states that if such a requirement existed any disadvantage, provided it was ‘clear and obvious and more than de minimis’ may be small. The message is very clear that Morgan is something of an aberration on this point, proceeding from an unwarranted reliance on a single appeal from India (Poosathurai) and, at an appropriate point, the House of Lords will override it. As Nourse LJ states (at p 399): ‘Although in CIBC Mortgages plc, judicial courtesy no doubt prevented Lord Browne-Wilkinson from saying so, my strong impression is that he thought its introduction into cases of presumed undue influence was no more appropriate than into cases of actual undue influence.’ A further uncertainty arising out of the decision in Morgan is that Lord Scarman does not make it clear which class of undue influence he was dealing with. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody, adopted a threefold classification, namely: • Class 1 Actual undue influence. • Class 2A Presumed undue influence arising out of recognised relationships such as solicitor and client, etc. • Class 2B Presumed undue influence not based on a recognised relationship, but in which there is a relationship of trust and confidence. Lord Scarman at no point indicates which of the relevant categories the respondent in Morgan fell into. Vicarious undue influence

1995 ◽  
pp. 431-431
1995 ◽  
pp. 417-419

Legal Studies ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Battersby

In the twin cases of Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien and CIBC Mortgages Plc v Pitt the House of Lords consided for the first time an issue which has fresuently troubled the lower courts in recent years. In essence the issue can be boiled down to the following question:Where a debt owed by A to C is guaranteed by B, in what circumstances will the fact that A induced B to make the guarantee by misrepresentation, undue influence or other conduct of which Equity disapproves, render the guarantee voidable by B against C?(This simplified scenario, where A is the principal debtor, C the creditor, and B the guarantor, will be used in much of what follows). The contemporary significance of the question, and the difficulty which it has posed to the courts, are graphically shown by the fact that it has given rise to eleven reported decisions by the Court of Appeal in the last eight years.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.


Legal Studies ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Handford

The distinction between primary and secondary victims confirmed by Page v Smith has caused major problems in English psychiatric damage law. The House of Lords has suggested that the search for principle has been called off, and that the only sensible strategy is to say ‘thus far and no farther’. This paper suggests that one way forward is to recognise that it is not only persons who are physically proximate to an ‘accident’ who should be put in a special category: any case in which there is some sort of pre-existing relationship between claimant and defendant should be regarded as different from the standard secondary victim scenario. The relationship concept, first recognised in the USA and now adopted by the Court of Appeal, can be found in embryo form in the early cases.


2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 305-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun D. Pattinson

It is argued that the application of the doctrine of undue influence to patient's decisions in the context of medical treatment is ripe for development. The doctrine is capable of providing much needed protection for vulnerable patients if developed along lines suggested by its use in other contexts. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal has recently missed an opportunity to develop the law in this way and it may be some time before another suitable opportunity is presented to the courts.


2012 ◽  
pp. 136-136

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