Transcendental Philosophy and the Challenge of the Human Body: Merleau-Ponty and Kant

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Angelica Nuzzo

This essay discusses Merleau-Ponty's assessment of Kant's philosophy looking first at his critique of Kant's transcendental idealism in the preface to the 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, and second at his account of the duality of the concepts of nature in the 1956-57 lecture notes on Nature at the Collčge de France. In both cases, Merleau-Ponty points to the encounter with the issue of the living/lived body as the stumbling block that halts the transcendental inquiry leading to his transcendental phenomenology. Along this itinerary, countering Merleau-Ponty's reading a different interpretation of Kant is offered. The claim is made that Kant did not evade the problem of the human body but made it functional to his own transcendental inquiry. Task of this essay is to measure the distance that separates the two accounts of Kant's view of sensibility, namely, the critical account that inspires Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body leading him beyond the alleged impasse of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what the author claims to be Kant's own transcendental view of sensibility.

Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.


Open Theology ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingjing Li

AbstractIn this paper, I investigate the account of self-consciousness provided by Chinese Yogācārins Xuanzang (602-664CE) and Kuiji (632-682CE). I will explain how they clarify the transition from selfattaching to self-emptying through the articulation of consciousness (vijñāna). Current scholarship often interprets the Yogācāra account of consciousness either as a science of mind or as a metaphysical idealism. Both interpretations are misleading, partly because they perpetuate various stereotypes about Buddhism, partly also because they overlook the religious goal of realizing in practice the wisdom of emptiness and the non-egoistic compassion. Against the status quo, I argue that through their account of self-consciousness, Xuanzang and Kuiji advocate what can be referred to as transcendental idealism that stresses the correlation between subjectivity and objectivity. Yogācārins thus neither nullify the existence of subjectivity nor formulate subjectivity as a higher entity. The transcendental idealism yields a Buddhist phenomenology that is similar to and also different from Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In what follows I will first characterize Husserl’s phenomenology as an approach to consciousness at two levels (the descriptive level and the explicative level). Then, I elicit the Buddhist phenomenology from Yogācāra philosophy that is not only descriptive and explicative but also prescriptive. This three-level architectonic of consciousness, while reaffirming the importance of agency, further justifies the role of religious rituals and moral practices for Yogācāra devotees.


Philosophy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Froman ◽  
Meirav Almog

Merleau-Ponty (b. 1908–d. 1961) was a major 20th-century French philosopher and contributor to phenomenology. He studied at the École Normale Supérieure from 1926 to 1930, received the aggrégation in philosophy in 1930 and the Docteur ès lettres in 1945. After early teaching largely in psychology, culminating with a Sorbonne appointment as professor of child psychology and pedagogy, he was elected in 1952 to the Chair in Philosophy at the Collège de France, as the youngest philosopher ever in this position, which he held until his death. His inaugural lecture was published as Éloge de la philosophie (In Praise of Philosophy). In 1945, Merleau-Ponty became, along with Raymond Aron, Simone de Beauvoir, and Jean-Paul Sartre, a founding editorial board member as well as political editor of Les temps modernes, a journal devoted to “la philosophie engagée.” In 1953 he resigned from the journal. After the Korean conflict, Merleau-Ponty’s political difference with Sartre was acute, and in Les aventures de la dialectique (Adventures of the Dialectic) Merleau-Ponty characterizes Sartre’s position as “ultra-bolshevism.” Eventually, Merleau-Ponty would relinquish Marxist tenets. Merleau-Ponty’s first book, La structure du comportement (The Structure of Behavior), from 1942, is largely a critique of behavioral psychology as lacking a-propos, his stated goal, understanding the relation between nature and consciousness. His second and major completed book is La phénoménologie de la perception (Phenomenology of Perception). In this work Merleau-Ponty undermines classical theories of perception, which rely on “sense data”; introduces his understanding of the “lived body”; accentuates Husserl’s remark that consciousness is initially a matter of an “I can,” not an “I think”; and introduces a gestural analysis of language. While affirming Eugen Fink’s observation that there is no total “reduction” phenomenologically, Merleau-Ponty proceeds under the “epochē,” nonetheless. When he died, Merleau-Ponty was writing what would have been a book of major proportions. The material that he completed was posthumously published as Le visible et l’invisible (The Visible and the Invisible), a title from working notes that were published with it. Critical discussions of reflective philosophy, dialectic, and intuition precede a decidedly ontological project involving: “la chair” (the “flesh”), successor to Phenomenology of Perception’s “lived body,” through which “I live the world”; “reversibility,” the perceptual dynamic operative in our habitation of the world; and “the chiasm” or “intertwining” of different contexts, such as vision and motility. L’oeil et l’esprit (Eye and Mind), intended for inclusion in The Visible and the Invisible but published separately, addresses exploration of these factors in painting.


