scholarly journals Don’t Join the Joyride:

2019 ◽  
pp. 5-19
Author(s):  
Kjetil Mangset Skjerve ◽  
Trygve Lavik
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Good Time ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Large Group ◽  
Climate Ethics ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Undesirable Outcome

The paper argues that, counter to Walter Sinnott-Armostrong and Ewen Kingston’s view, we are morally required to refrain from joyguzzling, i.e., driving a fuel-inefficient car for no other purpose than having a good time. It is undisputed that joyguzzling is an example of a situation where the uncoordinated actions of a large group of individuals lead to an undesirable outcome. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that any one individual’s actions will have a significant impact on that outcome. But there are morally relevant differences between cases that share these characteristics.  The paper clarifies the debate by introducing and discussing three different types of cases: drop-in-the-ocean cases, overkill cases and emergence cases. We argue that we may have moral obligations in drop-in-the-ocean cases, and that emissions of GHGs are not examples of overkill cases.   Then we demonstrate through counterexamples that there are moral obligations in a subgroup of emergence cases we call joyguzzling-like cases. After criticizing the soundness of Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments, we critically address their relevance. We argue that Sinnott-Armstrong and Kingston fail to distinguish between two concepts of moral obligation — namely, autonomous and heteronomous moral obligation; that their most important arguments do not have any relevance to heteronomous obligations; and, finally, that heteronomous moral obligations are essential for social change. Keywords: joyguzzling, individual responsibility, climate ethics, harm principle, autonomous vs. heteronomous moral obligations

Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajen A. Anderson ◽  
Benjamin C. Ruisch ◽  
David A. Pizarro
Keyword(s):  
Moral Character ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Different Types

Abstract We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.

Climate Ethics

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Gardiner ◽  
Simon Caney ◽  
Dale Jamieson ◽  
Henry Shue
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Environmental Science ◽  
Human Dimensions ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
General Reference ◽  
Science And Policy ◽  
Climate Ethics ◽  
Climate Economics ◽  
Intergenerational Ethics

This collection gathers a set of seminal papers from the emerging area of ethics and climate change. Topics covered include human rights, international justice, intergenerational ethics, individual responsibility, climate economics, and the ethics of geoengineering. Climate Ethics is intended to serve as a source book for general reference, and for university courses that include a focus on the human dimensions of climate change. It should be of broad interest to all those concerned with global justice, environmental science and policy, and the future of humanity.

MORAL OBLIGATION AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CONCERNS FROM IMMANUEL KANT, G. W. F. HEGEL, AND ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Tristram Engelhardt
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Important Change ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Presence Of God ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Status

AbstractOnce God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.

GOALS, LUCK, AND MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-316
Author(s):  
R. G. Frey
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Obligations

AbstractIn Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work.

Individual Responsibility for Promoting Global Health

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-126
Author(s):  
Nicole Hassoun
Keyword(s):  
Global Health ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Access To Medicines ◽  
Health Impact ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Pharmaceutical Companies

If Global Health Impact labeling is successful, it will give companies a reason to produce drugs that will save millions of lives. One might wonder, however, whether consumers have any moral obligation to purchase goods from Global Health Impact–certified companies or whether purchasing these goods is even morally permissible. The fourth chapter suggests that, if the proposal is implemented, there is reason to purchase goods from Global Health Impact–certified companies. It defends something along the lines of this argument: (1) pharmaceutical companies violate rights and (2) do not do enough to address the access to medicines issue, so (3) if the Global Health Impact initiative helps rectify these problems, people should generally purchase goods from certified companies.

Discretionary Moral Duties

2019 ◽  
pp. 50-72
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Mutual Aid ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Duties

The topic of Chapter 3 is the idea that there are discretionary moral duties, i.e., duties that cede to the agent who stands under them wide latitude in determining the actions that count as satisfying them. The chapter offers a general framework for thinking about moral obligations, which construes such obligations in essentially relational terms. It then draws on this conception of moral obligation to understand two classes of obligations that are intuitively understood to exhibit wide agential discretion: duties of gratitude and of mutual aid. It argues that the wide agential discretion apparent in these cases makes sense against the background of an understanding of morality as a set of directed obligations that we owe to each other, as individuals. A further important theme is the standing of morality as a source of requirements that make it possible for agents to relate to each other on a basis of autonomy and equality.

scholarly journals Review of Terms and Definitions Used in Descriptions of Running Shoes

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (10) ◽  
pp. 3562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Marchena-Rodriguez ◽  
Ana Belen Ortega-Avila ◽  
Pablo Cervera-Garvi ◽  
David Cabello-Manrique ◽  
Gabriel Gijon-Nogueron
Keyword(s):  
Motion Control ◽  
Literature Search ◽  
Web Of Science ◽  
Google Scholar ◽  
Inclusion Criteria ◽  
Large Group ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
Running Shoes ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Definition Of

