scholarly journals Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Natalia Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Transformative Impact ◽  
The Military ◽  
Control Regime

Two weeks after Joseph Biden took office as President, the U.S. and Russia extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. This landmark arms control treaty limits the number of strategic offensive weapons each country can have. A ‘window of opportunity’ for a new stage of strategic stability discussions on arms control has opened. Strategic competition between the world’s most powerful countries, escalating global and regional threats, accelerating technological advances in the military sphere, which hold the potential to have a transformative impact on arms forces and military conflicts, have given added urgency to the bilateral dialogue on arms control between the two nuclear superpowers. Political barriers to a new agreement are significant. The perilous state of U.S.-Russia relations, lack of trust and mutual suspicion make it more difficult for the two powers to have sustainable negotiations toward a new treaty. However, if political will is in place coupled with a realistic approach and the United States’ readiness to address Russia’s concerns, a follow-on agreement could be reached.

scholarly journals Offensive Weapons and the Future of Arms Control

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-102
Author(s):  
Nancy Jane Teeple
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cruise Missile ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
The Future ◽  
Nuclear Systems ◽  
Cruise Missiles

With a focus on the strategic competition between the United States and Russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. The end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the INF Treaty and Open Skies has accelerated the arms race. What is the future of New START and are we likely to see any extension beyond 2021? The relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. The provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. This work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. Under conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the US and Russia. Could New START be revised – or a new treaty established – to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonics, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons?

scholarly journals Changes in International Arms Control and China’s Role

2020 ◽  
Vol 06 (02) ◽  
pp. 181-203
Author(s):  
Chunsi Wu
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Power ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Military Buildup ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
Control Regime

The international arms control regime has arrived at a crossroads as the United States pulls out of a number of international treaties and launches a new round of defense and military buildup in pursuit of absolute strategic and technological superiority. Under the Trump administration’s “America First” doctrine, Washington is leading the global arms control cause astray. The article traces the international arms control regime’s liberal institutionalist roots and situates the positions of the world’s largest nuclear powers in it. It analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the regime and put forward a number of policy measures to improve it. It argues that the officially recognized nuclear powers, especially the United States and Russia, should assume the lion’s share of maintaining global strategic stability. The author highlights the most urgent challenges in the current arms control regime and outlines China’s role and responsibilities as a rising military power in the evolution of the arms control cause.

scholarly journals Problems and Dilemmas of the Next Start Treaty

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (6) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
A. Arbatov
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Highly Active ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Military ◽  
Two Sides

Received 28.02.2021. In the end of January 2021, the New START Treaty was extended by five years by the United States and Russia. Thus, the two nuclear superpowers have time to work on the follow-on treaty not in a strategic vacuum, but relying on the valid treaty and its system of transparency and predictability. The promoters of abolishing negotiations on arms limitation and their substitution by amorphous multilateral discussions of “a general philosophy of strategic stability”, who have been highly active during recent years, have temporarily shied away, but probably not for long. The predictable difficulties of the forthcoming negotiations would be interpreted as the evidence of their impending doom, and this may turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy and once again deadlock the dialogue. During the previous decades, the development of the military technologies and new strategic concepts have changed strategic relationship of the parties. This was happening against the background of deteriorating political relations, a long pause of arms control negotiations and abrogation of a number of crucial disarmament treaties. Now the two sides have to catch up. Already it is possible to foresee the main differences of their positions. Washington is emphasizing deep reduction of the nuclear arms of the two superpowers – both strategic and tactical. Moscow has advanced a concept of “security equation”, which implies limitation of offensive and defensive arms – both nuclear and nonnuclear. There will be a great demand for strong political will and wisdom of the leaders of the two nations and of hard work and professionalism of civilian and military experts – in order to restore arms control, which has historically proved its effectiveness as a barrier in preventing nuclear war and as a stabilizer of turbulent world politics.

scholarly journals CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES REGARDING THE EXTENSION OF THE “NEW START” TREATY: CAN THE USA AND RUSSIA PRESERVE EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL?

2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4/2020) ◽  
pp. 123-149
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Security Challenge ◽  
The Cold War

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.

scholarly journals What History Can Teach

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-132
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
International System ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Century ◽  
Comprehensive Strategy ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

Most analyses of arms control during the Cold War focus on its role in maintaining strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, history shows that the superpowers' search for strategic stability is insufficient to explain the roots and course of negotiations. This essay argues that arms control was used as one tool in a broader strategy of war prevention, designed to contain a series of challenges to U.S. and Soviet dominance of the international system that both sides worried could upset bipolarity and increase the chances of conflict between them. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers balanced this joint superpower interest with Washington's extended deterrent commitment to its allies, which ultimately upheld the integrity of the system as a whole. The essay concludes that today's leaders should integrate arms control into a more comprehensive strategy of political accommodation fit for twenty-first-century conditions.

scholarly journals Possible approaches to reducing the risks of nuclear escalation at the regional level

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Pavel Zolotarev
Keyword(s):  
High Precision ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Nuclear Potential ◽  
Armed Struggle ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Nuclear Systems

