Institutional Credibility and the Political Costs of Market Transactions

2019 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Lewis W. Snider
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Institutional Credibility

Audience Costs and the Credibility of Commitments

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
The Political ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Qualitative Case Studies ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Large N ◽  
Survey Experiments ◽  
Methodological Approaches

Threats and promises are prevalent in international relations (IR). However, deception is also a possibility in diplomacy. Why should one state believe that another state is not merely bluffing? How can a state credibly communicate its threats and promises to others? The IR scholarship suggests that one way by which a state may make its commitments credible is by generating audience costs—the political costs a leader suffers from publicly issuing a threat or promise and then failing to follow through. There is a broad and methodologically diverse literature on the existence, mechanisms, and effectiveness of audience costs. The concept of audience costs has also been applied to explain many phenomena in IR. This article examines the IR scholarship on audience costs across different methodological approaches, including qualitative case studies, large-N statistical tests, and survey experiments.

Inflation, Unemployment, and Government Collapse

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN D. ROBERTSON
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Decline ◽  
Discrete Events ◽  
Significant Evidence ◽  
Initial Application ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Incumbent Regime

As democracies enter an era of economic retrenchment, the political costs associated with economic decline have come under close scrutiny by students of comparative politics and public policy. Of particular concern is the linkage between inflation, unemployment, and the collapse of incumbent governments. The present study provides an initial application of an alternative approach to measuring this linkage across 8 European democracies, and offers significant evidence linking political costs for cabinet governments with rising prices and the growing unemployment. By utilizing the Poisson method of determining probabilities of discrete events, increasing probabilities of government collapse are significantly associated with rising inflation and unemployment in European democracies between January 1958 and December 1979. Subsequent use of the Sanders and Herman's (1977) and Warwick (1979) analyses of cabinet stability provides a useful means to disaggregate the nation sample of the study into four discrete subsets of nations. After applying the model developed in the current study to these separate subsets, it is concluded that the more significant the change in rates of inflation and unemployment, the more likely the pattern of government collapse will be interrupted by the unexpected termination of an incumbent regime.

When Participation Wins Votes: Explaining the Emergence of Large-Scale Participatory Democracy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Abbott
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Participatory Democracy ◽  
National Level ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Participatory Institutions ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Nationwide Implementation

Why are large-scale participatory institutions implemented in some countries but only adopted on paper in others? I argue that nationwide implementation of Binding Participatory Institutions (BPIs)––a critical subtype of participatory institutions––is dependent on the backing of a strong institutional supporter, often a political party. In turn, parties will only implement BPIs if they place a lower value on the political costs than on the potential benefits of implementation. This will be true if: 1) significant societal demand exists for BPI implementation and 2) the party’s political opponents cannot take advantage of BPIs for their own gain. I test this theory through two detailed case studies of Venezuela and Ecuador, drawing on 165 interviews with key national-level actors and grassroots activists.

Global Capital Cycles and Market Discipline: Perceptions of Developing-Country Borrowers

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Alexandra O. Zeitz
Keyword(s):  
Developing Country ◽  
Global Markets ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bond Markets ◽  
International Financial Institutions ◽  
Global Capital ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Bond Issues ◽  
Systemic Factors ◽  
Global Liquidity

Abstract Developing countries are often thought to be particularly exposed to the constraints of global markets. Facing scrutiny from foreign investors, why do developing-country governments enter international bond markets, especially when they can access cheaper finance from international financial institutions? I argue that borrowing governments' perception of market constraints depends on global liquidity. When bond markets are highly liquid, investors become more risk acceptant and governments perceive the political costs of borrowing to be lower, especially compared to the conditionality of concessional loans. I use data on the timing of bond issues and three case studies—Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya—to demonstrate that choices to issue debt were shaped by global liquidity. These findings nuance debates about how markets constrain governments, emphasizing that market constraints are conditional on systemic factors, including, global liquidity.

In the Kingdom of Whomever: Baldwin’s Method

Empty Houses ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kurnick
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
James Baldwin ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
Generic Difference

James Baldwin is not only one of the more notable Anglophone twentieth-century novelists to attempt continually and with minimal success to enter the theater. He is also one of the major inheritors of the aesthetic and political problematic we have repeatedly encountered in the course of this book. Baldwin is perhaps the most important twentieth-century novelist to seriously explore what it means to make interiority the bearer of collective desire. This chapter argues that the novel of interiority reaches an impasse and a breakthrough in the work of Baldwin precisely when the contradictions inherent in the attempt to think collective problems through sexual interiority becomes unavoidably insistent—and does so through Baldwin's negotiation with the generic difference of the theater. His career makes clear that if the novel relentlessly personalizes collective issues, its theatrical preoccupation constitutes a record of the political costs of that reduction, one that demands to be read at the level of form.

Principal–Agent Problems in Militant Groups

2018 ◽  
pp. 101-114
Author(s):  
Max Abrahms
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
Militant Groups ◽  
And Behavior

Militant leaders must not only understand the folly of terrorism, but prevent members from carrying it out. Members are known to harm civilians even when their leaders oppose this targeting practice. This disconnect between the preferences of leaders and behavior of subordinates is due to what economists call a principal–agent problem. This chapter explains the principal–agent problem facing militant leaders and how they can overcome it. The second rule for rebels is grasping this organizational predicament to minimize it. Smart leaders know not only the political costs of civilian attacks, but how to restrain their members from committing them.

scholarly journals Why Ukraine and Russia Need Each Other

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-202
Author(s):  
Nicolai N. Petro
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
European Union ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The West ◽  
Economic Strategy ◽  
Political Costs

The West’s focus on corruption in Ukraine is largely misplaced. The main impediment to stability and economic growth is the government’s suicidal choice to cut the country off from its main investor – Russia. This article looks at the economic and political costs of pursuing such a policy, and concludes that there is no alternative to Russian investment. Given the political and economic constraint imposed upon the European Union, the West and Russia need to work together to develop a comprehensive economic strategy that can promote Ukraine’s economic development.

Mexico tax complaints will fan state-federal tensions

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Small Proportion ◽  
Regional Inequality ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
The Law

Subject Tax tensions. Significance The governors of four states joined forces on April 17 to seek a new fiscal agreement with the federal government. They argue that the 1978 Fiscal Coordination Law (also known as the Fiscal Pact), which establishes a formula by which taxes are transferred to the federal government and redistributed among Mexico’s 32 states, is unfair and that they receive only a small proportion of the resources they contribute. They intend to produce proposals to amend the law this month. Impacts The complaining governors could become leading opposition figures against AMLO and his government. AMLO’s perceived COVID-19 failings will harm his popularity, potentially benefiting governors with presidential ambitions. All states need to increase taxes to curb regional inequality, but this will be resisted by many owing to the political costs of taxation. As long as the current Fiscal Pact remains unchanged, opacity and dependency will define dealings between federal and state governments.

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