Objective: Our study aim is to identify and describe the definitions used for different types of running shoes. In addition, we highlight the existence of gaps in these concepts and propose possible new approaches. Methods: This review was undertaken in line with the guidelines proposed by Green et al., based on a literature search (until December 2019) of the PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, SPORTDiscus and Google Scholar databases. A total of 23 papers met the inclusion criteria applied to identify the definition of running shoes. Results: Although there is a certain consensus on the characteristics of minimalist footwear, it is also described by other terms, such as barefoot-style or barefoot-simulating. Diverse terms are also used to describe other types of footwear, and in these cases, there is little or no consensus regarding their characteristics. Conclusions: The terms barefoot-simulated footwear, barefoot-style footwear, lightweight shoes and full minimalist shoes are all used to describe minimalist footwear. The expressions partial minimalist, uncushioned minimalist and transition shoes are used to describe footwear with non-consensual characteristics. Finally, labels such as shod shoes, standard cushioned running shoes, modern shoes, neutral protective running shoes, conventional, standardised, stability style or motion control shoes span a large group of footwear styles presenting different properties.

The Obligation Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Skeptical Conclusion

This book argues for the prima facie plausibility of the surprising and paradoxical conclusion that there are no moral obligations regardless of whether determinism is true. In the form of a dilemma, the primary argument for this skeptical conclusion presupposes that obligation requires freedom. A minimal number of credible principles entail that this is the freedom both to do, and to refrain from doing, what is obligatory. On the deterministic horn of the dilemma, since determinism eliminates freedom to do otherwise, it imperils moral obligation. On the indeterministic horn, pertinent actions are too luck-infected to qualify as obligations. Hence, there are no moral obligations. The book’s principal goal is to develop the obligation dilemma as powerfully and clearly as possible to inspire sustained philosophical work to solve it (assuming that it can be solved). In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the venerable responsibility dilemma: regardless of whether determinism is true, no one is morally responsible for anything. The book shows that various prevalent moves in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma are, when suitably amended, not promising as supportive of, or retorts to, the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma’s implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to salutary interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency.

scholarly journals Undesirable Postoperative Anesthesia Outcomes at Two National Referral Hospitals: A Cross-Sectional Study in Eritrea

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Yonatan Mehari Andemeskel ◽  
Traudl Elsholz ◽  
Ghidey Gebreyohannes ◽  
Eyasu H. Tesfamariam
Keyword(s):  
Postoperative Pain ◽  
Cross Sectional Study ◽  
Care Patient ◽  
Sectional Study ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Referral Hospitals ◽  
Postoperative Problems ◽  
Undesirable Outcome

Background. Postoperative undesirable anesthesia outcomes are common among patients undergoing surgery. They may affect body systems and lead into more serious postoperative problems. This research is conducted in the Eritrean National Referral Hospitals with the aim of assessing the prevalence of undesirable anesthesia outcomes during the postoperative period. Method. A cross-sectional study design was applied on 470 patients who underwent different types of surgeries within a three-month period. Patients were interviewed 24 hours after operation (POD 1) using the Leiden Perioperative care Patient Satisfaction questionnaire (LPPSq). This study reports one component of a large study conducted. The dimension “Discomfort and needs” of the LPPSq was considered, and the measurements of that dimension are presented in this report. Items of the dimension were standardized and measured using a five-point Likert scale from “Not at all” to “Extremely.” Multivariable logistic regression was used to look for the association of the outcomes with the types of surgery and types of anesthesia using SPSS (Version 22). Results. The prevalence were computed in two manners, prevalence of those with ‘at least a little bit’ outcomes, which was computed to see the total occurrence of these outcomes, and prevalence of those having ‘more than moderate’ outcomes to see the severe experience of these outcomes. Prevalence of the predominant undesirable outcome, postoperative pain, for ‘at least a little bit’ and ‘more than moderate’ were 82.6% and 43.6%, respectively. The rest of the postoperative undesirable outcomes were less frequently reported. Conclusion. Postoperative pain was found to be the most prevalent undesirable outcome. Enhancement of proper assessment and management of postoperative pain through the development and implementation of specific pain management modalities is needed.

“BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG”

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Darwall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Reactive Attitudes ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Reason For Action

AbstractIs the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest “buck-passing” about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but “passes the buck” to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of normative concepts entail buck-passing with respect to reasons for the specific attitudes that are inherently involved in the concept, the concepts of moral obligation and wrong are normative not in the first instance for action, but for a distinctive set of attitudes (Strawsonian “reactive attitudes”) through which we hold ourselves and one another answerable for our actions. On this analysis, moral obligations are demands we legitimately make as representative persons, and the fact that an act would violate such a demand, and so disrespect the authority these demands presuppose, is indeed a reason not to perform the wrongful act that is additional to whatever features make the act wrong.

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