potential to have a transformative impact on arms forces and military conflicts, have given added urgency to the bilateral dialogue on arms control between the two nuclear superpowers. Political barriers to a new agreement are significant. The perilous state of U.S.-Russia relations, lack of trust and mutual suspicion make it more difficult for the two powers to have sustainable negotiations toward a new treaty. However, if political will is in place coupled with a realistic approach and the United States’ readiness to address Russia’s concerns, a follow-on agreement could be reached.

scholarly journals Strategic stability and the possibilities of China's involvement in the strategic arms control negotiations

2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 678-708
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Cold War

Th? paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China?s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China?s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China?s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China?s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.

scholarly journals Offensive Weapons and the Future of Arms Control

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-102
Author(s):  
Nancy Jane Teeple
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cruise Missile ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
The Future ◽  
Nuclear Systems ◽  
Cruise Missiles

With a focus on the strategic competition between the United States and Russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. The end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the INF Treaty and Open Skies has accelerated the arms race. What is the future of New START and are we likely to see any extension beyond 2021? The relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. The provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. This work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. Under conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the US and Russia. Could New START be revised – or a new treaty established – to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonics, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons?

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