Suspension of Judgment

Author(s):  
Hubert J.M. Hermans ◽  
Rob Bartels
Author(s):  
Ester Massó Guijarro

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is an exercise in ethnography (through a process of self-estrangement) applied to my own research career, discipline and curriculum, as a result of my experience with a bachelor in philosophy and anthropology, with a master in development cooperation and from the African studies (with an Africanist anthropological thesis, defended in a department of philosophy with no tradition about it). I propose to reflect on the intersection, controversial in itself, we find between these different disciplines, fields and regional study areas, with their particular heritage, customs, rituals and rigors, epistemologies, transmitted traditions, methodologies, empiricism, endowments or classifications, from my bio-bibliographical experience and the building of my own curriculum. The ultimate goal is the epoche, the suspension of judgment about reality, or the relativism on each of those disciplinary experiences, the study process coming from its meeting (crossroads) and the emergence of the "land of no one" (uncomfortable while libertarian) in the investigation. Arguably, then, I'll try to test an "ethnography" of my own academic path illuminated by philosophical reflectionRESUMENPropongo aquí un ejercicio de etnografía (a través un proceso de autoextrañamiento) aplicada a mi propia trayectoria investigadora, disciplinaria y curricular, a raíz de mi experiencia como licenciada en filosofía y en antropología, con una experticia en cooperación al desarrollo y desde el campo regional de los estudios africanos (doctorada con una tesis de antropología africanista en un departamento de filosofía sin tradición al respecto). Propongo reflexionar sobre la intersección que hallamos entre estas diferentes disciplinas, campos y ámbitos regionales de estudio, con sus particulares herencias, costumbres, rituales y rigores, epistemologías, tradiciones de transmisión, metodologías, empirismos, investiduras o nomenclaturas, desde mi propia experiencia bio-bibliográfica y mi propia construcción de currículo. El objetivo final es la epojé de todo ello, la suspensión de juicio sobre la realidad, o bien la relativización sobre cada una de esas experiencias disciplinarias, el proceso de estudio que deviene de su encuentro (encrucijada) y la emergencia de la "tierra de nadie" (incómoda y a la vez libertaria) en la investigación. Podría decirse, pues, que trataré de ensayar una "etnografía" de la propia trayectoria académica iluminada por una reflexión filosófica.


Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa

This book develops an improved virtue epistemology and uses it to explain several epistemic phenomena. Part I lays out a telic virtue epistemology that accommodates varieties of knowledge and understanding particularly pertinent to the humanities. Part II develops an epistemology of suspension of judgment, by relating it to degrees of confidence and to inquiry. Part III develops a substantially improved telic virtue epistemology by appeal to default assumptions important in domains of human performance generally, and in our intellectual lives as a special case. This reconfigures earlier virtue epistemology, which now seems a first approximation. This part also introduces a metaphysical hierarchy of epistemic categories and defends in particular a category of secure knowledge.


2020 ◽  
pp. 9-30
Author(s):  
Larry R. Churchill

Moral perplexities are not of a single type; they take a variety of forms. They need to be appreciated before trying to resolve them through ethical systems or theories. Ethics begins in curiosity about why we think and feel as we do and why we differ from others. Everyone is engaged in ethics, and everyone can learn to exercise the skills that will make for a meaningful moral life. Engaging in moral dialogue is a humanizing activity; it requires suspension of judgment and respectful exploration of our own values and those of others. Three obstacles to ethics are defined: moral arbitrariness, absolute certainty, and perfectionism. Four aims of ethics are explored: discovering and claiming the moral values that define us; identifying the values of others; achieving consonance between internal values and external actions; and solving problems. The final section considers whether and how ethics can be taught and learned.


Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew

ABSTRACTFamously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers a question left open in Pettigrew (2014).


2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 713-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronika Kisfalvi ◽  
David Oliver

The increasing popularity of experiential learning in management education raises a number of new opportunities and challenges for instructors, particularly with regard to shifting instructor roles and attention to learning through one’s emotions. In this article, we draw on psychodynamics—in particular D. W. Winnicott’s notions of “transitional space” and “holding”—to delineate what a safe space might look like in a management education context. We propose that experiential learning can result in deeper learning when conducted in such a space, which consists of appropriate physical aspects, trust, respect, suspension of judgment and censorship, a willingness to share, and high-quality listening. We further propose that a safe space can be developed and maintained by creating a strong container early on, establishing ground rules, providing lessons in listening and witnessing, teaching by example, and developing a reflexive attitude.


Author(s):  
Richard Bett

This chapter assesses the relations between Greco-Roman philosophical skepticism, centered on the attitude of suspension of judgment, and the Second Sophistic. It begins with Favorinus, who identified as an Academic skeptic, and whose rhetorical activity is recognizably related to the practice of Academic skepticism, but who also engaged with the Pyrrhonist skeptical tradition. The rest of the chapter addresses Pyrrhonism, particularly Sextus Empiricus. The central point is Sextus’s complete lack of reference to the Second Sophistic, despite its being almost certainly contemporary with him. This may be due in part to his self-effacement and disengagement from the public arena, which is encouraged by the Pyrrhonist goal of ataraxia. But it also seems to be connected with the peculiar anachronism of his intellectual engagements, both concerning philosophy and (in his Against the Rhetoricians) concerning rhetoric itself.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-211
Author(s):  
Anna Tigani

Sextus responds to the Dogmatists’ criticism that the Sceptics cannot investigate Dogmatic theses, formulating his own version of Meno’s puzzle against them. He thus forces them to adopt υοεῐυ ἁπλῶς – a way of thinking that does not carry any commitment to the reality of what someone thinks – as their only solution to the puzzle and as the necessary starting point of their investigation. Nοεῐυ ἁπλῶς avoids Dogmatic assumptions without making use of the Sceptical argumentation that leads to suspension of judgment. It constitutes a novel answer to Meno’s puzzle, Dogmatism- and Scepticism-free, with important consequences both for Dogmatism and for Scepticism.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document