scholarly journals U.S. Semiconductor Exports to China: Current Policies and Trends

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saif Khan

The United States has long used export controls to prevent the proliferation of advanced semiconductors and the inputs necessary to produce them. With Beijing building up its own chipmaking industry, the United States has begun tightening restrictions on exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. This brief provides an overview of U.S. semiconductor export control policies and analyzes the impacts of those policies on U.S.-China trade.

1990 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Hofhansel

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes differences between United States and West German export controls. It shows that United States controls are more extensive and stricter than controls in West Germany. Three possible explanations for this variation in policy are considered. First, these two states differ in regard to their positions in the international system and in their choice of economic strategies. Second, the extent of domestic political support for strict export control policies varies between the two countries. Finally, West Germany lacks the institutional framework to adequately control its foreign trade. The evidence presented corroborates the first two alternatives, while institutional explanations receive relatively little support. The article then discusses the historical development of United States and West German export control policies and institutions. The analysis shows evidence of both change and stability. More specifically, the article questions the argument that institutions in foreign economic policy, once established, persist and resist change, instead of adapting to environmental changes. Several hypotheses are considered to explain why in the area of export controls changes in policy, and to some extent institutions, occurred more frequently in West Germany than in the United States.


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Luo

After World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and the export controls of conventional weapons and civilian and military dual use technologies have been one of the most important focal point of international cooperation. Many international treaties have been signed and the international organizations have been established to promote these non-proliferation and export control efforts. The industrialized countries and the developing countries of China, India, and Pakistan that possess nuclear weapons and missile technologies have also enacted domestic laws and set up administrative regimes to control these goods and technologies from flowing to other countries or undesirable people. Among these countries, the United States has been the leader strongly advocating non-proliferation of WMD and export controls of civilian and military dual use goods. In fact, the United States has established a very sophisticated export control system to prevent its weapons and technologies from going to the hands of any adversaries. Because the complicities and overlaps of international treaties and domestic laws on this topic, it warrants a research guide for would-be researchers to walk through the maze of international and domestic export control regimes.


Subject China's plan to blacklist foreign firms for denying supplies to Chinese customers. Significance China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is responding to US export controls by creating a new tool to punish foreign businesses that curtail supplies to Chinese enterprises for non-commercial reasons: the Unreliable Entity List (UEL). China has not shied away from targeting foreign businesses for political reasons in the past. The UEL gives it a much more powerful tool to do so. Impacts The United States is the target for now, but once in place the UEL can easily be used against other countries. An export control bill now in the works will hasten the decoupling of China and the West. Foreign firms in sensitive sectors may opt to curtail their presence in China preventatively, or curry greater favour with Beijing.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Fedasiuk ◽  
◽  
Jennifer Melot ◽  
Ben Murphy

This report examines nearly 350 artificial intelligence-related equipment contracts awarded by the People’s Liberation Army and state-owned defense enterprises in 2020 to assess how the Chinese military is adopting AI. The report identifies China’s key AI defense industry suppliers, highlights gaps in U.S. export control policies, and contextualizes the PLA’s AI investments within China’s broader strategy to compete militarily with the United States.


2021 ◽  
pp. 187-217
Author(s):  
Joop Voetelink

AbstractThe sovereignty of states is reflected in the notion of jurisdiction, empowering them to enact and enforce laws and regulations, and to adjudicate disputes in court. The jurisdiction of states and the exercise thereof is primarily territorial, limiting the exercise of state authority to their respective national territories except in specific situations. However, in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, it would be hard to maintain that a state should be denied the right to exercise its sovereign powers beyond national borders when there are reasonable grounds for doing so. Consequently, the exercise of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction has become more accepted, although it is limited to particular situations and circumstances. These have to do with the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals, vessels and aircraft registered in or pertaining to the legislating state, as well as certain activities aimed at undermining the state’s security or solvency or which constitute crimes under international law. However, in principle it is not allowed to regulate activities of foreign nationals or entities operating wholly outside the legislating state’s territory. One area where this has become increasingly prevalent is through the exercise of export controls over foreign nationals and legal persons. The United States (US) has long been engaged in the exercise of this type of extraterritorial jurisdiction and is, without doubt, the state that is most proactive in doing so. This chapter considers US extraterritorial claims with respect to its export control and sanctions legislation and explores the limits of this practice under public international law.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Hunt ◽  
Saif M. Khan ◽  
Dahlia Peterson

To reduce its dependence on the United States and its allies for semiconductors, China is building domestic semiconductor manufacturing facilities by importing U.S., Japanese, and Dutch semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In the longer term, it also hopes to indigenize this equipment to replace imports. U.S. and allied policy responses to China’s efforts will significantly affect its prospects for success in this challenging task.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-55
Author(s):  
Mohamad Zreik

AbstractThe Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued a statement Friday morning, July 6, 2018, confirming the outbreak of a trade war between the United States and China. The statement came after the United States imposed tariffs on many Chinese goods, in violation of international and bilateral agreements, and the destruction of the concept of free trade which the United States calls for following it. It is a war of opposite directions, especially the contradiction between the new Trump policy and the Chinese approach. The proof is what US Defense Secretary James Matisse announced in Singapore in early June 2018 of “the full strategy of the new United States, in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific,” where China was the “sole enemy of the United States” in China’s geostrategic region. Intentions have become publicized, and trade war between the two economic giants is turning into a reality. This paper will give an overview of the US-China scenario of trade war, then a focused analysis on the Trump’s administration economic decision regarding China, and the consequences of this decision.


Significance Follow-on action from Washington and responses from foreign actors will shape the US government’s adversarial policy towards China in semiconductors and other strategic technologies. Impacts The Biden administration will likely conclude that broad-based diversion of the semiconductor supply chain away from China is not feasible. The United States will rely on export controls and political pressure to prevent diffusion to China of cutting-edge chip technologies. The United States will focus on persuading foreign semiconductor leaders to help develop US capabilities, thereby staying ahead of China. Washington will focus on less direct approaches to strategic technology competition with China, notably technical standards-setting. Industry leaders in the semiconductor supply chain worldwide will continue expanding business in China in less politically sensitive areas.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document