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-87
Author(s):  
Stanko Vlaski

The relation of Jena romantics to Kant?s transcendental philosophy could be considered from the point of view of the romantic theory of the fragment. The author claims that fragmentariness had a transcendental character in the philosophical ref lections of Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. That is the reason that they have acquired the opportunity of approaching to the immanent tension of Kant?s philosophical project. The problem of ref lection of relation between systematicity and incompleteness of knowledge and of man?s theoretical and practical side is among the most important. The author tries to evaluate the importance of Fichte?s version of critical idealism for romantics, considering the crucial romanticists? intention of historization of transcendental idealism with the help of the fragment. Final chapter refers to recent interpretations of the romantic fragment which tend to ignore this intention.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Thomas Hidya Tjaya

Abstrak: Dalam pengantar pada karyanya Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty praktis mengidentikkan filsafat dengan fenomenologi sebagai usaha untuk mempelajari kembali bagaimana cara melihat dunia. Dalam upaya tersebut ia mengajak pembaca, mengikuti slogan khas fenomenologi Husserl, untuk kembali ke permulaan atau bendabenda itu sendiri. Yang menarik adalah bahwa permulaan yang dianalisis oleh Merleau-Ponty justru tubuh manusia, sebuah dimensi yang cenderung dipandang rendah dalam sejarah filsafat Barat. Ia tidak sendirian dalam hal ini, mengingat dalam fenomenologinya Levinas juga menekankan sensibilitas sebagai locus etika. Menurut penulis, gerakan fenomenologi menuju hal yang sensibel (the sensible) ini tidaklah mengubah hakikat filsafat sebagai usaha untuk mencari asal mula realitas. Realitas yang tersingkap dalam orientasi demikian justru menjadi lebih integral dan komprehensif daripada apa yang selama ini dikenal dalam sejarah filsafat dan sains. Meskipun demikian, orientasi pada pengalaman konkret manusia untuk menggali dasar realitas secara potensial menimbulkan masalah bagi fenomenologi itu sendiri yang selalu ingin kembali ke permulaan. Kata-kata Kunci: Fenomenologi, asal mula, permulaan, ada-dalam-dunia, sains. Abstract: In the Preface to his work Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty virtually identifies philosophy with phenomenology as a way of relearning to see the world. For this purpose he invites the reader, following the catchphrase in Husserl’s phenomenology, to return to the beginning or the things themselves. What is interesting is that the beginning that Merleau-Ponty analyzes is the human body, which belongs to a dimension that tends to be despised in the history of Western philosophy. He is not alone in this type of investigation, as Levinas also emphasizes sensibility as the locus of ethics. The author argues that the phenomenological movement towards the sensible does not alter the nature of philosophy as an attempt to seek for the nature of reality. The reality as disclosed in this analysis can be more integral and comprehensive than what is usually presented in the history of philosophy and science. The orientation towards the concrete dimension of human life in search for the foundation of reality, however, may cause a problem for phenomenology itself insofar as it always tries to return to the beginning. Keywords: Phenomenology, origin, beginning, being-in-the-world, science.


Author(s):  
THOMAS BYRNE ◽  

This essay critically assesses Roman Ingarden’s 1915 review of the second edition of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations. I elucidate and critique Ingarden’s analysis of the differences between the 1901 first edition and the 1913 second edition. I specifically examine three tenets of Ingarden’s interpretation. First, I demonstrate that Ingarden correctly denounces Husserl’s claim that he only engages in an eidetic study of consciousness in 1913, as Husserl was already performing eidetic analyses in 1901. Second, I show that Ingarden is misguided, when he asserts that Husserl had fully transformed his philosophy into a transcendental idealism in the second edition. While Husserl does appear to adopt a transcendental phenomenology by asserting–in his programmatic claims–that the intentional content and object are now included in his domain of research, he does not alter his actual descriptions of the intentional relationship in any pertinent manner. Third, I show Ingarden correctly predicts many of the insights Husserl would arrive at about logic in his late philosophy. This analysis augments current readings of the evolution of Ingarden’s philosophy, by more closely examining the development of his largely neglected early thought. I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Husserl’s later writings and from recent literature on the Investigations. By doing so, I hope to additionally demonstrate how research on the Investigations has matured in the one hundred years since the release of that text, while also presenting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Luft

In this paper I compare and contrast Natorp’s and Husserl’s philosophies as to their programmatic and systematic profiles. I will begin by giving an assessment of their relationship and mutual influence, something that many scholars believe had been done exhaustively in Kern’s initial study of 1964 on the relation between Husserl and Kant and the neo-Kantians. Indeed, this topic – in general, the relation between phenomenology and „critical“ philosophy – deserves a new look now that more material has appeared in the Husserliana, forcefully demonstrating the „transcendental Husserl“ and the Kantian influence on his phenomenology, and given the overall growing interest in neo-Kantianism. I will show that, despite fundamental differences in their philosophical outlooks, Natorp and Husserl share the same principal premise as to the relation between life, science and philosophy, and thus the role of philosophy itself in the midst of „culture“ and „lifeworld“ respectively. Hence, the similarities between Natorp’s Marburg School neo-Kantianism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology outweigh the differences, opening up new avenues to pursue transcendental philosophy.


Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi

In the previous chapters, I have chartered Husserl’s route from descriptive phenomenology to transcendental idealism. I have discussed how the latter is phenomenologically motivated, what kind of transcendental philosophy it amounts to, and what its metaphysical implications are. Let me by way of conclusion return to the last question. In ...


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