Monotheism and transcendental idealism

2021 ◽  
pp. 78-104
Author(s):  
Louay M. Safi
Author(s):  
Paul F. Snowdon

The overall question of this chapter is: what relevance do Kant’s Paralogisms have for current philosophy? After characterising Kant’s negative points about rational psychology, it is argued that once we abandon transcendental idealism and we appreciate that Kant’s assumption that we lack intuitions of ourselves is problematic, then Kant’s approach lacks a convincing basis. It is further argued that Strawson’s much more favourable reading of Kant’s argument relies on certain conceptual assumptions that are also unwarranted. The major and important lesson for our time, it is suggested, is that Kant identifies a serious weakness in a popular style of pro-dualist reasoning.


Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi

Whereas a certain popular (Fregean) interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality makes Husserl into an internalist and methodological solipsist, the aim of Chapter 4 is to show that Husserl’s commitment to transcendental idealism prevents his theory from being either. I first discuss competing interpretations of Husserl’s concept of the noema, and argue that the Fregean interpretation misreads the transcendental character of Husserl’s phenomenology. I next present an interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism that highlights its difference from metaphysical idealism and shows why Husserl’s conception of the mind–world relationship cannot be adequately captured within the internalism–externalism framework. In the final part of the chapter, I discuss how the claim that Husserl is a methodological solipsist fails to engage properly with his account of transcendental intersubjectivity, and how that latter account eventually transforms the very character of the transcendental project.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-673
Author(s):  
Joe Saunders ◽  
Martin Sticker

AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-511
Author(s):  
Truls Wyller

Abstract I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).


PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Angelica Nuzzo

This essay discusses Merleau-Ponty's assessment of Kant's philosophy looking first at his critique of Kant's transcendental idealism in the preface to the 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, and second at his account of the duality of the concepts of nature in the 1956-57 lecture notes on Nature at the Collčge de France. In both cases, Merleau-Ponty points to the encounter with the issue of the living/lived body as the stumbling block that halts the transcendental inquiry leading to his transcendental phenomenology. Along this itinerary, countering Merleau-Ponty's reading a different interpretation of Kant is offered. The claim is made that Kant did not evade the problem of the human body but made it functional to his own transcendental inquiry. Task of this essay is to measure the distance that separates the two accounts of Kant's view of sensibility, namely, the critical account that inspires Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body leading him beyond the alleged impasse of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what the author claims to be Kant's own transcendental view of sensibility.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-156
Author(s):  
Andrija Filipović

In this paper I will show that the movement from Kant's transcendental idealism to Gilles Deleuze's transcendental empiricism and then to new materialisms and speculative realisms is what enables us to talk about the direct and non-mediated access to the thing in itself (or its dissolution). In other words, it's the change from the conditions of possible experience to the conditions of real experience that made possible current philosophical and theoretical discourses of materialisms and realisms. What is of particular interest for the purposes of this paper is how the change from conditions of possible to real experience relates to the current conceptualizations of art practices. More precisely, I will show how the ontology of art changed, or at least that there perhaps appears paradigm-shifting possibility of different aesthetics and ontologies of art, flat ontology being one of them, with the appearance of new materialisms and speculative realisms that were made possible by the change to the conditions of real experience.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Rudolf Meer

Over the last two decades, the controversy between conceptualists and nonconceptualists has provided important insights into Kant’s critical project and especially the transcendental deduction. At the same time, the differentiation of the various positions has led to a seemingly unsolvable paradox in interpretation. However, if the intensifications of the debate are withdrawn and the current positions are placed in the context of historical interpretations, it becomes apparent that a nonconceptualism can indeed be developed without coming into (irresolvable) conflict with Kant’s conceptualism. In this sense, Alois Riehl proposes in his Philosophical Criticism (vol. 1) a so-called state nonconceptualism. Even if he does not have the terminology in use today, he can defend this on par with the current debate especially with regard to A 89–90 / B 122–123. In doing so, Riehl’s realistic interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism offers strategies that again question a hasty skepticism towards nonconceptualist interpretations.


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