scholarly journals Anatomy of «fatal reforms»: features of party-state control and management in the USSR (mid-1950’s — early 1960’s)

Author(s):  
Kirill Yudin
2020 ◽  
pp. 255-278
Author(s):  
Yoram Gorlizki ◽  
Oleg Khlevniuk

This chapter looks at why Leonid Brezhnev extended the principles of indigenization to the Slavic republics. It assesses the changing balance of co-optation, repression, and political exclusion after Khrushchev. It also discusses how political exclusion took on a more muted form as levels of repression fell. The chapter highlights how Nikita Khrushchev's heirs reunified the regional party committees, dismantled the system of party-state control, dissolved the sovnarkhozy, and reinstated the central industrial ministries. It describes how Brezhnev oversaw a massive infusion of resources into the agricultural sector and adopted a more inclusive, conciliatory approach to the countryside. The chapter also discusses the acknowledgment of the diminished motivational power of Marxism–Leninism, in which functionaries at the Central Committee apparatus turned to Russian nationalism as an agent of mobilization.


2007 ◽  
Vol 189 ◽  
pp. 162-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-sho Ho

As an industrial control strategy, Leninism imposed extensive state-party apparatuses in the workplace. After its defeat in China, the émigré Kuomintang instituted party-state infrastructure in the vast public sector inherited from Japanese colonialism to consolidate its grasp on Taiwan. This article traces the rise and fall of Leninist control in Taiwan's state-owned enterprises. Taiwan's Leninist penetration was deployed after the suppression of the 1947 uprising, and hence failed to overcome the pre-existing ethnic divide between Taiwanese and mainlanders. Further, since the 1960s, widespread moonlinghting has enabled Taiwanese workers to be more psychologically and economically detached from the clientelist network of redistribution. As the political environment turned favourable in the late 1980s, a strong current of workers's movements surged and succeeded in dismantling party-state control in nationalized industry. Taiwan's case reveals the importance of societal embeddedness as a variable that explains the trajectory of Leninist control.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-145
Author(s):  
Fernan Talamayan

Social networking sites have become increasingly relevant in the study of democracy and culture in recent years. This study explores the interconnectedness of social networks, the imposition of state control, and management of social behavior by comparing various literature on the operation of repression in Thai and Philippine cyberspaces. It examines the overt and covert policing of daily interactions in digital environments and unpacks governmental technologies’ disciplinary mechanisms following Michel Foucault’s notion of government and biopolitical power. Subjugation in the context of social networks merits analysis for it sheds light on the practice of active and passive self-censorship—the former driven by the pursuit of a moral self-image and the latter by state-sponsored fear. In tracing various points of convergence and divergence in the practice of cyber control in Thailand and the Philippines, the study found newer domains of regulation of social behavior applicable to today’s democracies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 205630511880878
Author(s):  
Yizhou (Joe) Xu

This project explores the recent censorship of two Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots on Tencent’s popular WeChat messaging platform. Specifically, I am advancing a technographic approach in ways that give agency to bots as not just computing units but as interlocutors and informants. I seek to understand these chatbots through their intended design—by chatting with them. I argue that this methodological inquiry of chatbots can potentially points to fissures and deficiencies within the Chinese censorship machine that allows for spaces of subversion. AI chatbot development China presents a rich site of study because it embodies the extremes of surveillance and censorship. This is all the more important as China have elevated disruptive technologies like AI and big data as critical part of state security and a key component to fulfilling the “Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation.” Whether it is the implementation of a national “social credit” system or the ubiquitous use facial recognition systems, much of Western fears about data security and state control have been already realized in China. Yet, this also implies China is at the frontlines of potential points of resistance and fissures against the party–state–corporate machine. In doing so, I not only seek to raise questions dealing with the limits of our humanity in the light of our AI-driven futures but also present methodological concerns related to human–machine interfacing in conceptualizing new modes of resistance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Sidel ◽  
Ming Hu

Abstract In China, the story of Covid-19 and the relationship between government and civil society is not a sharp break from the past. China has long guided and controlled the development of civil society organizations, and that has not changed in the Covid era. Instead, the Covid era is a story of a continuation in restrictive policy, and responses to Covid have utilized those existing policies and regulatory framework rather than developing new policies for the Covid era. The Chinese story may thus somewhat different from others in this special issue. China is certainly not a story of, in the words of our issue editors, when “pluralist and social democratic visions fade.” The Chinese Party-state’s permission for the reemergence of some kinds of civil society organizations in China since the early 1980s has never been marked by pluralist and social democratic visions. Instead, it has been marked by Party and state control, and clear choices on what kinds of organizations to facilitate and which kinds to repress. That control-based framework has accelerated since the current administration came into office in 2012. Covid has neither upset that restrictive framework nor substantially altered it. Instead, the framework of differentiation and constraint employed by the Chinese state has adapted, in some ways, to the need to control Covid and to control public mobilization on it and against the Party-state. In this brief article we outline the framework of differentiation and constraint that the Chinese Party-state uses to control the Chinese nonprofit sector, and mention a few ways in which that framework has been used in the Covid era.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 550
Author(s):  
Rebecca Supriya Shah

