scholarly journals Officers Under the Appointments Clause

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Plecnik
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Internal Revenue Service ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Tax Court ◽  
Hearing Officers ◽  
Previous Scholarship ◽  
The U.S

Much ink has been spilled, and many keyboards worn, debating the definition of “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution.  Most recently, this debate has focused on the denizens of the Office of Appeals of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  In Tucker I, the U.S. Tax Court faced the question of whether the settlement officers, appeals officers, and appeals team managers (collectively, IRS hearing officers) within the Office of Appeals are Officers or mere employees. In Tucker II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) faced the same question on appeal. Both courts sided with the IRS in holding that none of the above are Officers.  Although it hardly seems controversial to agree with the Tax Court and D.C. Circuit when the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari in the case, remarkably, all previous scholarship disputes the outcome of the Tucker decisions. This Article will defend that outcome as a proper application of Supreme Court precedent.

The Justiciability of Paraguay’s Claim of Treaty Violation

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Fisler Damrosch
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Government’s position asserting nonjusticiability of the treaty claims raised by Paraguay in the domestic and international lawsuits is disturbing. The Government’s amicus filings at the court of appeals and the Supreme Court denied that Paraguay’s claims belonged in federal court (or indeed in any court at all); at die International Court of Justice, the United States admitted a treaty violation but denied the competence of that tribunal to enter a judicial remedy. At one or another phase of these proceedings, the U.S. Government pressed a variety of arguments that (if accepted) would rule out virtually any judicial consideration of a treaty-based claim. The haste with which the Supreme Court denied a stay in Breard’s case foreclosed adequate consideration of the justiciability of such claims in domestic courts and also effectively barred Paraguay from achieving the relief it sought on the international plane.

scholarly journals Elonis v. United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: Protecting Our Ever-Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the New Era of Communication

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
New Era ◽  
The Public ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The U.S

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.

Antitrust: U.S. Supreme Court Affirms FTC Jurisdiction but Vacates Scope of Analysis on CDA Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Ninth Circuit ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Business Financing ◽  
The U.S

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.

Questions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Gibson ◽  
Michael J. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
African Americans ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Public Support ◽  
The United States ◽  
Future Research ◽  
White Americans ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The U.S

We have investigated the differences in support for the U.S. Supreme Court among black, Hispanic, and white Americans, catalogued the variation in African Americans’ group attachments and experiences with legal authorities, and examined how those latter two factors shape individuals’ support for the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court’s decisions, and for their local legal system. We take this opportunity to weave our findings together, taking stock of what we have learned from our analyses and what seem like fruitful paths for future research. In the process, we revisit Positivity Theory. We present a modified version of the theory that we hope will guide future inquiry on public support for courts, both in the United States and abroad.

Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Rep. Venez. (3D Cir.)

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Kevin D. Benish
Keyword(s):  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Decision To Leave ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Third ◽  
To Come ◽  
Alter Ego ◽  
Oil Company ◽  
The U.S

On May 18, 2020, the United States Supreme Court denied a request by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), to review the merits of Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Crystallex, the Third Circuit affirmed a trial court's determination that PDVSA is the “alter ego” of Venezuela itself, thus permitting Crystallex to enforce a $1.4 billion judgment against Venezuela by attaching property held in PDVSA's name. Given the Supreme Court's decision to leave the Third Circuit's opinion undisturbed, Crystallex is a significant decision that may affect parties involved in transnational litigation for years to come—especially those pursuing or defending against U.S. enforcement proceedings involving the property of foreign states.

scholarly journals Immunizing the Flock: How the Pandemic Court Rewrote Religious Freedom

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Paul Baumgardner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
The United States ◽  
Religious Practices ◽  
The Past ◽  
The U.S

When coronavirus began to descend upon the United States, religious freedom advocates across the country sounded the alarm that citizens’ religious practices and institutions were under threat. Although some of the most extreme arguments championed by these advocates were not validated by our legal system, many were. This article explores the underappreciated gains made by religious freedom advocates before the U.S. Supreme Court over the past year. As a result of the “Pandemic Court”, religious freedom in the United States has been rewritten. This promises to radically change the educational, employment, and health prospects of millions of Americans for the rest of the pandemic and long afterwards.

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