scholarly journals Public Entities as Undertakings under Competition Rules

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-243
Author(s):  
Martina Repas
Keyword(s):  
Economic Activity ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Local Communities ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Economic Entity ◽  
Criminal Offenses ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Public Bodies

This paper deals with undertakings, i.e., entities that are obliged to act in accordance with competition rules. This issue is one of the key elements for the application of competition rules. Its importance derives from severe consequences in case of breach of these rules that may give rise to fines, nullity of agreements, and in some regulations, even to criminal offenses. For this purpose, the paper explains the notion of ‘undertaking’ as understood in the EU and Slovenian competition law systems. It deals especially with public bodies such as states, local communities, public institutes, and others that can also qualify as undertakings when they perform activities for pay in the market, and are thus obliged to follow competition rules. A review of the case law shows that many public entities have been under the Competition Authority’s investigation of infringements of competition rules. KEYWORDS: • competition law • public authority • undertaking • economic activity • association of undertakings • single economic entity • EU • Slovenia

scholarly journals What Has Changed in European Concept of Undertaking? From „FENIN“ to „EASY PAY“

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 81-88
Author(s):  
Katarína Kalesná
Keyword(s):  
Economic Activity ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
General Internal ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Regulatory Principle ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Impact

Competition is the main self-regulatory principle of the market in general, internal market included. Competition law has the form of general clauses making its application dependant on the correct interpretation of general concepts. Core competition rules of the Functional Treaty („TFEU“) are addressed to undertakings; undertaking thus belongs to key concepts of competition law. Interpretation of this concept is decisive for the scope of competition rules application. So, the article explores different approaches of the case law to the interpretation of the concept of undertaking based on economic activity.  It compares the FENIN doctrine and the new functional test of separability developed in EASY PAY. It drives attention to the impact of this new test for the evaluation of procurement activities under competition scrutiny.

23. Particular sectors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Transport Sector ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.

2. The Competition Law and Institutions of the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-96
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.

scholarly journals Information exchanges between competitors from a competition law perspective – the problem of premature exchanges of sensitive information in the context of merger control (Gun Jumping)

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-101
Author(s):  
Nuno Calaim Lourenço
Keyword(s):  
Specific Problem ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Sensitive Information ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Market Transparency ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Competition Rules

The topic of information exchanges between competing undertakings is central to competition law. These are practices that enhance market transparency and, as such, can generate significant efficiencies. However, they can also give rise to serious competition concerns, often because they afford competitors the possibility of reaching focal points of coordination. The analysis of information exchanges has traditionally taken place in the context of the legal framework that prohibits cartels. This article reviews, at first, the approach taken in Europe by competition authorities and courts, firmly grounded in the Commission Guidelines and in the most recent case law of the European Court of Justice. After discussing the relevant legal framework and the main criteria for the assessment of information exchanges in detail, the article elaborates on the specific problem that premature exchanges of information between competitors can create in the context of a merger transaction. As the competitors that they are, at least until closing of the deal, it is essential that contracting parties ensure that their due diligence exercise and the planning of the integration of their businesses are carried out in a manner that is consistent with competition rules, avoiding behaviour that can be interpreted as gun-jumping or as a cartel practice and, as a consequence, financial penalties and judicial claims.

scholarly journals The Implementation of the ECN+ Directive in Hungary and Lessons Beyond

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Institutional Aspects ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement

scholarly journals Towards the Effects-based Approach in EU Competition Law: the Assessment of Single Branding Agreements

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang-Chiang Hsieh
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Relevant Factors ◽  
The Eu

This article compares the economic assessments conducted by judicial practice on single branding/exclusive dealing cases between the EU and the U.S. in order to gain insights on how to improve the effects-based approach to competition law. Generally speaking, the U.S. judicial practice presented a more integrated approach to examine the practical effects caused by exclusive dealing arrangements than its EU as well as Taiwanese counterpart. The U.S. cases Tampa and Standard Stations laid down the requirement to weigh the anti-competitive effect with all relevant factors taken into account. More recent cases exemplified the incorporation of the theory of Raising Rivals’ Cost (RRC) into assessment of contested conducts, which enriched the analysis of the practical effects on barriers to entry.In contrast, the EU case law has still been taking a more formalistic approach. Though it is widely acknowledged that analysis of effects on restriction of competition is required as to single branding agreements under Art. 101 TFEU, Delimitis as the leading case failed to clarify the economic logic behind and the economic relationship between the factors required to be examined. The application of Art. 102 TFEU before Intel is close to a per se standard. However, the turn of Van den Bergh and Intel to more consideration of the effect on cost of existing or potential competitors deserves more observation as to future developments. It is argued that the U.S. practice can shed light on EU competition law in two perspectives. Firstly, the test of Delimitis needs to be restructured to examine and weigh the effect of the contested agreements. Secondly, the approach for Art. 102 TFEU could be developed through adoption of similar tests with those conducted in application of Art. 101 TFEU, where assessment of barriers to entry is crucial.

Rule of Law Values in the Decentralized Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
The Eu

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.

Part II Legal Foundations, 4 The Objective of Article 102

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazzini Renato
Keyword(s):  
Productivity Growth ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Legal Foundations ◽  
Teleological Interpretation ◽  
Economic Objective ◽  
The Eu

This chapter identifies the objective of Article 102 through a process of literal and teleological interpretation. The literal interpretation of Article 102 sheds little light on its objective. The only element that points to the purpose of the prohibition is the requirement that abuses of a dominant position are prohibited as ‘incompatible with the internal market’. Therefore, the purpose of Article 102 must be determined in the light of the objectives of the internal market. A literal interpretation of Article 3(3) reveals that the economic objective of the internal market is to maximize long-term social welfare through productivity growth. Therefore, this is also the objective of the EU competition rules and Article 102 in particular. The chapter then looks at the case law on Articles 101 and 102 and the EU Merger regime.

Market Competition

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Critical Dimension ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Global Effect ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 discusses competition law, which offers one of the most prominent examples of the EU’s global regulatory hegemony. This chapter first introduces the key aspects of EU competition law. It then explains why the EU has chosen to build an extensive regulatory capacity in this area, illustrating how competition law forms a critical dimension of the EU’s broader, single market program. Following that, it offers examples of the de facto and de jure Brussels Effects pertaining to competition regulation. These examples illustrate that the de jure Brussels Effect has been extensive. At the same time, the occurrence of the de facto Brussels Effect often turns to the question of non-divisibility, at times enabling while at times limiting the global effect of EU competition rules.

The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 143-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Hard Core ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Right

AbstractPrivate enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.

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