The article deals with issues related to the task of reducing the risks of escalation of a local military conflict to the level of a nuclear one. To find ways to solve this problem, three aspects are considered – doctrinal, concerning official views on the use of nuclear weapons; features of the means of delivery of tactical nuclear weapons; features of the storage of tactical nuclear ammunition; the influence of high-precision weapons. The main doctrinal provisions are considered for Russia, the United States and China. The conclusion is substantiated that it is expedient to consolidate in the doctrinal documents of nuclear states or in other forms of mutual obligations the provision that each state will develop new non-nuclear systems of armed struggle with a simultaneous reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring security. To reduce the risk of escalation of the conflict to a nuclear one, it is proposed to work out the issue of refusing to create and deploy delivery vehicles that allow their use for both conventional and nuclear strikes. Relevant proposals have been made regarding the deployment of short-range nuclear weapons carriers and storage sites for nuclear charges, aimed at minimizing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. An assessment of the capabilities of high-precision weapons to disrupt strategic stability when trying to use them for decapitating or disarming strikes is carried out. The conclusion is made about the unreality of such scenarios. A comparative analysis of the risks of escalation of military conflicts to the nuclear level was carried out for the European and Asia-Pacific regions. Taking into account the achieved level of survivability of the Chinese nuclear potential and the prospects for its development, it is assumed that there is a higher risk of an escalation of a military conflict for the European theater. 

scholarly journals Hybrid War and the National Security of Russia

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-99
Author(s):  
V. M. Rodachin
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretical Concept ◽  
American Military ◽  
New Instrument ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Hybrid War ◽  
The Military

The article is devoted to the military conflicts of the XXI century and the existing approaches to their understanding of the foreign and domestic scientific literature. The subject of research is the phenomenon and theory of “hybrid war”, which originated in the late 1990s — early 2000s, and are widely used in current conditions. The founders of the term, theoretical concept and military doctrinal foundations of “hybrid war” are American military experts. The article reveals the stages of formation of the theory of hybrid war, the existing militarytheoretical and political-ideological approaches to the characterisation of its essence. The author emphasised the unfounded nature of the accusations against the Russian Federation about the “annexation of Crimea”, the implementation of “hybrid aggression” in the South-East of Ukraine and other regions. Further, the author presented the analysis of real, not fictional signs of “hybrid war”. The author concluded that hybrid wars are a new instrument of aggression of the neo-Imperial Western powers against sovereign States as opposed to the hegemony of the United States in the crisis of the unipolar world order. The necessity of improving the system of national security of Russia taking into account the USA and NATO unleashing against our country “hybrid war” and its possible escalation is substantiated.

scholarly journals Opposing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the U.S. Congress: Ideological analysis of Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee Hearings

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-72
Author(s):  
Teemu Mäkinen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Armed Services ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The U.S

The United States Senate voted to ratify the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia in 2010 by 74-26, all 26 voting against being Republicans. The change in the voting outcome compared to the 95-0 result in the 2003 SORT vote was dramatic. Using inductive frame analysis, this article analyzes committee hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations and the Armed Services committees in order to identify competing narratives defining individual senators’ positions on the ratification of the New START. Building on conceptual framework introduced by Walter Russel Mead (2002), it distinguishes four schools of thought: Jacksonian, Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and Wilsonian. The argumentation used in the hearings is deconstructed in order to understand the increase in opposition to the traditionally bipartisan nuclear arms control regime. The results reveal a factionalism in the Republican Party. The argumentationin opposition to ratification traces back to the Jacksonian school, whereas argumentation supporting the ratification traces back to Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian and Wilsonian traditions. According to opposition, the Obama administration was pursuing its idealistic goal of a world-without-nuclear-weapons and its misguided Russia reset policy by any means necessary – most importantly by compromising with Russia on U.S. European-based missile defense.

Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses

1993 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
M I Chevrier
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
Matrix Analysis ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
The Military ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention ◽  
Control Regime

The arguments for and against the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are examined. A country's decision to acquire such weapons is analyzed by means of matrix analysis, separating the effects of three parameters: The offensive capability of the aggressor, the retaliatory capability of the target, and the military purpose(s) to which the weapons would be applied. The research identifies those circumstances wherein BTW are most likely to be used. The findings have implications for the type of arms control regime that should be implemented to minimize the probability that these weapons will be used, and to control their proliferation. Specifically, the author makes recommendations concerning proposals to promote compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

Countercombatant Strategy: A New Balance of Terror?

Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 47-53
Author(s):  
Robert C. Johansen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
Industrial Complex ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Military Industrial Complex ◽  
Nuclear Policy ◽  
The Military

Military planners, security-minded intellectuals and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger himself have been reexamining current nuclear strategy in light of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. As always, caution and skepticism are advisable in appraising new proposals for military strategy and even for arms control, since such proposals often encourage the arms race to continue unabated in new, more volatile areas.Because of Schlesinger's public / announced intention to modify American nuclear policy, one strategic proposal receiving attention is Bruce Russett's suggestion, published two years ago in Worldview (“Short of Nuclear Madness,” April, 1972), and in his contribution to The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and Charles Moskos, that the United States should replace a countercity nuclear strategy with a counter-combatant strategy.

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