In this paper, I explore how India’s complex regime of control and management of religious institutions and communities—ironically, particularly Hindu institutions—influences the capacity of these institutions to promote various dimensions of human flourishing and socio-economic uplift among the most marginalized. In addition, I provide an overview of India’s highly varied landscape when it comes to the freedom of religious institutions from state control, and in particular discuss how some minority religious institutions experience fewer government constraints on some aspects of their freedom to self-identify and self-govern, especially when compared to some majority institutions, such as Hindu temples. Although some minority institutions still face constraints on certain aspect of their operations, the freedom they have to manage their internal affairs can, at times, translate into greater agility and the ability to innovate and flourish in the context of 21st-century India.


Author(s):  
A. V. Rychkov ◽  

The struggle in Soviet biological and agricultural science is examined through the prism of letters of scientists to Soviet leaders in the 1950s. Scientists’ “letters to power” were an important form of struggle of the scientific community to normalize the situation in the agrarian and scientific sphere under conditions of total party-state control. Considering science to be the most important element of the USSR’s international prestige, scientists who advocated classical genetics considered it necessary to rid biological and agricultural science of external "imperious" influences on the sphere of scientific knowledge. Moreover, some suggested the active use of party-state structures, not excluding law enforcement agencies, against their scientific opponents. Others believed that the shortcomings of the organization of Soviet science could only be eradicated by the scientists themselves, provided that the scientific community was widely involved in identifying the most important scientific areas through free creative discussions. With all the disagreements, the appeals of scientists to Soviet leaders, the author concludes, contributed to a change in public sentiment in favor of genetics. On the contrary, the supporters of Trofim Lysenko by their “letters to power” pursued the goal of maintaining his dominant position in science. Transferring scientific problems to the political plane, they called on Soviet leaders to resolve the contradictions accumulated in the agrarian-scientific sphere by the methods of party-state influence. The rejection of each other's arguments by the scientific opponents did not allow them to reduce the severity of confrontation in biological and agricultural science and did not contribute to scientific research. The appeal of geneticists to the authority of world science in the context of the Cold War further aggravated the situation in the scientific community, since in the opposite camp, this phenomenon was assessed as ideological sabotage. The inertia of such traditions of scientific communication persisted for a long time.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Benney

Microblogs, epitomized by Twitter in the West and Weibo in China, have attracted considerable attention over the past few years. There have been a number of optimistic accounts about their potential to stimulate political activism and social change, juxtaposed with suggestions that their networks are too weak and that they are too easily censored for such change to occur. Yet, in this debate, little attention has been paid to the medium itself; microblogs have too often been treated as mere conduits for information, and the practical and aesthetic experience of microblogging has been marginalized.This article addresses this imbalance in two ways. First, it argues that the microblog is a distinctive medium with special potential for political communication. It applies Rancière’s ‘politics of aesthetics’ and Baudrillard’s ‘private telematics’ to microblogs, suggesting that the particularly immersive quality of microblogs provides new and distinct opportunities for the promotion of opinions and social movements. Second, it argues that by allowing, re-modelling, monitoring and censoring the Weibo service, the Chinese party-state, acting collaboratively with the key microblog companies and the market as a whole, is consciously manipulating the medium of the microblog to reduce the risk of activism, controversial use, and network formation. Thus, the medium of Weibo differs from other microblogs – of which Twitter is the key example – in several important ways, each of which, the article argues, are intended to maximize the cacophonous spectacle of entertainment and to minimize reasoned discussion and debate. Furthermore, while pure censorship of information can be evaded in many ways, it is more difficult for dissenters to evade state control when it is applied to the medium itself.


2012 ◽  
Vol 212 ◽  
pp. 1019-1039 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-sho Ho

AbstractThis article challenges the accepted view that during the period of martial law Taiwan's labour unions were “a useless token.” Focusing on the petroleum and sugar industries, I analyse the incremental process of how party-state control over the labour unions was converted by the workers themselves in Taiwan's national enterprises. In the early 1950s, the KMT's policy of unionizing enterprises was a complementary strategy to reinforce its slow and unsuccessful party-state penetration. With the unions' prominent role in welfare provision, workers were encouraged to develop a sense of stakeholdership. Over the years, labour unions legitimatized the interests of worker members and thus gave rise to an explosion of claim-making activities – what I call “petty bargaining.” By the mid-1980s, labour unions, although still dominated by the KMT, were no longer a Leninist transmission belt, but rather functioned as a de facto complaint centre – an often overlooked precondition for the rise of post-1987 independent labour unionism.


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