binds a company and its members under the terms of the memorandum and articles of association. In each case, there is separate provision for these varieties of contract under other legislation. Apart from the provisions of the 1999 Act, the third party’s rights arising under some other rule of law will remain unaffected. Thus, if an existing common law or equitable exception to the doctrine of privity of contract applies in favour of T, he may rely on that instead of invoking the provisions of the 1999 Act. This will be particularly important in cases in which T is unable to prove that he has relied on the term in the contract between A and B or in any other case in which the restrictive provisions of s 1 and s 2 might work against T. Thus, if T can establish the existence of a trust of the promise made in his favour or if he has an action in the tort of negligence or if some other statutory exception applies in his favour, T will still be able to avail himself of that alternative route. Although s7(1) only refers to T’s right under s 1, it must follow that the provisions of ss 2 and 3 are also inapplicable, since both of these provisions expressly state that they apply where T has relied on s 1. It has been seen above that at common law there is nothing to prevent the promisee from enforcing a term expressed to be for the benefit of the third party, if he wishes to do so. This position is preserved under s 4 of the 1999 Act.

1995 ◽  
pp. 805-806
Author(s):  
ONG Burton

Singapore’s contract law framework, in the context of third party beneficiaries, has stayed faithful to the approach taken under English law. The common law in Singapore has adopted the privity of contract rule, various common law exceptions to the rule, and a statutory regime to empower third parties to enforce contractual terms in prescribed circumstances. The privity rule confines the benefits and burdens under a contract to the contract parties; only they have given consideration and only they can sue and be sued under it. However, various reasons support the third party beneficiary having some right to enforce that benefit and a range of common law mechanisms have been recognized by the courts to allow the third party to do this. Some are true exceptions, others operate by recharacterizing the status of the third party into that of a primary party, thereby eliminating the lack of privity. In cases where the third party may potentially be able to sue the promisor in tort, the basis for loosening the privity doctrine to permit the third party to sue the promisor in contract, and the character of the damages recoverable from the party in breach, requires closer scrutiny.


Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 307-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally, it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


Legal Studies ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-295
Author(s):  
P.J. Davies

It is commonplace in the commercial world for contractual obligations to be performed by persons other than the original parties to the contract. Because of the doctrine of privity of contract persons who are not party to a contract generally cannot take advantage of terms contained in it. If, therefore, a person undertakhg the performance of obligations which someone else has originally assumed misperforms those tasks so as to incur legal liability towards the other original contracting party, it would seem that he cannot rely on a protecting clause in the contract even though that clause may purport to afford him cover. A variety of avenues of escape from this situation (which is often commerically inconvenient) have been at various times advocated: the doctrine of vicarious immunity and the trust idea have been explored and eventually rejected. Other methods of avoidance retain more vigour: we have probably not heard the last of arguments based on the doctrines of volenti non fit injuria and disclaimer, of the bailment on terms and of the idea of spelling out a separate contract (or offer) between the party now suing and the third party.


1952 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-257
Author(s):  
T. C. Thomas

The purpose of this article is to consider the legal effects of a transfer of property by A to B subject to the performance by B of some obligation in favour of C, a third party to the transfer. The student of the law of contract is well familiar with the common law rule that no one who was not an original party to the contract is entitled to the benefit of that contract. But this rule creates hardship in particular cases and it has been shown that, in the main, three methods have been evolved to evade those unfortunate results. First, the legislature has intervened and provided C, the third party, with statutory rights. Secondly, the doctrine of agency has been invoked whereby C may claim that he is the principal of B. Thirdly, but with varying success, the trust concept has been pressed into service whereby C has sometimes been able to show that he is a beneficiary.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-125
Author(s):  
Tumo Charles Maloka

The pivotal judgments on dismissals at the behest of a third party – East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd v UPUSA, Lebowa Platinum Mines v Hill, NUMSA v Hendor Mining Supplies a Division of Marschalk Beleggings (Pty) Ltd, TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA, NUPSAW obo Mani v National Lotteries Board and NUMSA v High Goal Investments t/a Chuma Security Services – deeply implicate discrimination in all its manifestations, accountability, gendered precariousness and social justice. This contribution explores the focal questions raised in recent times concerning the fairness of a dismissal at the instance of a third party. First, there are fundamental points relating to the constitutional and statutory protection of security of employment. Secondly, there are those familiar problems often associated with substantive and procedural fairness that surface here under the guise of questioning the disciplinary power of the employer. In this context, inroads into managerial prerogative and disciplinary procedure are amplified where there has been no fault on the part of the employee and no breakdown of the trust relationship, or where the employee has been disciplined, but not dismissed and the employer did not want to terminate the employee’s employment but was coerced by the third party to do so. Thirdly, there is the thorny issue of the reason behind the third-party demand and the related issue of intolerability caused by the targeted employee. And finally, there is the issue of striking in support of a demand for dismissal of a co-employee.


