Political disagreement

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-132
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Edenberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Disagreement

The Differences Between Ranciere's Mesentente (Political Disagreement) and Lyotard's Differend

SubStance ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.-L. Deotte ◽  
E. Mechoulan
Keyword(s):  
Political Disagreement

scholarly journals Political Disagreement and Minimal Epistocracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam F. Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Body Of Knowledge ◽  
Political Disagreement ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Crucial Assumption

Despite their many virtues, democracies suffer from well-known problems with high levels of voter ignorance. Such ignorance, one might think, leads democracies to occasionally produce bad outcomes. Proponents of epistocracy claim that allocating comparatively greater amounts of political power to citizens who possess more politically relevant knowledge may help us to mitigate the bad effects of voter ignorance. In a recent paper, Julian Reiss challenges a crucial assumption underlying the case for epistocracy. Central to any defence of epistocracy is the conviction that we can identify a body of political knowledge which, when possessed in greater amounts by voters, leads to substantively better outcomes than when voters lack such knowledge. But it is not possible to identify such a body of knowledge. There is simply far too much controversy in the social sciences, and this controversy prevents us from definitively saying of some citizens that they possess more politically relevant knowledge than others. Call this the Argument from Political Disagreement. In this paper I respond to the Argument from Political Disagreement. First, I argue that Reiss conflates social-scientific knowledge with politically relevant knowledge. Even if there were no uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge, there is much uncontroversial politically relevant knowledge. Second, I argue that there is some uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge. While Reiss correctly notes that there is much controversy in the social sciences, not every issue is controversial. The non-social-scientific politically relevant knowledge and the uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge together constitute the minimal body of knowledge which epistocrats need to make their case. 

scholarly journals Social Affect and Political Disagreement on Social Media

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 205630511879772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Barnidge
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Communication ◽  
Perceived Similarity ◽  
Representative Survey ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Political Disagreement ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
Social Affect ◽  
The Relationship

The perception of political disagreement is more prevalent on social media than it is in face-to-face communication, and it may be associated with negative affect toward others. This research investigates the relationship between interpersonal evaluations (i.e., perceived similarity, liking, and closeness) and perceived political disagreement in social media versus face-to-face settings. Relying on a representative survey of adult internet users in the United States ( N = 489), the study first examines the differences between social media and face-to-face settings in terms of interpersonal evaluations and relates them to parallel differences in perceived disagreement. Results are discussed in light of important, ongoing scholarly conversations about political disagreement, tolerance toward the other side in politics, and the “affective turn” in public communication about politics.

Introduction

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Sabl
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Political Ideas ◽  
Political Disagreement ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
Practical Politics ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Or History

This introductory chapter discusses how David Hume's political ideas shed light on a host of questions in political theory, political science, and practical politics that would otherwise seem intractable. Aspects of Hume's work that might seem either hard to understand or of questionable modern relevance when treated with the methods of philosophy or history both fall into place and prove their continuing importance when viewed through the lens of political theory. Political theorists can find in Hume an innovative, unfamiliar way of understanding and addressing political disagreement. Hume's “liberalism of enlargement” suggests that moral factions divide the members of polities; whereas political interests, suitably defined and creatively accommodated, unite them.

Campus Novels, Camaraderie, and White Nationalist Merriment

2019 ◽  
pp. 22-42
Author(s):  
Travis M. Foster
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
National Belonging ◽  
Political Disagreement ◽  
Racial Exclusion ◽  
Campus Novel

Chapter 1 highlights the significance of everyday social practices for white sectional reunion after the Civil War, reassessing the form assumed by reconciliation as it transitioned from an object of political contestation to common sense reality. Specifically, it recovers the campus novel, a popular though largely unstudied genre that, despite its sophomoric content, acquired historical weight by turning the practice of campus affections into a metonym for national belonging tacitly predicated on racial exclusion. Focusing on the ability for merriment to overcome and, above all, trivialize intra-white difference, novels like Hammersmith: His Harvard Days (1879) and For the Blue and Gold (1901) enacted a civic pedagogy, becoming handbooks for a sociality that turned political disagreement into jocular affinity, dispute into banter, and racial exclusion into an implicit element of white fellow feeling.

Political Disagreement, Arrogance, and the Pursuit of Truth

2021 ◽  
pp. 244-258
Author(s):  
Michael P. Lynch
Keyword(s):  
Infectious Diseases ◽  
People Of Color ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Political Disagreement ◽  
Two Factors

This chapter explores two contributing factors to cognitive polarization. The first is what is known as epistemic disagreement—or disagreement over what is known, who knows it, or how we know. Crucially, even the perception that such disagreement is widespread—whether or not it actually is—can be dangerous. The second factor is intellectual arrogance. This is arrogance about what we know or think we know; it is the kind of arrogance that tells whites they have nothing to learn about racism from people of color and that reassures those who believe they know more about infectious diseases than those who spend their lives studying them. The chapter also attempts to argue that these two factors can be mutually reinforcing. This makes them doubly dangerous, because by increasing cognitive polarization, they in turn undermine the democratic value of the pursuit of truth.

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