David Lewis, David Armstrong and the causal theory of the mind

Problemos ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys

Straipsnyje tiriamos dvi XX a. viduryje išplėtotos funkcionalistinio sąmonės aiškinimo kryptys: D. Armstrongo ir D. Lewiso analitinis funkcionalizmas ir H. Putnamo komputacinis funkcionalizmas. Siekiama parodyti, kad šios dvi kryptys iš esmės sutampa metodologiniu požiūriu, tačiau jų atstovai suteikia savųjų teorijų metodologiniam pagrindui skirtingas ontologines interpretacijas. Sutardami, kad fizikinio būvio ir funkcinio būvio sąvokos skiriasi, jie nesutaria dėl to, ar funkcinio būvio sąvoką reikia laikyti išskiriančia atskirą ontologinę būvių kategoriją, ar ši sąvoka išreiškia tik skirtingą tų pačių fizikinių būvių identifikavimo realiame pasaulyje būdą. Šiame nesutarime iš esmės užsimezga šiuolaikinei sąmonės filosofijai būdinga kontroversija klausimu: savybių ontologija turi būti rekonstruojama intensiniu ar ekstensiniu pagrindu? Pagrindiniai žodžiai: funkcionalizmas, materializmas, įvairiopa realizacija, reduktyvistinės sąmonės teorijos. FUNCTIONALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: METHODOLOGY OR ONTOLOGY?Jonas Dagys SummaryThe article investigates two functionalist accounts of the mind developed in the middle of the 20th century: analytical functionalism of David Armstrong and David Lewis and computational functionalism of Hilary Putnam. The aim is to show that the two accounts are identical from the methodological point of view, but their proponents give different ontological interpretations to the methodological base of their theories. While they agree that the concept of ‘functional state’ is different from the concept of ‘physical state’, they nevertheless disagree on whether ‘functional state’ should be taken to designate a distinct ontological kind of states or it should be taken as expressing a different way of identifying the same physical states in the actual world. This disagreement could be taken to mark the beginning of the controversy characteristic of contemporary philosophy of mind regarding the question whether the ontology of properties should be reconstructed on the intensive or extensive basis.Keywords: functionalism, materialism, multiple realizability, reductive theories of mind.


Philosophy ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 66 (258) ◽  
pp. 517-521
Author(s):  
Katherin A. Rogers

According to David Hume our idea of a necessary connection between what we call cause and effect is produced when repeated observation of the conjunction of two events determines the mind to consider one upon the appearance of the other. No matter how we interpret Hume's theory of causation this explanation of the genesis of the idea of necessity is fraught with difficulty. I hope to show, looking at the three major interpretations of Hume's causal theory, that his account is contradictory, plainly wrong, or (at best) inherently impossible to verify.


2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lewis-Williams ◽  
E. Thomas Lawson ◽  
Knut Helskog ◽  
David S. Whitley ◽  
Paul Mellars

David Lewis-Williams is well-known in rock-art circles as the author of a series of articles drawing on ethnographic material and shamanism (notably connected with the San rock art of southern Africa) to gain new insights into the Palaeolithic cave art of western Europe. Some 15 years ago, with Thomas Dowson, he proposed that Palaeolithic art owed its inspiration at least in part to trance experiences (altered states of consciousness) associated with shamanistic practices. Since that article appeared, the shamanistic hypothesis has both been widely adopted and developed in the study of different rock-art traditions, and has become the subject of lively and sometimes heated controversy. In the present volume, Lewis-Williams takes the argument further, and combines the shamanistic hypothesis with an interpretation of the development of human consciousness. He thus enters another contentious area of archaeological debate, seeking to understand west European cave art in the context of (and as a marker of) the new intellectual capacities of anatomically modern humans. Radiocarbon dates for the earliest west European cave art now place it contemporary with the demise of the Neanderthals around 30,000 years ago, and cave art, along with carved or decorated portable items, appears to announce the arrival and denote the success of modern humans in this region. Lewis-Williams argues that such cave art would have been beyond the capabilities of Neanderthals, and that this kind of artistic ability is unique to anatomically modern humans. Furthermore, he concludes that the development of the new ability cannot have been the product of hundreds of thousands of years of gradual hominid evolution, but must have arisen much more abruptly, within the novel neurological structure of anatomically modern humans. The Mind in the Cave is thus the product of two hypotheses, both of them contentious — the shamanistic interpretation of west European Upper Palaeolithic cave art, and the cognitive separation of modern humans and Neanderthals. But is it as simple as that? Was cave art the hallmark of a new cognitive ability and social consciousness that were beyond the reach of previous hominids? And is shamanism an outgrowth of the hard-wired structure of the modern human brain? We begin this Review Feature with a brief summary by David Lewis-Williams of the book's principal arguments. There follows a series of comments addressing both the meaning of the west European cave art, and its wider relevance for the understanding of the Neanderthal/modern human transition.