Notaire ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Raden Ajeng Cendikia Aurelie Maharani

In the Marriage Agreement to bind the third party, then the marriage agreement must meet the principle of publicity, that is, by registered or recorded. Registration of marriage agreement for Muslims at KUA Kecamatan / PPN LN, while for non-Muslims are recorded at the Department of Population and Civil Registration. One of the conditions for recording a marriage agreement is the marriage agreement act. The form of marriage agreement for Muslims is regulated in Article 22 paragraph (2) Permenag RI No. 20/2019, the word “done in front of a notary” in question is an authentic act. As for non-Muslims, the form of marriage agreement is regulated in Circular Letter 472.2 / 5876 / Dukcapil which does not follow MK Decision No. 69 / PUU-XII / 2015 which states that the marriage agreement is made in the form of a Notary deed, this is stated in the first point in the circular. In the making of marriage agreements there is often a misunderstanding by making an affirmation act from a letter under hand. The result of the research obtained is that the marriage agreement made under hand and then made a affirmation act by a notary then the affirmation act does not meet the principle of publicity as determined in the Marriage Law, because in one of the conditions of validity of the marriage agreement must be registered with the registrar bind the third party until the act of affirmation of the marriage agreement does not bind the third party. This research is a study of normative juridical law with the method of Legislative approach and conceptual approach.Keywords: Affirmation Deed; Marriage Agreement; Publicity Principle.Dalam Perjanjian perkawinan agar mengikat pihak ketiga, maka perjanjian perkawinan harus memenuhi prinsip publisitas, yaitu dengan didaftarkan atau dicatatkan. Pencatatan perjanjian perkawinan bagi yang beragama Islam pada KUA Kecamatan/PPN LN, sedangkan bagi yang beragama Non-Islam dicatatkan di Dinas Kependudukan dan Pencatatan Sipil. Bentuk perjanjian perkawinan bagi yang beragama Islam diatur dalam Pasal 22 ayat (2) Permenag RI No. 20/2019 dilakukan dihadapan notaris yang dimaksud adalah akta autentik. Sedangkan bagi yang beragama non-Islam bentuk Perjanjian perkawinan diatur dalam Surat Edaran 472.2/5876/Dukcapil yang menindaklanjuti Putusan MK No. 69/PUU-XII/2015 yang menyebutkan bahwa Perjanjian perkawinan dibuat dalam bentuk akta Notaris, hal ini tercantum dalam point kesatu dalam surat edaran tersebut. Dalam pembuatan perjanjian perkawinan masih seringkali terdapat kesalahpahaman dengan dibuatkannya akta penegasan atas perjanjian perkawinan yang dibuat di bawah tangan. Adapun hasil penelitian yang diperoleh bahwa Perjanjian perkawinan yang dibuat di bawah tangan kemudian dibuatkan akta penegasan oleh notaris maka akta penegasan tersebut tidak memenuhi prinsip publisitas sebagaimana yang telah ditentukan dalam UU Perkawinan, karena dalam salah satu syarat keabsahan perjanjian perkawinan harus dilakukan pendaftaran pada pegawai pencatatan perkawinan agar mengikat pihak ketiga sehingga akta penegasan perjanjian perkawinan yang tersebut tidak mengikat pihak ketiga. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian normatif dengan metode pendekatan yang dipergunakan adalah pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konseptual.Kata Kunci: Akta Penegasan; Perjanjian Perkawinan; Prinsip Publisitas.


Author(s):  
Lee Mason

This chapter analyses the law on third party beneficiaries in Hong Kong long characterized by strict adherence to the traditional common law doctrine of privity. The law relating to third party rights was only reformed by way of Ordinance in 2016, along the lines of the statutory reform of English law in 1999. A small number of specifically enumerated types of contract are excluded from the scope of the Ordinance; other contracts may be concluded to confer enforceable contractual rights on third parties. Whether a third party may enforce a term of a contract depends on the interpretation of the contract: if the third party right was not expressly conferred there is a presumption that the conferral was intended; but this can be rebutted if the parties made it clear that they did not intend it to be enforceable. The third party must be identified by name, as a member of a class, or answering a particular description and may claim the same remedies for breach as a party to the contract.


, cases such as White v Jones will not come to be regarded as actions in contract, since it must be the contract between the relevant contracting parties which expressly or impliedly confers a benefit on the third party and, in White v Jones, it was the will, rather than the contract which conferred the relevant benefit. The second question above asks if T can seek to rely on a defence contained in the contract between A and B in an action brought against him by A or B. Typically, such cases will involve the question of whether T is entitled to the protection of an exemption clause. Many commercial transactions involve many parties. Typical examples include international trade dealings under which there is a complex of relations between the buyer, seller, carrier and other parties involved in the process of shipment of a cargo. Similarly, many contracts entered into for the purposes of the construction of a building or a ship may involve a number of subcontractors as well as the party commissioning the work and the main contractor. These multipartite relationships are often difficult to explain in terms of traditional rules of the law of contract which appear to treat the two-party contract as the norm. Where exemption clauses are concerned, a simple application of the doctrine of privity of contract would suggest that a third party cannot claim the benefit of such a provision if it is part of a contract between two other parties. If a firm of stevedores, employed by a carrier to unload a cargo, negligently damages goods carried under the terms of a contract of carriage made between the consignor of goods and the carrier, the question may arise whether the stevedore, in an action brought by the purchaser of the cargo, can claim the benefit of an exclusion clause in the contract between the consignor and the carrier which purports to protect both the carrier and the stevedore. Commercial reality suggests that if the risk of loss or damage to a cargo has already passed to the buyer then he should be insured against that risk. Accordingly, since there is likely to be a valid insurance policy covering the risk of damage in the course of unloading, it makes commercial sense for the stevedores to be able to claim the protection of the exemption clause. However, a rigid application of the doctrine of privity of contract in this type of case would mean that the stevedores could be sued for the damage to the cargo despite the fact that the buyer was insured against that risk. The commercial reality approach suggests that there should be a doctrine of vicarious immunity under which the third party may rely upon an exemption clause in a contract to which he is not a party, provided it is the intention of all concerned that the benefit should be extended to such a person. However, the doctrine of vicarious immunity was later rejected by the House of Lords in Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd, where the

1995 ◽  
pp. 772-772

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