scholarly journals The changing political identity of the "Overseas Chinese" in Australian Politics

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-138
Author(s):  
Chongyi Feng

This paper explores the role played by the Chinese communities in the Australian politics of multicultural democracy from the perspective of political socialisation and resocialisation. It argues that there is no such a thing as inherent “cultural values” or “national values” that differentiate ‘the Chinese” politically from the mainstream Australian society. This paper focuses on the Chinese nationalism of Han Chinese migrants in Australia. Within the “new mainland migrants” who have come to Australia directly from the PRC since the 1980s, nationalism is much weaker among the Tiananmen/ June 4 generation who experienced pro-democracy activism during their formative years in the 1980s. Nationalism is much stronger among the Post-Tiananmen Generation who are victims of the “patriotism campaign” in the 1990s when the Chinese Communist party-state sought to replace discredited communism with nationalism as the major ideology for legitimacy.

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Chan ◽  
Stewart Clegg ◽  
Matthew Warr

Under socialist development, the contemporary Chinese Communist Party (CCP) refashions thought management with a changed message. The Party increasingly promotes Chinese cultural values, through a policy of designed corporate culture programs within state-owned and private enterprises. The culture is one that inculcates corporate cultural values “imported” from corporate culture discourses in the Western business world. A curious “translation of ideas” has occurred, ideas that have traveled from the Korean Peninsula and War, through the boardrooms of corporate America and into the mundane practices of the CCP, to build corporate culture. At the core of this culture are practices that Schein has termed coercive persuasion. This article discusses the role of coercive persuasion in two sites: (a) China’s state-owned enterprises and (b) private businesses and social organizations. We conclude that as ideas travel, they may change in substance, whereas in form and functionality, they remain surprisingly similar.


Modern China ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 322-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ding Xiaodong

This article argues that the Chinese Communist Party has adopted a unique understanding of law. Unlike the liberal view and the unwritten constitution view, which generally consider law as positive norms that exist independently of politics, the party understands law as a reflection of the party’s and the people’s will and a form of the party’s and the people’s self-discipline. In the party’s view, liberal rule of law theories are self-contradictory, illusive, and meaningless. This article argues that the party views the people as a political concept and itself as a political leading party, marking a fundamental difference from a competitive party in a parliamentary system. The legitimacy of the party’s dominant role and the party-state regime, therefore, depends on whether the party can continue to provide political momentum to lead the people and represent them in the future.


Author(s):  
Taomo Zhou

This chapter examines the memoirs, diaries, poems, and theater scripts written by Ba Ren, an undercover member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and a writer, and those who used to work with him in the 1940s. It contends that the CCP was better able than its Nationalist rival to capture the hearts and minds of young overseas Chinese by expanding its political networks and promoting cross-ethnic alliances among the working class. In the 1940s, the CCP built its support base among the overseas Chinese through the education and publishing efforts of left-wing intellectuals like Ba Ren who traveled from Mainland China to Southeast Asia and worked as teachers and journalists in overseas Chinese communities. The subsequent rise of literacy and increasing availability of left-wing publications created a generation of revolutionary-minded ethnic Chinese youth. Through supplies, information, and refuge provided by these young people during the Japanese occupation, the CCP established underground offices in Sumatra, which were hidden behind the counters of pastry shops, Chinese medicine companies, soap factories, and wineries. It was the enthusiasm of these left-leaning youth that allowed openly active pro-CCP civic associations and political organizations to blossom during the Indonesian National Revolution.


1994 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 1052-1079 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph W. Esherick

It used to be a truism that 20th-century China witnessed one of the great peasant revolutions of world history. The Chinese Communist Party built a popular base in the countryside, and eventually a massive army of peasant soldiers surrounded the cities and drove the urban-based Kuomintang from the Mainland. In the comparative literature, the Chinese revolution was classified as a peasant revolution, and a number of important studies sought to explain the social origins of that phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Reardon

Establishing a totalitarian state after 1949, Chinese Communist Party elites formulated religious regulations that ensured strong national security and guaranteed the Party’s hegemonic control of the state. The party state eliminated all foreign religious connections and established Party-controlled religious organizations to co-opt the five recognized official religious beliefs. By the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong prohibited all religious beliefs except in himself. As the post-totalitarianism of the 1980s evolved into consultative authoritarianism of the 1990s, Communist elites resurrected the Party-controlled religious organizations and implemented a new series of religious regulations in 1994 and 2005 that permitted the operation of officially recognized religions to strengthen moral standards and to supplement the state’s social welfare functions. Facing perceived challenges from foreign religions and fearing the growing popularity of religious belief, the party state adopted a third set of religious regulations in 2017 to strengthen Party hegemony.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Huwy-Min Lucia Liu

This article discusses how the Chinese Communist Party governed death in Shanghai during the first half of the People's Republic of China. It examines how officials nationalized funeral institutions, promoted cremation, and transformed what they believed to be the unproductivity of the funeral industry into productivity (by raising pigs in cemeteries, for instance). I show how each of these policies eliminated possible sources of identity that were prevalent in conceptualizing who the dead were and what their relationships with the living could be. Specifically, in addition to the construction of socialist workers, the state worked to remove cosmopolitan, associational, religious, and relational ideas of self. By modifying funerary rituals and ways of interment, the Chinese state aimed to produce individualized and undifferentiated political subjects directly tied to the party-state. The civil governance of death aimed to produce citizen-subjects at the end of life.


2019 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-664
Author(s):  
Ivan Franceschini ◽  
Christian Sorace

Since their appearance in the mid-1990s, Chinese labour NGOs have mostly focused on disseminating labour law and guiding labour disputes through official channels. In so doing, they have assisted the Chinese Communist Party in achieving its paramount goal of maintaining social stability. In line with this approach, activists in these organizations have traditionally framed their work in terms of "public interest" or "legality," both of which resonate with the hegemonic discourses of the Party-state. However, earlier this decade a minority of Chinese labour activists began to employ some new counterhegemonic narratives centred on the experience of the labour movement and the practice of collective bargaining that attempted to recode the proletarian experience outside of its official representation. In this paper we analyze this discursive shift through the voices of the activists involved, and argue that the rise of these new counterhegemonic voices was one of the reasons that led to the Party-state cracking down on labour NGOs.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-223
Author(s):  
Ka-Ming Wu

This article examines how Chinese national values are imparted to and through the recent phenomenon of ceremonial volunteers or etiquette volunteers (liyi zhiyuan). These volunteers are all young college women who serve at major national events by greeting guests, ushering, and holding ceremonial ribbons. They are supposed to embody Confucian ritual values and the practices of propriety that define China as a nation of civilization through their roles as ceremonial hostesses. This feminine symbol of national tradition and cultural virtues is realized through a heavy emphasis on discipline, physical training, compliance to authority, and collectivism expressed through the ways the performances are staged and mass mediated. This article argues that the ceremonial volunteer represents a new state effort to engineer a model woman citizen by combining the Confucian discourse on etiquette, the communist party-state discourse on militarization and strong womanhood, the communist sport tradition of body training, and the latest initiatives on volunteering. The result is the making of gendered national subjects, marking new values of class, femininity, and nationalism. This article contributes to the understanding of emergent values about gender, class, volunteering, and the important roles they play in the process of citizen making in today's China.


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