Mental fragmentation is the thesis that the mind is fragmented, or compartmentalized. Roughly, this means that an agent’s overall belief state is divided into several sub-states—fragments. These fragments need not make for a consistent and deductively closed belief system. The thesis of mental fragmentation became popular through the work of philosophers like Christopher Cherniak, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker in the 1980s. Recently, it has attracted great attention again. This volume is the first collection of essays devoted to the topic of mental fragmentation. It features important new contributions by leading experts in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Opening with an accessible Introduction providing a systematic overview of the current debate, the fourteen essays cover a wide range of issues: foundational issues and motivations for fragmentation, the rationality or irrationality of fragmentation, fragmentation’s role in language, the relationship between fragmentation and mental files, and the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of implicit attitudes.


2020 ◽  
pp. 87-136
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Platt

Chapter 3 argues that Descartes’ views about mind–body interaction are internally consistent, and compatible with his more general views about causation; thus neither Descartes nor his followers were forced to reject interactionism to maintain mind–body dualism. In some later works, Descartes says that corporeal motions “give occasion” to the mind to form ideas, which are innate to the mind. Section 3.3 argues that these remarks are consistent with his claims in earlier texts that corporeal motions produce or bring about ideas in the mind. This causal theory of sensation seems to be inconsistent with general causal principles that Descartes endorses elsewhere—such as the principle that a cause must contain, “formally or eminently,” whatever it brings about in its effect. But sections 3.3 and 3.4 show that Descartes’ general statements about efficient causation are compatible with the view that bodily motions have the power to elicit sensations in the mind.


Philosophy ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 70 (274) ◽  
pp. 545-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. C. Smart
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

This paper is partly to get rid of some irritation which I have felt at the quite common tendency of philosophers to elucidate (for example) ‘is red’ in terms of ‘looks red’. For a relatively recent example see, for example, Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, ‘An Objectivist′s Guide to Subjectivism about Colour’. However rather than try to make a long list of references, I would rather say ‘No names, no pack drill’. I have even been disturbed to find the use of the words ‘looks red’ that I am opposing ascribed to me by Keith Campbell in his useful article ‘David Armstrong and Realism about Colour’. I am not saying that such talk is necessarily wrong. Talk of ‘looks red’ may be a way of harmlessly referring to the behavioural discriminations with respect to colour of a human percipient. Where it is dangerous, at least to those of us who wish to argue for a broadly physicalist account of the mind, is that it may have concealed overtones of reference to epiphenomenal and irreducibly psychic properties of experiences. Moreover even if it does not do so it may be fence sitting on this issue and liable to misinterpretation.


1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-612
Author(s):  
Jaegwon Kim

At the outset of his instructive and thought-provoking paper, ‘The Nature of Possibility,’ Professor David Armstrong gives a succinct description, in itself almost complete, of his ‘combinatorial theory’ of possibility. He says: ‘Such a view traces the very idea of possibility to the idea of the combinations - allthe combinations which respect certain simple form- of given, actual elements’ (575). We can perhaps start a bit further back than this. In explaining the idea of a ‘possible world,’ some philosophers begin with the idea of ‘things being a certain way’ or ‘the way things are.’ From this idea a leap is made to ‘things might have been a certain other way’ or ‘ways things could have been.’ And here we already have possible worlds, or so some philosophers assure us: David Lewis, for example, says his talk of possible worlds is nothing but a ‘permissible paraphrase’ of this familiar and innocent-sounding locution, ‘ways things could have been.'


2021 ◽  
pp. 130-153
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Burnston

According to the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), genuine actions are individuated by their causal history. Actions are bodily movements that are causally explained by citing the agent’s reasons. Reasons are then explained as some combination of propositional attitudes—beliefs, desires, and/or intentions. The CTA is thus committed to realism about the attitudes. This chapter explores current models of decision-making from the mind sciences, and argues that it is far from obvious how to locate the propositional attitudes in the causal processes they describe. The outcome of the analysis is a proposal for pluralism: there are several ways one could attempt to map states like ‘intention’ onto decision-making processes, but none will fulfill all of the roles attributed to the attitudes by the CTA.


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